

The Month in Review

ONE YEAR after the riots for "bread and freedom" in Poznan, a year choked with shocks that threatened, at times, to shatter the Soviet Union's East European Empire, the area seems for the moment to have subsided into a wary, nervous and unstable equilibrium. In Hungary that equilibrium is most explicitly enforced by the shadow of Soviet guns; there was a wry and bitter reminder of this in the belated signing of an "agreement" between Moscow and the Kadar puppet regime on the Soviet troop garrison in the country. In Romania, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria the memory of the bloody Soviet repression is a tacit accompaniment to the flow of demands for conformity to the will of Party and State, demands decreasingly leavened by references to the "liberalizing" Twentieth Soviet Party Congress. Even in Poland, which still pursues its cautious dissidence from the strict Moscow line, the attempt to mend the facade-shattering blows of the year's events was symbolized in a visit by Party head Gomulka to East Germany, which of all the Satellites had most opposed Poland's October Revolution and Poland's thrusts toward liberalization.



This areawide tendency to control and freeze the flow of change is opposed by the developing influence of the Chinese Communist Party. In recent months the Chinese ideological innovations signalized by the phrases "Let all flowers blossom" and "non-antagonistic contradictions" have been increasingly discussed in Poland, and have forced their way into the press of the rest of the area, if only in dilute and distorted form. Much of this discussion had been based on rumors and hearsay reports of a February speech by Chinese head of State Mao Tse-tung. In the middle of June an official version of this speech was released. It confirmed the statements of the liberalizing Polish Communists that Mao had made an important ideological departure from the Moscow line in permitting a relatively free atmosphere of political and literary discussion, and in admitting the possibility of "contradictions" between a people and its Communist rulers. The full text of the speech, however, revealed what the Polish liberals had not, for obvious reasons, brought up: the limits put by Mao to the degree of liberalization his ideological innovations permit. "Revisionism," of which the Polish liberals have lately been accused, and which seems to mean any real deviation from ultimate Party control, was bitterly condemned by Mao, and he gave explicit standards, all aimed at the maintenance of that control, by which the right of flowers to blossom must be judged.

Despite these limits, the Chinese influence, as it has been polarized in Eastern Europe against Soviet influence, is toward liberalization or, at the least, against regressions toward "Stalinism." Poland's Gomulka, whose speech to the recent Ninth Plenum of the Polish Party's Central Committee hewed a middle line between the Soviet-guided "Stalinists" and the liberals impatient for more and faster reform, used the prestige of the Chinese Party as a defense of his position against "Stalinist" attacks. Indeed, although the official account of Gomulka's speech and the ensuing Plenum discussions made it seem that the Party leader's criticisms and strictures were more heavily directed against the liberals than the

"Stalinists," subsequent unofficial reports made it clear that in fact this view was unbalanced. These reports state that when in the discussions after his speech Gomulka was the target of far-reaching attacks from the "Stalinist" wing of the Party, he counter-attacked vigorously, indicating that despite his moderation and his restrictions on liberal expression he intends no major capitulation to the Party "Stalinists."

The Hungarian regime has permitted its press to take fairly detailed notice of the Chinese theses, but only to underline that they cannot be applied to Hungary. In other Satellites there is, as yet, only a tightly controlled seepage of the Chinese theses into the press, largely limited to quotation without serious discussion.

In Hungary the hidden terror continues, coming to the surface only in a series of announcements of executions carried out and prison sentences imposed. Among those marked for death was an associate of Pal Maleter, who led the Hungarian Army in fighting the Soviets during the Revolt and was taken prisoner at the final Soviet onslaught even as he was negotiating with the Soviets on the promised troop withdrawals. It is believed that Maleter is shortly to appear on trial; such a trial, if it is staged, will doubtless be a carefully managed propaganda show-piece. Aside from the terse official announcements of trials and executions, unofficial reports indicate that the repression is widespread, that the prisons are being packed with workers and students who participated in the Revolt, and that the torture cellars of the security police, briefly revealed to the world during the uprising, have again closed upon their victims. Kadar himself appears to be in an increasingly difficult position. As backstage maneuvering in preparation for the first national conference of the post-Revolt Party reached its climax, the puppet Premier was subject to pressures from a number of factions jockeying for power.

In the past month the Czechoslovak regime indicated in a number of ways its determination to act as if the past year, including the abortive Czechoslovak intellectual ferment of last summer, had not really happened. A Congress of the Czechoslovak Journalists' Union convened in Prague to hear First Party Secretary Novotny line out the doctrine that the function of the press "is to struggle for the realization of the policy of the Communist Party." No hint of the sort of ferment that has elsewhere marked journalists' convocations was permitted expression.

The Czechoslovak regime has also continued its spy scare with a further series of arrests and trials of persons accused of being Western agents, particularly of NATO, recently a favorite target for this sort of propaganda. Finally, the regime symbolized its devotion to the classical forms of Communist domination by staging an "election" for national councils, local administrative organs, in which the unopposed regime slate received a monolithic 99.2 percent of the vote.

The period of rapid development in Eastern Europe seems, for the moment, halted. Even in Poland, changes toward further liberalization tend increasingly to be trivial, and some liberals, once most fervent in their ardor for change, seem increasingly to sink into disengaged apathy. However, as if to remind us of the great distance that East Europe has traversed in the past year, the Albanian regime, which alone among the Satellites never moved beyond Stalinism, staged a charade in the grimmest Stalinist tradition. After Major General Plaku's recent unexplained flight to Yugoslavia, the official Party paper published a letter purportedly from his mother, his brother and his sister-in-law, in which they dutifully cursed the departed. "May he be cursed; may he never have a happy day; may he perish like a dog, like a filthy traitor," the letter read, in part. Just that sort of Stalinist obscenity, at least, is now unimaginable anywhere else in the Satellite bloc.

My Beliefs

by Imre Nagy

A Dissertation Addressed to the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party

Editor's Foreword

IMRE NAGY was Premier of Hungary between October 24 and November 4, 1956. He was called back to power from forced political retirement by a tottering Party no longer able to control an aroused nation. In the few tumultuous days of his rule he declared Hungary's neutrality, taking the country out of the Moscow-controlled Warsaw Pact; he formed a coalition government and agreed to the reconstitution of democratic parties; he appealed for help to the United Nations and clearly sided with his own people in their fight for freedom and independence from Soviet domination. When the Soviets marched in he took refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy and, after being promised safe-conduct, was deported to Romania on leaving this sanctuary.

Behind these facts and all the glare of publicity that was focussed on Hungary in its tragic days, there remained the complex enigma of Imre Nagy himself. The world had known him as a convinced Communist who, in his first tenure as Premier between July 1953 and March 1955, had introduced a reformist New Course program to remedy the ills of the previous Stalinist period. But after he had been ousted from the leadership in the Spring of 1955 nothing more had been heard from him, except indirectly in vicious attacks on him by his former Comrades in the Party. He had tried to save his Party and country from disaster; for more than a year and a half he had been forced to watch in silence and disgrace as his adversaries, Rakosi and Gero, systematically set about reversing the policies he had inaugurated.

Had the calumny and the bitterness of failure driven him away from the Party? Did he still think, as he re-assumed power on October 24, that his New Course program could steer the country to clear waters? What had been his reactions to the disclosures of the Twentieth Party Congress, to the ferment in Poland and in his own country? Were his actions in the Revolt undertaken out of conviction or as a result of popular pressure?

The enigma is partially solved. We now possess the complete text of a dissertation some 115,000 words long, written by Imre Nagy during his forced retirement before the Revolt and addressed to his former Comrades on the Central Committee. It contains Nagy's beliefs on all the major aspects of Party and government policies with references to the Stalinist period, his own New Course program and the developing ferment some time before the Revolt. It is a truly remarkable document, because it was meant exclusively for the ears and eyes of high Party officials. It therefore contains the kind of information—such as verbatim reproductions of talks with Khrushchev, Malenkov



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and other Soviet leaders, and detailed accounts of the power struggle in Hungary—which rarely if ever seeps out to the free world.

The lengthy dissertation clearly indicates that Imre Nagy, despite his anger at Rakosi and his clique, remained a dedicated Marxist and Communist. The thesis is replete with quotations from Marx, Lenin and Stalin; all justifications of principles, all thoughts and policies are firmly rooted in so-called "Marxism-Leninism." Every word he wrote points to the fact that he had remained faithful to the Party and that he considered that his New Course, far from being a rightist deviation, actually upheld the essentials of the creed and alone could save Hungarian Communism from destruction.

At the same time Nagy reveals himself to be a decent man, a man imbued with a sincere love for his country and fellow-Hungarians and one who understood the errors in Stalinist policies, the aspirations of the majority of his people, and the aims of his adversaries. In that sense he resembles Gomulka of Poland. But he differs from him in that he lacks the toughness and the tactical flexibility required of a Communist leader. Nagy was totally unsuited for the kind of in-fighting Rakosi engineered against him; it is astonishing, for instance, that Nagy, as Premier and Politburo member, was unable to publicize his own New Course program, that he did nothing to force Rakosi to publish the June 1953 resolutions or that he did not have the foresight to do so on his own.

The text, which was smuggled out of Hungary, is unquestionably authentic; all facts pertaining to its origin have been carefully checked. Besides, the internal evidence for its authenticity is overwhelming: the dissertation contains the text of letters, documents and conversations which only Nagy himself could have known. We herewith publish Nagy's introductory chapter in full, followed by extensive representative quotations from the rest of the work.

Introductory Chapter

I SHOULD LIKE to point out, by way of introduction, that I wrote this dissertation before the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party [February 1956], during the summer of 1955, finishing the bulk of it by September. I counted on having my case discussed by the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' [Communist] Party in the Fall, after my recovery,¹ as had been stated in the [Central Committee] resolution of March, 1955.

Hoping that this discussion would indeed take place I prepared this dissertation so that I could hand it over to the Central Committee as a justification of principles and a detailed reply to accusations publicly levelled against me since March, 1955.

As is well known, my case never did come up for discussion, so that I was deprived of any means to expound my views or to refute the baseless accusations and the slander directed against me.

This dissertation therefore could not be aired before a Party forum at that time. I was expelled from the Party [in November 1955] without having been given the chance to clarify my views within the framework of ideological struggle and in accordance with legal Party procedure.

Since then events of great significance have taken place, foremost among them the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. These developments convinced me that stating my views in writing to crush, by a discussion of principles, the accusations made against me and to refute the groundless slanders, would not be in vain; and after I had been expelled from the Party and after the Twentieth Congress had taken place I added a couple of chapters taking into consideration the new situation—I have indicated the date of writing at the end of each chapter.² Preparing this dissertation was indeed not in vain because, re-reading it after the Twentieth Congress, I felt strengthened in my earlier conviction that my stand, rooted in basic principles, was correct.

Recent events have induced me to make up my mind to place this dissertation—if circumstances permit—before the Party members so as to allow the membership to judge for itself from my replies to accusations made against me.

I have kept quiet so far because I was silenced. But I

¹ Nagy apparently suffered a heart attack in February, 1955; the following month his policies were savagely attacked in the March resolution of the Central Committee and, on April 14, another meeting of that body removed him from the Premiership. The official version of the March resolution as released in *Szabad Nép* of March 9 does not mention anything about a future discussion of the Nagy case.

² Actually only a few chapters bear a date; this introduction, probably written in Spring 1956, does not.

Key to Terms and Dates

June 1953 Resolution:

The beginning of the New Course, also called the "June Road." Imre Nagy becomes Premier at this time, but Rakosi remains head of the Party as its First Secretary. The New Course entailed a program of liberalization in all spheres of national life, including a slow-down in forced industrialization, some de-collectivization, an increase in private trade, greater freedom of artistic expression, etc.

Third Congress of the Party, May 1954:

The Congress endorsed the New Course program but also revealed splits in Party ranks.

October 1954 Resolution:

A plenary session of the Central Committee which resolved to continue the New Course with specific suggestions for reorganizing the economy. It revealed continued dissension within the Party.

March and April 1955 Resolutions:

The March meeting of the Central Committee condemned Nagy for "rightist" deviation, anti-Marxism-Leninism, etc. The resolution promised to proceed with the June Road; in actual fact, the meeting marked the end of many aspects of the New Course and the return of Rakosi to exclusive leadership. The April session ousted Nagy from his positions as Premier and Politburo and Central Committee member.

November 1955:

Nagy is expelled from the Party.

February 1956:

The Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party takes place.

October 1956:

Nagy is readmitted to the Party; again becomes Premier on October 24.

now feel that it is my duty to the Party to speak up. A number of circumstances have led me to come to this decision, first of which is the demand by Party members at past meetings that my case should be presented to the Party publicly so that I should have the opportunity to explain my views.³

The other reason which prompts me to speak up is the unprecedented lying, slander and abuse by the so-called leadership, all of which is totally opposed to Communist attitudes, morals and principles because it shifts the "ideological battle"—so often mentioned since the Twentieth Congress—from an ideological to a personal plane. I want to show in this dissertation that I have no intention of

³ As ferment increased in the country, particularly following the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Party in February 1956, the demand for Nagy's return gained strength within the Party, culminating in his re-assumption of the Premiership at the start of the Revolt on October 24, 1956.

following them along this path, so diametrically opposed to the Leninist Party system and Communist morals. I shall stay on the terrain of an ideological battle fought by arguments.

Finally, I was moved to make this dissertation public because neither the Party nor the Hungarian press—that is, newspapers and magazines—have given me the slightest opportunity to publish these views. I was thus deprived of all means of acquainting the Party membership and the public at large with the contents of this dissertation.

The smouldering, political, personal and ideological differences within the Party leadership since the June 1953 Central Committee resolutions⁴ have come to the notice of the Party membership one-sidedly, only in the form of accusations levelled at me. I shall disregard the personal questions, though they are significant in my political persecution: the settlement of intra-Party differences, as well as debates and exchanges of views, have all been channeled to the un-Party-like field of personalities. But precisely because this is so the clarification of problems which arise from differences in principles is all the more important.

The battle being waged for the purity of Marxism-Leninism, and the proper application of these teachings to the Hungarian situation is, in the final analysis, a matter of keeping the power in the hands of the people. This is the underlying question of these ideological-political differences. And these questions clearly cannot be solved and clarified by [Party] resolutions based on one-sided accusations. It is absolutely necessary that any ideological-political dif-

⁴ Nagy is referring to the start of the New Course and the beginning of his first term as Premier, which ended with Rakosi's counterattack in the March and April resolutions in 1955.

About the Author

IMRE NAGY was born of Calvinist parents in 1896. He graduated from high school and apparently had no further formal education. He served in the army in World War I; captured by the Russians he was taken to Russia by them. There he joined the Russian Revolution and became an active Bolshevik. He returned to Hungary in the early Twenties but was forced to flee to avoid arrest. Back in Moscow, he taught at the Agrarian Institute and became a Soviet citizen. He remained in Moscow until the end of World War II, having in the meantime become an expert in Marxist ideology and agricultural problems. He has written extensively on both subjects.

Nagy returned to Hungary in December 1944 and immediately became one of the top leaders of the Hungarian Communist Party. He was elected to the Central Committee as well as to the Politburo. He has held high government positions ever since 1944. From the end of that year to November 15, 1945, he was Minister of Agriculture; from then to March 23, 1946, Minister of Internal Affairs; from September 15, 1947 to August 23, 1949, Speaker of parliament; from May 8, 1950 to November 16, 1952, Minister of Crop Collection. He was a Deputy Premier from November 16 to July 4, 1953, assuming that day the Premiership for the first time.

ferences be solved through a debate of principles, that they be settled by the strength of valid arguments and clarified by the widest possible publicity before the Party. This is the only correct, Marxist, scientific method, the only Party-system method of clarifying ideological questions. This approach is also required because it is basic not only to the solution of debatable questions in Party life but also to the building of Socialism itself. And finally it is necessary because the accusations were directed at a former Politburo member and President of the Council of Ministers, and Party members and the rest of the nation are certainly entitled to know what actually happened.

At one of the sessions of Party meetings in Somogy County, Matyas Rakosi⁵ said, among other things, the following:

"... There cannot be two separate organizational rules, two kinds of laws in the Communist Party, one for the leaders—for the Politburo, for example—and another for ordinary members. There cannot be any difference among Party members on this score. Anyone who makes a mistake—and this was stated by the Third Congress⁶ [of the Hungarian Communist Party]—must answer for it to the Party, regardless of the position he holds within the Party or of his status in any other form. . . . The Party was right in presenting this question [at the Congress] to the masses of the hundreds of thousands of Communists and the millions of working people. We thus showed that, in our cause, there is not a single case which we cannot calmly take to the working people for their judgment."

It is indeed proper and true that one standard should apply. There should therefore be no difference among Party members: everyone should answer for his mistakes, no matter who he be, whether Imre Nagy or Matyas Rakosi. I wish to avail myself of the rights as described in the organizational rules, which make it possible for me to

⁵ Rakosi was born on March 9, 1892; captured by the Russians in World War I, he made the acquaintance of Lenin and worked in the Soviet Party. With Bela Kun he was one of the founders of the Hungarian Party, becoming People's Commissar for Production in the first Communist reign in Hungary. The years 1920-24 saw him as Secretary of the Comintern. Having illegally returned to Hungary, he was arrested in 1925 and sentenced to eight and half years imprisonment. He was again tried in 1935 and sentenced to life imprisonment for crimes committed in the first Communist revolution in Hungary. On October 30, 1940, he was handed over to the Russians in return for war relics from the 1848-49 revolution. After World War II he returned to Hungary, becoming Secretary-General of the Party in December, 1944. Deputy Premier 1945-52, he became Premier that year and remained in that position until June 27, 1953, thus controlling both Party and government. After the New Course he retained the position of First Party Secretary, the Secretary-General position having been abolished. He lost this position to Erno Gero on July 18, 1956. He is now believed to be in the Soviet Union.

⁶ The Third Party Congress was held May 24-30, 1954. It was the New Course Congress in the sense that it endorsed policies decreed in the June 1953 resolutions. Already then, however, there were not only deep splits in the Party but also expressed differences on basic questions. Rakosi's speech, for instance, contained sharp attacks on accepted policies, particularly in the rural sector, where he demanded that the fight against "kulaks" be renewed. He also said: "We must end the liberalism infecting many of our Party and State organs."

place before the Party my description of the responsibility and faults of Matyas Rakosi, using the same process he used against me. Let the Party members and workers judge, on the strength of my dissertation and his accusations, what faults were committed and by whom, and who is responsible and for what. I agree with the contention that there is no question which cannot calmly be taken to the people for their judgment. But let us be careful to weigh things equally on the basis of the equality of Party members: it is not just the question of Imre Nagy that should be presented to the people for their decision; the case of Matyas Rakosi must also be presented. Matyas Rakosi himself justified this demand. I hope he will not deny this now that he himself is involved.

I have repeatedly presented my views to the Politburo with respect to the intensification of ideological differences which arose between November 1954 and January 1955. This was in fact the substance of my brief review submitted in memorandum⁷ form to the Central Committee at its March [1955] meeting.

There had been serious differences of opinion in the evaluation of the political and economic situation in the Fall of 1954. After the October 1954 session of the Central Committee, following the initial execution of decisions then arrived at, the strained situation which had prevailed before the meeting undoubtedly improved. The confidence of Party members in their leaders grew, and so did the membership's confidence in its own ability to solve successfully the many problems that confronted it. Simultaneously the masses' confidence in the Party and government grew stronger, and they hopefully looked to the future.

This greater enthusiasm was reflected in production figures for the fourth quarter of the year which turned out to be relatively higher than those for the year as a whole. There was a significant increase in the execution of the export plans amounting to 1,950,000,000 foreign exchange *forint*, which was well over the quarterly average. The balance between purchasing power and consumer goods showed that, in this period, we were able to effect a peak volume [of goods turnover] with relatively no hitch. In comparison with 1953, our domestic trade by the end of the year had registered a 15 percent increase in volume. The large and continuous increase in currency circulation since July 1953 had been stopped to some extent in the last quarter of 1954. Also, some improvement had taken place in industrial production, mainly in raising labor productivity rather than, as in the past, only overall output. In short, except for the collection of agricultural produce, a sector which continued to show poor results, there was a noticeable trend for improvement after October [1954]. One should not overestimate this tendency, but neither should it be disregarded.

The Party's policies were, as shown in Party documents, extremely successful in bringing to life and sponsoring the

effective development of the Patriotic People's Front Movement. Despite some errors and growing pains, which had to be corrected as they developed, the Patriotic People's Front Movement was able to supply a great deal of support to Party and government policies in all areas entered by us since the inception in June [1953] of a new period in economic, political and cultural fields.

The Patriotic People's Front Movement strengthened the nationwide political activity of the masses with respect to local, national and international issues. In turn, this added successfully to the growth of local economic development and led to a start in many kinds of social reforms.

A similarly encouraging picture emerges from the other important national political event to take place after October [1954]—I mean the election of the local councils. This assumed a decisive importance with regard to Party and government policies. Party documents state that the council elections of November 28, 1954 were a great success both for the Party and the people's democratic system. The Party's links with the workers were strengthened, and the prestige of the executive branches increased. An impressive, intimate political atmosphere was created, with the great majority of citizens professing their faith in the basic aims of Socialist construction and indicating that they were willing to follow the Party and the government in carrying out the program of this new political era. The success of the elections signaled the failure of the enemies of our People's Democracy inside and outside our country.

That is how the official Party documents appraised the situation as it developed after October [1954]. There were, naturally enough, mistakes and shortcomings at this time; dangers arose which had to be fought. In short, the characteristic features of the post-October period were: a growth in the people's democracy, a strengthening of the Party, a stabilizing expansion of the bases for Socialist building.

The very exaggerations of the troubles and mistakes contained in the frightening picture Matyas Rakosi painted of the situation as it then existed are extraordinarily dangerous in themselves, for they are intended to discredit all the policies carried out since June [1953], to drive the Party and the country away from the path then taken, all in support of the thesis that it would be better to return to the old [pre-June 1953] system.

It was this motive which gave rise to the question of rightist deviation. I did not agree with the exaggeration when it was first made, and nor do I now. It must be acknowledged, though, that for more than a year and a half we dealt with the left but we neglected to fight against the dangers from the right. This was undoubtedly a mistake. And it had to be changed all the more because, besides the fact that the Communist Party cannot fight against only one deviation or danger to the exclusion of all others, the danger of rightist deviation was actually growing. From this it follows that the Party's attention should necessarily have been directed to this, that all the Party's means of agitation and propaganda should have been used to render more effective our ideological work in fighting the danger from the right.

⁷ In various places in the text of his dissertation Nagy refers to this memorandum or to a "petition" he then addressed to the Central Committee. It seems that he also wrote a number of letters to the Central Committee and Rakosi personally asking that his case be openly debated.

I feel that this is what would have been proper, and that it would have been understood by the Party membership. But I could not approve a course which greatly exaggerated internal troubles and dangers and made use of these alleged dangers for ideological purposes by throwing unexplained, unjustified and explosive charges into the Party's ranks, thus causing the greatest of confusion. In subsequent months the main danger allegedly was that emanating from the right. But the wavering of the Politburo⁸ with respect to this question shows how negligible had really been the attention it had devoted to this serious problem. It was not correct that when so serious a danger arises in the Party—it had allegedly been inundating the Party and the country—it should not have been taken up by the Central Committee. Why was it not taken up by this Committee?

This is a crucial question, particularly in view of the fact that the October [1954] session of the Central Committee had taken place only some four to six weeks before. And at this session attention was called to dangers from the right as well as from the left.⁹ At that time certain members of the Politburo, though mainly Mihaly Farkas, were following a line differing from that of the resolution of the Central Committee and did not ask for appropriate instructions from this Committee.

It was not correct then, nor it is correct now, that the battle against rightist danger, absolutely necessary as it is, was not carried out by Party methods or procedures. Politburo members attempted to wage this fight primarily by administrative directives, terror, vilification, dismissals, etc.

Summing up: In my petition to the Central Committee in March [1955] I maintained that the Party could not, as it had hitherto, carry on the battle on only one front, be it the left or the right. Ideologically and politically the Party must arm itself against rightist mistakes and viewpoints, but it must do so in a way which will not disarm it in dealing with errors and dangers from the left, which probably have deeper roots in our Party than anywhere else.

It is widely believed in the Party—and I share these anxieties, which have proved to be justified—that the present leadership is not concerned with correcting mistakes in implementing economic, political and cultural policies as formulated in June [1953], that it is not concerned with remedying errors in the June program pertaining to the Party's leadership and Party life. Such a course would be absolutely necessary and right. But what is really happening is an attempt to review the June [1953] policies in order to revert to pre-June conditions. I would carry out the policy

⁸ Nagy explains in subsequent chapters that his power within the highest reaches of the Party—that is, the Politburo—was sharply restricted by the machinations of Rakosi and his friends who controlled the Party machinery. He is therefore making the point that, if in the last phase of his Premiership, rightist deviation had indeed become so great a danger, then it would have been necessary to discuss this topic in the Party. Instead, Nagy explains, nothing was done until accusations were hurled at him after his downfall.

⁹ As reported in *Szabad Nep* of October 22, the resolution stated *inter alia*: "The only correct and possible path to building Socialism in our country is the policy of the New Course. All organs of the Party as well as every single Party member must carry out this policy systematically and resolutely."

of correcting mistakes with all my strength, as I indicated in the declaration I signed. But this is not what is at stake now, for the burning question of the moment is the endeavor [by Rakosi] to return to the old order. Events indeed show that this is so. And it amounts to a catastrophe for both the Party and the country. As a result of it, the Party will divorce itself from the people; this might bring about unforeseeable consequences not only within the country but also internationally.

It is because of all this that I felt it necessary to stress in a draft resolution that the Party and government policies in the economic, political and cultural spheres cannot rest in substance on anything but the application of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete Hungarian situation, on the transformation of the Socialist people's economy and its further development according to the objective, lawful basis of Socialist construction in this temporary transitional period. This policy has to entail Socialist industrialization as the main means and basis of Socialist transformation, with major stress being put on heavy industry (production of the means of production), as well as on the transformation of Socialist agriculture. With respect to the Party's economic policy, the key factor must be production and the lowering of its cost. Very improperly we have not paid sufficient attention to this [cost reduction] thus far; this must now be remedied through serious exertion on our part.

In my petition [to the Central Committee in March, 1955] I stressed that the June [1953] policies did not constitute a deviation from the principles of Marxism-Leninism, that they were not in opposition to it, and that they did not amount to a mere Party tactic. This must be clearly stated because there is the grave danger that the June policies themselves might be confused in Party members' minds with the mistakes and difficulties that have cropped up in the implementation of these policies in the economic, political and literary sectors, and with the exaggeration of these difficulties in terms of rightist deviation. This would inevitably lead to the abandonment of the June line and a return to the previous mistaken policies.

That is why I stressed that the Central Committee should declare that the actual mistakes which had earlier been disclosed to it would now be corrected. At the same time let us forge ahead in the spirit of the June resolutions along the path of Socialist construction.

I hold unwaveringly to the views I outlined in my petition because I am convinced that the [most] serious mistakes in our Party's policies were those which had occurred before the June [1953] resolutions. These mistakes sprang from exaggerated "leftist," sectarian, anti-Marxist views as chiefly represented in our Party by the "foursome"¹⁰ under the leadership of Matyas Rakosi; these views were sharply condemned by the Central Committee's June resolution. There is a statement by Lenin which perfectly describes these views:

¹⁰ In other parts of the dissertation Nagy mentions these as: Rakosi, Erno Gero (also now in the USSR), Mihaly Farkas (former head of Defense and Secret Police who personally tortured Kadar; recently sentenced to imprisonment), and Jozsef Revai (an unrepentant Stalinist who has recently written violent "theoretical" articles in substance endorsing Rakosi and vilifying the "liberals").

"For the true revolutionary the greatest danger—possibly the only danger—is the exaggerated revolutionary spirit which forgets within what confines and under what circumstances it is proper and effective to apply revolutionary tactics and methods. The true revolutionaries most often broke their necks when they tried to write 'revolution' in capital letters and almost canonized it as an immortal concept. They lost their heads and became unable to weigh soberly circumstances in which one must revert to reformist action. True revolutionaries can be destroyed only if they lose their ability to think clearly. They are destroyed not by external defeat, but very definitely by the internal failure of their cause, because, by losing their ability to think straight they take it into their heads that 'the great world revolution' can and will solve all kinds of problems, under any circumstances, by absolute revolutionary methods.

"Those who take such things into their heads are lost, because they approach a fundamental question with utter stupidity. During a merciless war—and a revolution is the most merciless of all wars—stupidity is punished by defeat.

"What is the basis for the concept that the 'great, victorious revolution' can use only revolutionary methods, and that nothing but these methods is permitted? There is no precedent for this. And it is definitely not true. That it is not true is clearly apparent purely on the basis of theoretical considerations, assuming that we do not forsake Marxism. That it is not true is reinforced by the experiences gained in our Revolution. Concerning the theory: in revolutionary times stupidities are committed just as they are committed at any other time; so said Engels and he spoke the truth."

This is what Lenin wrote and taught.

Before June [1953] the faults in our Party were undoubtedly characterized by "leftism," by sectarianism. Such faults have deep historical roots in our Party. At the same time we should realize that these "leftist" mistakes inevitably give birth to rightist mistakes. Since the announcement of the June [1953] policies and the opposition to "leftist" errors such [rightist] faults have appeared in the people's national economy, in culture and in the ideological field, as well as in some phases of social life.

From all this it clearly follows that one must fight, with all possible means pertaining to an ideological battle, for the eradication of these deviations and against the petit bourgeois frame of mind and the influence exerted by the lower middle class upon the worker. However, not for a single moment should one lose sight of the fact that the causes which brought about sectarian "leftism," so deep-rooted in our country, have ceased to exist. We always fail to fight with necessary determination against the more dangerous deviation. At present this is the exaggerated sectarian "leftism." It is necessary therefore to fight ceaselessly against rightist deviationism, but also against "leftist" faults and deviations.

In weighting all this, however, it must be established that the present difficulties in our economic, political and social life reach back in their origins to the era before June

[1953]. Although we succeeded in eliminating a great many of the difficulties by the implementation of the June policies, new difficulties inevitably arose, partly because of these past policies, partly because of our own mistakes.

Taking all this into consideration, I informed the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' [Communist] Party in a letter dated May 4, 1955, that I concurred with the guiding principles and the practical objectives of the March [1955] resolutions of the Committee. These principles and objectives were summarized as follows in the introduction to the resolution:

"The Central Committee established that the resolutions arrived at by the session of the Central Committee in June 1953 were correct. They remain in effect in unchanged form and, together with the resolution of the Party's Third Congress, constitute the basis of the Party's present policies. It is in the spirit of these resolutions that the Party feels, without any change, that its main objective is the systematic improvement in the welfare of our workers and an ever-increasing rise in the fulfillment of social and cultural needs based on greater Socialist production and a growth in productivity. The main objective of the Party can be secured above all through an emphasis on heavy industry, Socialist industry as a whole, and the development of agriculture.

"Our Party will continue to effect the Socialist reconstruction of agriculture and will pursue policies designed to further the development of agricultural collectives on a voluntary basis. Besides this it will also continue to assure support to the individual farmers, enforcing the principle of financial aid to them to help them increase production and, above all, to raise their productivity. Communist criticism and self-criticism remain in effect without any change so as to establish collective leadership, and adhere to the resolutions meant to insure legality."

I am still in agreement with all this today and I similarly agree with the contention that, in the course of the successful fight waged to carry out correct resolutions, mistakes were made and deficiencies arose. I consider it a mistake that the opportunist distortion of the true character of the June resolution is not pointed out either in the March or April [1955] resolution of the Central Committee. That is why it [the June resolution] must be given the widest possible publicity in the Party press¹¹—since, as Matyas Rakosi stated in the speech at Kaposvar, we withhold no secrets from the people—so that, by comparing the June 1953 resolutions of the Central Committee with the measures taken for carrying them out, everyone will have the opportunity to establish for himself where these Party resolutions were "distorted" and when and by whom. This is the correct, Party-like method of clarifying this question, whereas simply accusing without justification is not.

It would also be worthwhile to examine the extent of the political and economic bankruptcy left in the wake of the "leftist" exaggerators, to look into the kind of inheri-

¹¹ Nagy very bitterly complains in later passages that the New Course resolutions were never made public, indeed not even shown to Party members. He maintains Rakosi withheld publicity in order to sabotage the program.

tance we had to take over when, in June 1953, they had finally led the Party and the people's economy into a blind alley. Following June 1953, for almost two years, the country's entire working force labored to correct the serious damage brought about by the "leftist" excess in all branches of the national economy. Looked at from the financial point of view only, the Party and State leadership as headed by Matyas Rakosi cost the country two years of intensive work; it can be figured, and indeed it must be figured, that this ran into billions of *forint*. But who can judge in figures and in billions the political, cultural and moral damage inflicted on the Party and the nation? For two years the moral and political capital contained in the Party resolutions and the government program was spent to rehabilitate the country. If all the material, political and moral strength which was used to undo the damage wrought by the so-called "foursome" had instead been used to build Socialism, Hungary would now be a cheerful country living in plenty and prosperity. Unfortunately we inherited a very heavy burden.

The "leftist" deviationists made promises they could not keep in the name of Marxist-Leninism, thus discrediting its prestige. What did the "leftists" promise? They promised that in the course of the first Five Year Plan they would raise the workers' living standards by 50 percent. In actual fact, though between 1950-54 industrial production—taking 1938 as 100—grew from 150 to 300, living standards decreased up to 1953, then increased by 15 percent solely as a result of the policies of the new period. In comparison with 1949, the workers managed to double industrial production, to increase labor productivity by 63 percent, to decrease costs; but in spite of all this their wages remained on the whole on the 1949 level. They [the "leftists"] promised an upsurge in agriculture. Instead, as a result of the "leftists'" excesses with respect to peasant policies, there occurred a marked decline in agricultural production and in the number of livestock. It is well known that the area of untilled land in the spring of 1953 amounted to approximately one million cadastral acres, that is, more than 10 percent of the arable land in the country. The "leftist" exaggerators promised an abundance of consumer goods, yet they created a scarcity unparalleled since Liberation.

If we now examine the 1955 program of the "leftist" exaggerators in detail we again find the same promises, and again they cannot fulfill them because they have failed to take into consideration objective facts, the laws governing socio-economic life. We should no longer make promises we cannot fulfill. We must not shatter the masses' faith in the Party, in the Party's truthfulness, in the correctness of Marxism-Leninism.

Communists will forfeit their honor if they are to be regarded as mere chatters. The danger that this might occur is now very acute. False promises basically shatter the political power of the working class, the worker-peasant alliance and hence they take the ground from under the Communists. Not every mistake and not every sin can be rectified by self-criticism. The criticism of the masses, as pointed out by the classics of Marxism and specially by Lenin, is a weapon powerful enough to sweep away

power. What we need is the kind of criticism by the masses which would strengthen this power. It seems, however, that the "leftist" exaggerators keep forgetting this.

It is well-known that, among other things, the Hungarian "leftist" exaggerators caused a grave decline in agriculture by their policy of forced collectivization. This played a crucial role, and indeed still does today, in creating a situation whereby the total volume of Hungarian agriculture is approximately what it was before the war. Excesses also caused serious faults to appear in the worker-peasant alliance, without which the working class cannot maintain its power. This power is the basic, the decisive factor in every revolution, ours included.

In the final analysis, however, the differences of opinion which have arisen within the Party in connection with the charges of rightist deviations are not primarily related to economic policies but are concerned with the fate of political power. This is so because by their scatter-brained attitude the "leftist" exaggerators endanger the basic and indispensable requirements needed to build Socialism, that is, the power of the proletariat. They are jeopardizing that power, built on the faith and the confidence of the working masses. The pseudo-radicalism of the "leftists," and their opposition to the masses endanger this power of the proletariat because they deny the Leninist concept that preserving and solidifying the power of the working class is a task that transcends everything else. Running amok, the "leftists" have caused profound political crises among the working people, endangering their power in our country. The main question in the differences of opinion and in the ideological battle is therefore the question of retaining political power; the differences reflect divergences on this key issue and mirror a different approach in principle as well as in economic policies.

In the years 1949-52 the "leftist" exaggerators were guilty of grave mistakes in carrying out their political line and, in practice, suffered failure. This is proved most strikingly by the necessity that arose to introduce the June resolutions; it is also proved by life itself. And yet, they did not abandon their anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist theories. Although this theory teaches us (Lenin: Materialism and Empirio-criticism, Collected Works, Szikra, 1954; Vol. 14, p. 141) that, if in practice, in real life, a theory does not work, then this theory should be re-examined. In practical application, criticism should concern theories, for it is not life that should be reconstructed to suit a faulty theory. The "leftist" deviationists are resurrecting their "theory" though life has shattered it into bits. They are doing so partly by their March, April and June 1955 Central Committee resolutions. They are again trying to mould the practical work of the Party and the country to this theory. Above all they are attempting to so mould their economic policies, justifying their actions as a battle against rightist deviation. The "leftist" deviationists, armed with these resolutions, have created so much of a chaos in political concepts that it is no longer possible to establish what is correct Marxism-Leninism, what is "leftist" deviation or rightist deviation and who is what kind of a deviationist. Those who do this are trying to cover up their own deviation by hypocritically alluding to Marxism. That is why they avoid de-

bates and instead of using arguments vilify their opponents on questions of principle. But it is possible to carry on a debate over differences in principles and politics, and views derived from them. I stand absolutely on the premise that there should be a debate over principles.

The Central Committee should have no other standpoint and therefore should make such a debate possible. This is inescapable. The charges should be clarified and the accusations answered. If we want to assure a unity on principles in the Party—unity which is non-existent at this time—we must put an end to the ideological and political chaos. And for this there is only one way out: a clarification of differences and the expression of differences in debates touching on principles, and a free exchange of views.

That is why this lengthy dissertation was written. I have tried to prove that the contention in the March [1955] resolutions of the Central Committee that "rightist views had become so dangerous in our Party and State because Imre Nagy supported these anti-Marxist views in his speeches and articles and was in fact the one person who primarily proclaimed them," is, in principle as well as from a political point of view, an unjustified and baseless accusation.

With facts and arguments I am trying to prove that there is no basis for the April resolutions of the Central Committee which declared:

"... Comrade Imre Nagy, as a member of the Politburo and as the President of the Council of Ministers [Premier] held political opinions which were sharply opposed to the overall policies of our Party and were inimical to the interests of the working class, the working peasants and the People's Democracy. Comrade Imre Nagy tried to slow down the motor of Socialist building, Socialist industrialization—especially the development of heavy industry—and, in the provinces, the development of agricultural collectives, this decisive method of Socialist reconstruction of villages. He tried to force the Party's leadership into the background and to confuse it; and he attempted to pit gov-

ernment agencies and the Party against each other, and similarly set the Patriotic People's Front against the Party. By all this Comrade Imre Nagy prevented the building of a solid basis for the increase in the welfare of the people.

"These anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist, anti-Party views of Comrade Imre Nagy form a composite system of attitudes which spread to the various fields of political, economic and cultural life. The activities of Comrade Imre Nagy have caused serious damage to our Party, our People's Democracy and our whole Socialist structure.

"Comrade Nagy, in order to implement his rightist, opportunistic policies, resorted to un-Party-like, anti-Party and even factional group methods which are completely incompatible with the unity, the discipline of the Marxist-Leninist Party."

All this was presented without any proof, facts or arguments. I do not follow this path: I shall prove my standpoint, my rights, the correctness of my views and my Marxist-Leninist faith with theoretical and practical facts. It is possible that I am in error on one point or another. The Party debate can clarify all that. Let them prove with Marxist-Leninist teachings and methods that I am wrong. I have expounded my convictions in this dissertation and I shall uphold these views until such time as they can be proved to be wrong by the scientific method of Marxist-Leninist arguments.

For holding my convictions and views I accept, as I have in the past, the stupid slanders, the being ignored, the political persecution, social ostracism and deep humiliation. I also accept responsibility for the mistakes I have really committed. I shall not accept responsibility for one thing: giving up my conviction based on principles.

It was with these thoughts that I began to work on my dissertation. I am striving to accomplish a useful task to benefit the Party and my country. The Central Committee can help to realize this aim by arranging for the widest possible debate on this dissertation.

Major Extracts from Other Chapters

The following are excerpts of the more important statements in the remainder of the dissertation. The material has been rearranged in chronological sequence starting with Nagy's rejection of Stalinism and ending with his rejection of pre-Revolt attempts to return to the practices of the hated Stalinist era. Nagy's own arrangement is more confused, and much of the text is taken up by references to his own previous writings and speeches, and the works of Marx and Lenin. These quotes have generally been omitted and maximum attention has been paid to Nagy's beliefs at the time he wrote this work. Particular stress has also been put on Nagy's treatments of subjects unavailable elsewhere—such as, for instance, the conversations with the Soviet leadership, which so clearly indicate that Hungary was little more than a colony of the Soviet Union, where all major decisions were made. As in the treatment of the introduction, explanatory footnotes have been added; within the text, brackets refer to the editors' explanations, parentheses being Nagy's own.

I. Rejection of Stalinism

Political, Social, Cultural Aspects

THE FAULTS for which Rakosi, as leader of the Party, was primarily responsible stemmed from the fact that under his leadership the internal life of the Party failed to conform to fundamental Marxist-Leninist principles. . . . It did not adhere to the organizational principle of the Party; its actual direction was not in the hands of the elected organs of the Party, having been seized by Gero, Farkas, and Revai, led by Rakosi. In fact, even this foursome was narrowed to an actual leadership by Rakosi and Gero alone. They failed to inform the Secretariat [of the Central Committee] and still less the Politburo, of important matters. They made decisions and took steps in affairs beyond their jurisdiction. They formed opinions in advance of the various questions [to be debated] and then had the opinions passed as resolutions. They did not consider the other members of the elected organs of the Party as their equals; they looked down on them.

* * *

The degeneration of power [in the Stalinist era] and the rise of Bonapartism could not have occurred without the degeneration of Party life—that is, the cliquish Party leadership became a personal dictatorship. Rakosi made himself independent of the will and the opinions of Party membership and of the decisions of the Party. He subjugated the Party to his will and, with dictatorial methods—primarily with the aid of the Security Police—dominated the Party, forcing it to execute his wishes.

* * *

No enemy propaganda, no Christmas or other "message"¹, will destroy more completely the people's faith in Socialism and in a better, happier, and more humane future than would a forced return to the old, mistaken, anti-popular, pre-June [1953] policy.

* * *

The Hungarian people reject the old system together with its masters, and they will crush all attempts to bring it back, no matter what the form.

* * *

. . . One of the causes of the ethical and moral crisis in social life is the attitude of the leading organs of government, of society and of the Party, all of which in the last 10 years flouted, underestimated and failed to do anything about this matter, so vital to our social development They completely forgot about living society, about man with his manifold, complicated individual as well as social relations, at the core of which are ethical and moral problems, or rather, the rules and principles which have been or are to be evolved.

¹ This refers to President Eisenhower's message in 1955 addressed to the people behind the Iron Curtain which was broadcast by Radio Free Europe and carried to the Hungarian people in balloons launched by the Free Europe Press.

In the period before June 1953 Hungarian writers interpreted the turbulent events around them by basing themselves on a false, warped definition of partisanship, and it turned out that they were seriously in error. They distorted reality and truth with this warped partisanship. Literature, art, and music became a distorting mirror in which the people could not recognize in their true proportions the great, unanswered problems of their lives.

Economic Aspects

One of the most important lessons of the First Five Year Plan [1950-1954] was that the resources of our people's economy cannot assure the simultaneous realization of two goals so huge as forced Socialist industrialization and the forced collectivization of agriculture.

* * *

One of the serious consequences of too rapid industrialization undertaken without regard for national resources was that it developed industries for which basic materials were lacking in Hungary and neglected or even restricted those industries which were based on Hungarian resources and basic materials. As a result, industrial development required more and more imported basic and raw materials and we acquired these on ever less favorable terms.

* * *

Here in Hungary, only a few years after the land reform had been completed, the "left-wing" fanatics, contradicting Lenin, were already speaking of the limits to the development of the productive forces of agriculture and scoffed at the possibility that proper economic policies could raise to any significant degree the productive level of small-scale peasant farming. That explains why in Hungary the "left-wing" deviationists, in spite of the fact that the Socialist sector amounted to 30 percent, kept agricultural production at the prewar level, though it should have exceeded that by at least 25 to 30 percent. With such policies we cannot improve the situation of the workers, we cannot strengthen the worker-peasant alliance and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

International Relations

[In the Stalinist past] we never examined the international situation thoroughly either in the light of our own country's interests or with respect to its effects on our country. Our own activity in the field of international relations was narrowed down to equalizing efforts [aping the USSR] deemed necessary to insure homogeneity within the Socialist group. That is why questions related to the international situation and external affairs were not of primary importance in the policies of the Party and the government, especially as these questions affected our own country. In general we used the international situation only to prove an economic or political aim which had been determined beforehand; we ignored the actual situation, often distorting it; we always explained it arbitrarily as the given task happened to require it.

The rigid, mechanical interpretation of Marxism—the kind that disregards the necessity for an exchange of views and debates within the Party—so prevalent in Stalin's era—was a prime factor in the role assumed by the Cominform in its stand against Yugoslav Communists. This stand gave rise to conflicts that were so grave that they paralyzed for years Socialist cooperation, and the cooperation of the people's democratic countries, with the Yugoslav League of Communists. This was a crude insult to Lenin's theory of proletarian internationalism.

* * *

In this civil war, in this international provocation, a grave role was played by the Hungarian [Communist] Party, whose "foursome" leadership, with Matyas Rakosi at the helm, was in the forefront of the attack against Yugoslavia, its Communist Party, its leadership; it was in the forefront of organizing international provocation, surpassing similar activities by the Soviet Union and by the Workers' and Communist Parties of other People's Democracies. The Rajk trial, the executions, all artificially built up and since unmasked as total lies; the mass imprisonments, the persecutions, the unbridled, inciting speeches and writings of Matyas Rakosi, Mihaly Farkas, Erno Gero, Jozsef Revai and others—all of the anti-Tito, anti-Yugoslav literature, including the pamphlets, declarations and similar activities of the press and radio, as well as the many, many series of economic, political and other measures taken against Yugoslavia—all these are well-known and irrefutable facts.

II. Defense of New Course

THE SUDDEN SHIFT and the profound changes initiated by the New Course saved the country from the more serious consequences of political and economic shock, of which tremors were felt at Csepel, Ozd, Diosgyor² at the time of the June 1953 events [i.e., riots] in Berlin, Pilsen, and Prague.

Hungarian Road to "Socialism"

We Hungarian Communists will faithfully cultivate and forever endorse the historical Marxist Communist motto "Workers of the world unite!" but to it we shall add the motto expressed in the "Szozat"³ reflecting deep national feeling and love of country: "Hungarians, remain unflinchingly faithful to your fatherland."

* * *

I do not deny my Hungarian nationality and ardently love my Hungarian homeland and my Hungarian people. True patriotism, together with love and respect for other

² All three are industrial towns, pointing to the fact that there must have been labor unrest. There was no public announcement of it.

³ A historical national document written in 1836 by Mihaly Vorosmarty.

peoples and nations, is the basis and essence of proletarian internationalism.

* * *

A People's Democracy is a democratic type of dictatorship of the proletariat. If methods used by the Soviets under entirely different circumstances are copied in imitation in a People's Democracy—and this has taken place in all the people's democratic countries but particularly so in Hungary—then the People's Democracy ceases to have the nature of a proletarian dictatorship. Such a country also thus loses characteristics required by the situation as it actually exists in that particular nation. To a great extent this happened in the people's democratic countries and it has given rise to serious obstacles in the stabilization of construction.

* * *

The leaders of the Party and the country must understand that the fate of the nation and the fate of the people is identical. The people cannot be free if the nation is not independent, if it does not possess complete sovereignty, if foreign influences prevail in its internal affairs; and no nation can be independent and sovereign if its people do not completely possess the right to freedom.

* * *

Since I first participated in the worker movement and since first becoming a member of the Bolshevik Party and later of the Hungarian Party in 1918, I have never been a nationalist-chauvinist. I have never represented such a view. The concept of proletarian internationalism has ruled my views and my actions.

Stress on Morality

The Party of the working people which stands at the head of the nation and leads it toward Socialist society must be the embodiment of social ethics and morals and must unite within itself all the moral virtues and values which our people have evolved in the course of their historical development and which constitute our heritage.

* * *

[At the Third Party Congress I said that] "Socialist legality, under the direction of the working class, is the broadest expression of the will of the masses, a very powerful tool for the building of Socialism and the protection of the people's democratic system. Socialist legality must be expressed in the unconditional and exact adherence to and maintenance of the laws and rules of the people's democratic State by all State and social organs, officials and citizens."

* * *

It is not compatible with public morality to have in positions of leadership the directors and organizers of fabricated mass trials, those responsible for torturing and killing innocent men, organizers of international provocations, and economic saboteurs or squanderers of public property who, through the abuse of power, either have perpetrated serious

acts against the people or are forcing others to commit these acts. The public, the Party and the State must be cleansed of these elements.

Economic Program

A disproportion between categories I [production of capital goods] and II [production of consumer goods] arises if the products of category II are insufficient to cover the needs of the population, that is to say if category II develops slower than is objectively possible and necessary. This is what happened in our country in the years 1950-1953 because of the excessive development of category I; the June [1953] resolution and the government measures were designed to change this situation. This was the basic purpose and theoretical justification of the economic policy introduced in June [1953].

* * *

. . . In the future the development of heavy industry must supply, to a much greater extent than it has in the past, technical services to both agricultural and light industry, eliminating shortcomings in the supply of goods and creating an abundance of commodities.

* * *

What do I consider wrong and intolerable [with respect to industrialization]? The concept that the growth of heavy industry must be greater year after year, that, for instance, if it happened to have been 10 percent last year it cannot be any less this year and must be even greater next year, and so on and so on . . . according to this if growth amounted to 10 percent last year it cannot be 8 or 9 percent this year. This is absurd. The man who makes such a statement and does it by referring to Marxist economic principles is a common charlatan and has no place in the field of economic science.

* * *

It can be ascertained from what I have related here [in numerous quotations from his speeches and writings] but also from the work I performed during the past twenty months [during his New Course Premiership] in the field of Socialist industrialization that neither I nor the government of the Hungarian People's Republic under my leadership . . . ever gave up the idea of continuing Socialist industrialization; on the contrary, from the very beginning it was considered to be the chief means for building Socialism. The June [1953] policy pointed out that, within industry, particular branches of the people's economy had to be regrouped, that in the course of Socialist industrialization consideration had to be given to the fact that we were not alone in building Socialism, unlike the Soviet Union which indeed had to build in isolation for a long period; it was further stated that, with respect to industrialization we had to take into account our real possibilities, the maximum capacity of the country and the international division of labor.

* * *

Leading Party circles are familiar with Matyas Rakosi's views, which he has repeatedly expressed since 1953 and

has tried to incorporate in our economic policy, according to which artificial unemployment has to be created in our industry; he claimed that this was the most effective method to improve labor discipline and increase productivity. Such a view is incompatible with Socialist economic policy and it is quite opposed to basic Marxist-Leninist principles. It must be recognized as an attempt to re-establish capitalist methods; it had to be rejected in the past and must still be rejected now.

* * *

Simultaneously with the promotion of large-scale farm collectives, the development of the prosperity and increased production of the peasants with medium holdings is an indispensable condition for the swift elimination of our agricultural backwardness.

* * *

The conclusions of the Central Committee's June resolution dealing with collectives and the advice on this subject given by the Soviet Comrades [to allow voluntary dissolution] proved to be correct; they were the direct consequences of the brutal and widespread violation of the principle of free choice for the sake of exaggerated collectivization by the intimidation of force, financial pressure (taxes, crop requisitions, etc.), and also by the application of punishments and other lawless procedures. In this process, dissatisfaction in the villages rose to a high pitch and hundreds upon hundreds of non-viable collectives came into existence in which forcibly recruited members simply did not work.

* * *

[In 1955] we planned that the Soviet Union would supply more materials and credits than it had supplied in 1954, and that it would, in exchange, accept more machinery. However, the outcome of the conferences, concluded in January 1955, was that the Soviet Union was willing to guarantee us only 50 percent of the 1954 import volume and only 36 percent of the items on our list for 1955. Our export possibilities fared about the same way. At the same time, the democratic countries [People's Democracies], especially Romania and Poland, also desired to reduce their export of materials to us in comparison with 1954.

* * *

Harmful influences [on our trade] were not only of an internal kind, there were also external forces and factors at play, especially in the field of foreign trade agreements. This made it all the more difficult to overcome difficulties [while I was Premier]. Since it is a State secret, I shall give no figures and be brief: it must be pointed out, however, that a considerable part of our foreign trade debts derive from expenditures and investments for security and defense; these place a heavy load on our foreign trade balance. The June 1953 resolution pointed out that there were also excesses in this field.

Foreign Affairs and Culture

Facts indicate that the five basic principles [first formulated by Nehru and Chou En-lai] cannot be limited to the

capitalist system alone, but must be extended to relations among the countries of the Democratic and Socialist camps.⁴

* * *

The country must uphold peace by every possible means. It must avoid becoming a participant in any of the clashes between power groups or becoming embroiled in a war, turning into a field of battle or an area of passage; it must also make sure that in all such questions the nation will decide for itself, in full possession of its sovereign rights. Our country, as an independent nation, must align itself with the countries and peoples who are fighting for peace.

* * *

The results achieved as a result of the June [1953] policy with respect to a freer atmosphere for cultural work, a marked decrease in the excessive degree of centralization, and the elimination of bureaucratic methods, had a favorable influence on our cultural life.

* * *

The contributions of Tamas Aczel, Tibor Dery, Sandor Erdei and Gyula Hay⁵ are real steps forward in the clarification of important questions of principle in Hungarian literature. I agree with their views and with their standpoint on principles. They are most competent to point out the paths and tasks of literary policy.

III. What the Soviet Leaders Said

A KEY to a full realization of the historic significance of the Central Committee's June [1953] resolution can be found in recognizing the nature of the extremely dangerous situation which had then arisen. This shocking situation was described by key members of the Soviet Communist Party who declared that the mistakes and crimes of the four-member Party leadership in Hungary headed by Rakosi had driven the country to the verge of a catastrophe . . . Khrushchev said that if we had not taken prompt measures, we [Hungarian leaders] "would have been booted out summarily."

⁴ The five principles as enunciated by Nehru and Chou En-lai on the occasion of the latter's visit to New Delhi in June, 1954, were: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; equality; mutual help and peaceful coexistence. Nagy does not enumerate the principles. He refers to them as 'the five basic principles which were first explained at the Bandung Conference by the representatives of the Chinese Republic and India—Chou En-lai and Nehru. . . ."

⁵ All four writers were in the vanguard of the literary revolt as "liberal" Communist rebels. Their rebelliousness became much more pronounced as the ferment reached new heights of intensity in the Summer and Fall of 1956. Nagy's endorsement of their stand at the time he wrote these words—probably late 1955—need not necessarily signify full agreement with them in the following months. Aczel is now in the West, while Dery and Hay have been imprisoned by the Kadar regime; nothing is known of Erdei's fate.

Criticism of Rakosi's Leadership

As the Central Committee members know, Matyas Rakosi has tried on countless occasions since 1953 to revise the June resolution by variously using Beria, the international tension, my alleged errors and excesses, and so forth. In this connection Comrade Khrushchev clearly stated the following:

"In June 1953 we correctly passed judgment on the Hungarian Party's leadership and that assessment is still correct to this very day. They can't hide behind Beria, as Rakosi is trying to do. We were there too when these errors were ascertained, every one of us! We were right, and what we decided then [in modifying agricultural policies] is also right today. This should already have been acted upon!"

* * *

It should also be known that the question of the relation of Party and State was very sharply discussed at the conference held with the Soviet Comrades before the June 1953 meeting of the Central Committee . . . At this conference Comrade Malenkov pointed out that in May 1953 they had discussed personnel questions with Matyas Rakosi . . . aimed at the separation of Party and State leadership. "We asked, whom do you recommend as your deputy? He could name no one. He had objections to everyone whose name was mentioned; he had something against everyone. Everyone was suspect except himself. This appalled us very much," said Comrade Malenkov. Comrade Malenkov declared that Matyas Rakosi had said that he did not want to be Premier: "but he wanted a Premier who would have no voice in the making of decisions." Comrade Khrushchev noted: "What is at stake is that leadership of the Party and the State should not be concentrated in the hands of one or a few men; this is not desirable."

* * *

By the end of June 1953 and the beginning of 1954, it had already become evident to the Soviet Comrades too that there was opposition to the June resolutions, and they blamed primarily Matyas Rakosi for this. Comrade Malenkov said: "The faults we noted in June are being remedied very slowly. Rakosi has not taken the lead in remedying these faults." Comrade Khrushchev also noted "Gero has no self-criticism or sense of responsibility for the serious mistakes in economic policy; at most he admits 'It is possible that Comrade Nagy is right in feeling that I am drawn back to the old economic policy.'"

* * *

Comrade Khrushchev, on the first of last year [presumably 1954, but possibly 1955] urged . . . rehabilitations, saying: "The prisoners are being released slowly. This is Rakosi's fault, because he has not taken the matter in hand. Rakosi refers to the fact that his nerves are bad. Nerves do not count. He has lost that measure of self-confidence needed to correct errors." On the occasion of our Moscow talks before the Third Congress, Comrade Khrushchev likewise said the following: "Rakosi is responsible for the arrests. Therefore he does not want to release them, because he knows that he is guilty and will compromise himself. It is

not permissible to denounce men and throw suspicion on them." Comrade Khrushchev advised that "the rehabilitations should be carried out so as not to destroy Rakosi's authority." But, so that his words should not be misinterpreted, he added: "We will protect Rakosi's authority only insofar as it is not prejudicial to Party authority."

* * *

The Soviet Comrades quite correctly stated that one of the gravest shortcomings of the old leadership was that "In Hungary, a true collective leadership failed to develop because Rakosi was incapable of working collectively." "He has lost the self-confidence required to correct mistakes, and it is possible that proper leadership will come into being over his head, which is catastrophic for a leader," said Comrade Khrushchev at the May 1954 conference in Moscow.

Comrade Malenkov, too, found that we were slow in correcting our mistakes in Party leadership and that Rakosi, as Party First Secretary, was not doing the job well, that he was incapable of taking the lead in correcting the mistakes. Each time we were there, the Soviet Comrades noted that Rakosi's reports on our problems failed to mention the main questions, the urgent problems connected with Party life. The Soviet Comrades were the ones who had to bring up the matter of Party unity and collective leadership. They asserted that their criticism and advice had led to no action.

Opinions about Hungary's Economy

It is worthwhile dealing with the question as to how the Soviet Comrades acted and criticized, what statements they made and what advice they gave concerning the particulars of the June [1953] Central Committee resolution on the development of heavy industry, the relationship between categories I [capital goods production] and II [consumer goods production], mistakes of the past and tasks of the future.

During a conversation which took place in Moscow in June 1953 before the Central Committee meeting, Comrade Mikoyan made the following statements concerning our economic planning and our policy of industrialization: "The economic planning shows a certain adventurous spirit, particularly with reference to the excessive development of your iron smelting industry. Hungary has no iron ore, nor coke. All this must be imported. No one in Hungary has yet figured out exactly the price of either a ton of iron ore or of steel. In 1952, for instance, there was a shortage of 700,000 tons of coke. There is also extravagance in some fields of investment."

Early in 1954, at a conference held in Moscow, Comrade Kaganovich made the following statement concerning our economic policy: "Earlier mistakes in the economic policy have not yet been completely corrected. The proportion between heavy and light industries is almost unchanged. You have wanted to build Socialism—a task that has occupied us for 35 years—too rapidly. The situation in Russia is entirely different from that prevailing in Hungary, and

you do not want to recognize this fact. The situation must be changed more profoundly."

* * *

Hegedus . . . prevaricates when he writes that, as a result of the spread of right-wing views, "uncertainty arose among members of collectives and led to many withdrawals and to the disbanding of many collectives in 1953-54." In this manner Hegedus tries to pin the responsibility for this also on the right-wingers, by which he means Imre Nagy. Andras Hegedus simply acts as if he did not know what he knows just as well as I do. For the June [1953] resolutions plainly states that the agricultural collectives must be allowed to disband if they so wish, and it explains why. So this is no right-wing view but part of the June resolution which comprises the basis of the guiding principles in the March [1955] Central Committee's resolution. It should be noted that the above-mentioned directive with reference to the collectives did not get into the Central Committee's [June] resolution accidentally but was proposed by the Soviet Comrades. On several occasions Matyas Rakosi tried to shift responsibility to Beria so as to compromise both the June resolution and those who carried out its provisions. . . . However, the fact is that when, in discussing the question of agricultural collectives at the June 1953 conference in Moscow, we expressed some anxiety, Comrade Molotov (and not Beria) reassured us as follows: "The collectives must not be disbanded by fiat but, if they choose to disband voluntarily, they should not be hindered. No harm will come of it."

IV. Nagy—Rakosi Fight

IN HIS SPEECH at the April [1955] meeting of the Central Committee, Matyas Rakosi allegedly said that he felt heavy responsibility for the fact that I had become Premier on July 4, 1953. . . . For the sake of truth, it must be stated that it was not Matyas Rakosi but the Soviet Comrades—Comrades Malenkov, Molotov, and Khrushchev—who recommended that Comrade Rakosi and all members of the Hungarian delegation accepted with approval.

Rakosi's Sabotage of New Course

By now it is a recognized fact that Rakosi, First Secretary of the Party, induced the Party—and primarily its apparatus—to assume a passive attitude toward the execution of the June [1953] resolution and the realization of the government program. In an attempt to turn the table on me, he tried, in the March [1955] resolution, to create the impression that the government was trying to push the Party into the background. In reality, the Party, by following the passive attitude inspired by Rakosi, pushed itself into the background, or rather, elected to assume such a stand, thus throwing enormous obstacles in the way of the June resolution and the government program.

. . . even before the Third Congress [of the Hungarian Party] Rakosi tried to achieve what he in fact did achieve in the Spring of 1955 [that is, Nagy's removal]. . . . Armed with baseless contentions, he took advantage of my absence because of illness to make the Politburo accept a resolution condemning the policy of the New Course. . . . Not only did Rakosi have the matter discussed in the Politburo in my absence, but he also wanted to go to Moscow without me. The Soviet Comrades felt that this would be wrong and refused to give him permission. Thus Rakosi's attempts in 1954 were a fiasco. He was obliged to admit both in Moscow and before the Politburo that he had made that body accept a resolution containing unfounded and misleading statements concerning collective leadership, unity of principle, and Party democracy, and that he had likewise informed the Soviet Comrades of it.

* * *

Guiding principles of a long-range plan for the Party and the government in the field of Socialist industrialization should have been calculated in a work program. This idea was accepted by the October 1954 meeting of the Central Committee, and the Politburo put me in charge of working out the details as the head of a committee created specially to direct this task. Preparatory steps would have enabled us to start with actual work as early as December 1954. I had already prepared the outlines of my introductory speech. Because of the stand taken by Rakosi and Gero the Politburo prevented me from delivering this speech, despite my many and urgent requests to be permitted to do so.

Rakosi Engineers Nagy's Ouster

Certain internal and external factors were moving [in Spring 1955] . . . toward a return [to the pre-June 1953 policy]: Rakosi's misleading report to the Soviet Communist Party on the situation of the Party and the country. . . .

* * *

The machinations, the falsifications and accusations, the deception and influencing of Party members [away from the June program] were greatly facilitated by the fact that, despite the many references to the June resolution, Party members were not familiar with its true contents for, in its complete form, it was available only to a small circle of Party functionaries. The majority of Party members have never had the opportunity to read the complete text. . . . In sharp contrast to this, Matyas Rakosi and the Party apparatus made certain that the March and April resolutions were received by the Party members 24 hours after they had been passed, and they were also made public in the press.

* * *

It appears that some people consider it a factional tactic that I refused to tolerate the illegal and irregular resolutions of the Politburo which attempted to isolate and silence me completely on the basis of a medical report drawn up by it. At that time [early 1955] I was frequently

obliged to write to the Central Committee because of the irregular action of the Politburo. In my letter of February 25, 1955, I wrote the following:

"A week ago today I addressed Matyas Rakosi by writing to him, requesting him to inform me about the Politburo proposals, resolutions, agenda, etc., as these pertained to the meeting of the Central Committee. I did not receive any answer to this request. The case was similar to Saturday's 'orientation' meeting, of which I was not notified. I am completely unfamiliar with the Politburo's report on the problem which was presented there. . . . [Nagy's ellipsis]. I consider this procedure unforgivable and irregular, and I object to it. It is apparent that they want to conduct the Central Committee's meeting without me, without giving me an opportunity to express my views on the problems to be debated, without allowing me to justify my viewpoint. For my part, it is apparent that the Politburo, which through numerous moves has actually stripped me of membership in it, does not want to solve the political differences of opinion on the basis of principles or on the plane of Party-like discussions. Neither does it want to do it with the assistance of the Central Committee; it wants to do it through the use of various irregular Party methods. They wish to remain silent and are hastening to influence the standpoint of the members of the Central Committee with a one-sided orientation. I maintain this is arbitrariness, contrary to Party principles and unforgivable in our Party."

V. Criticism of Post-New Course Policies

THE DENIAL of human honor, of Communist morality, and of Socialist legality . . . brings grim retribution. Whoever acts contrary to this has only himself to blame and should not charge me with damaging the authority of the Party leadership.

Political and Social Degeneration

The degeneration of power and the moral crisis of social life is also indicated by the fact that at present [written in December 1955] the number of persons imprisoned is greater than ever before; the number of persons sentenced is so excessive that many thousands cannot begin to serve their sentences because of a lack of "space." But the most alarming fact is that the majority of those convicted come from the ranks of the working force, are industrial workers.

* * *

The abuse of power and the use of illegal devices reached alarming proportions in 1955, exceeding the malpractices of 1950 to 1952. The situation has degenerated to such an extent that most of the workers have come to believe that they are at the mercy of illegalities and abuses, that there are no laws which protect their rights as human beings and citizens.

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Continued inside back cover

My Generation

by Pal Jonas

A Personal Account Of Hungarian Youth in Revolt

This is the story of the intellectual and political ferment behind the Revolt, told from the point of view of the generation which contributed most to that ferment. It is told by the man who headed the Petofi Circle during the Revolt, in his own words. All facts have been checked (and explanatory footnotes added where necessary), but the opinions and attitudes are those of the author and an important segment of the generation he represents. A subsequent article by the same author will discuss the Revolt in detail.



The Author

About the Author

Born in August, 1922, in Budapest.
Father's occupation: tailor.
Arrested by Nazis for sabotage in 1944.
Freed from Nazi prison in January, 1945.
Elected President of Federation of Hungarian University Students, MEFESZ.
Led Hungarian delegation to the International Students' Congress, at Prague, in the Fall of 1945.
Received his Doctorate in economics in 1946.
Assumed a post in the Economics Department of the Research Institute in Budapest.
Published several papers on economic and political subjects.
Arrested by the AVO in 1947; released after brief detention but thereafter denied the right to vote.
Arrested in 1948 for "questioning." Spent five years in Communist prisons, including the notorious Recsk "Death" Camp.
Released from prison at the end of 1953.
Was involved in the formation of the Petofi Circle in 1955.
Elected member of its Executive Board.
Elected president of the Petofi Circle on October 29, 1956, during the Revolt.
During the Revolt was member of the Revolutionary Council of Intellectuals in Budapest, the organization which coordinated the efforts of artists, journalists, students, teachers and intellectuals.

HUNGARY, during the Nineteen Twenties and Thirties, was unpracticed in freedom. The generation which developed between the two world wars was intended by its rulers to be ingrown, antagonistic to meaningful social reform, for such was the outlook of the regime and the aim of its educational policy. Many of the young people throughout the country still lived a semi-feudalistic existence in a nightmarish world of titles and social barriers held over from the Nineteenth Century.

Yet this very generation, my generation, prepared and fought the October Revolt. These young men and women, who had never experienced democratic government, joined, during their brief lifetimes, two armed battles with totalitarianism—against the Nazis in 1944, against the Communists in 1956. How this love of freedom was conceived and nurtured, how it grew, how it culminated in the events of last October, is the subject of this article.

Before the Communist Era

FIRST, OF COURSE, was the period of revolutionary gestation. Before the young people reached that point where they were willing and even eager to turn on the Stalinist hierarchy, their education had to take new and—for Hungarians—almost uncharted directions: outward, toward the democratic countries; inward, to an understanding of the diverse elements among the population of their own nation. The first was provided in the early Nineteen Twenties by the international Boy Scout organization which brought Hungary's adolescents into contact with the youth of the free nations and vigorously fostered the concepts of human-

ism and democracy in our land. The second was the "Village Explorers" movement in which young men and women studied folklore, collected folk songs and dances, and thus came into direct contact with the peasantry. The plight of the peasants became the subject of many books and articles by the "explorers," who drew the attention of the entire country to the economic problems of the largest class in the land, to their miserable working conditions, cave homes, and inhumanly low incomes.

The prewar authorities strongly opposed this interclass rapprochement. As for the Scout movement, it reached its peak of influence under the guidance of Count Paul Teleki,* but was gradually counteracted, and finally absorbed, by the compulsory military training program, the "levente" movement. On regime order the books of the "Village Explorers" were ignored in the universities; indeed the evils uncovered by the books were actually supported by the authorities who considered a downtrodden peasantry and a divided class system the prime necessities for maintaining the feudalistic *status quo*. Also, many in the ruling circles (although not Horthy himself or those closest to him) feared that any democratic trend would clash with the interests of Nazi Germany, which was beginning to influence Hungary. Yet even as the importance of the Nazis grew among the Hungarian governing circles, even as the German imperialistic designs became clearer and clearer, the number of those who believed in democracy increased. With the overrunning of the small nations, particularly of the Poles, with the forced trade agreements, which were so unfavorable to the well-being of the ordinary people of my country, with the racial discrimination—the effect of which was revealed in Hungary by the re-Germanization of many family names—the urge for freedom and national independence grew more and even stronger roots among the youth.

These roots, which produced their fruit in the October Revolt, sprouted during the Second World War at the 1943 Youth Congress in Balatonszarszo. Composed almost without exception of young men and women in their twenties or late teens, the Congress was led by writers, who, more than any other group in the country, felt and expressed the desire of the people. Laszlo Nemeth, perhaps the most important of these writers, characterized this gathering during the recent Revolt as the source of both the national desire for change and the healthy spirit of revolution.** Thirteen years after, it was the members of this Congress—the "thirty-year-olds," as they were called in reference to their age group—who formed the Petofi Circle and prepared the spiritual fermentation which laid the ground work for the Revolt.

The Congress at Balatonszarszo was made up of intellectuals, peasants and workers, all of whom participated on an equal footing. They drew up a statement setting forth

* Premier from February 1939 to April 1941; also a professor and renowned geographer.

** Nemeth was elected to the presidium of the Writers' Union in September, 1956, in the upset of the organization's Stalinist leadership. Although he is not a Communist and has never endorsed the regime, Nemeth was awarded a Kossuth Prize for his writing in March, 1957. He is apparently now living quietly in Hungary.



Wide World

Erno Gero

their desires and dissatisfactions over wages, working conditions, terms of apprenticeships in the trades, vacation rights. Even more important, they experienced, and never forgot, the creative discussions, the power of democratic ideas.

With this background and with the principles we had developed over the years, there was no alternative but "illegal" resistance for my friends and myself when the Germans occupied Hungary, March 19, 1944. We blew up Nazi monuments and shops run by pro-Nazis. We published and distributed leaflets attacking the invader. On several occasions we prevented the deportation to concentration camps outside the country of anti-German Hungarians. Many of us were captured and turned over to the Gestapo, where we were imprisoned and tortured, both by the Nazis and by our own renegade countrymen. One favorite method of the torturers was electricity on sensitive

portions of the body. Another, which I underwent myself, consisted in pouring gasoline over parts of the body and then putting a match to it.

Yet, even in the prisons and torture chambers of our invaders we formed new and passionate resolves for the introduction of democratic institutions into our country. And that firmness of purpose—and the struggle which inevitably accompanied it—continued through the defeat of the Nazis, the Stalinist reaction, the Nagy Course, the Revolt. Even now, in exile, we still look to the victorious realization of our ideals in our country.



Associated Press

Andras Hegedus

The Communists Take Over

WE LEFT THE Gestapo prisons in January of 1945, our clothes tattered rags, our faces unshaven for months, our bodies covered with sores and bruises, infested with lice. We were greeted by the sight of ruined cities, gutted buildings, destroyed bridges—and looting Soviet soldiers who carried off what little of value remained after a siege of seven weeks. Yet, even against these odds, we kept our spirit of optimism, our confidence that the final victory of democracy and freedom would assure a long period of peace for all the nations of the world.

It was with great satisfaction that the Hungarian people

noted the results of the Yalta Pact between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, for the agreement contained specific guarantees for the creation of an independent and democratic Hungary. It appeared that we would at last enjoy the basic national right of self-determination. During the Potsdam Conference the Western Powers held to this ideal and the Soviets appeared to be similarly inclined.

We veterans of the Balatonszarszo Congress—and the Gestapo prisons—went to work with all our strength. Still young men and women, we organized youth movements all over the country. In the summer of 1945 we set up the National Council of Hungarian Youth to represent all the young people's organizations. We were very optimistic, for this council had a composition which was, or so we believed, the best guarantee for the realization of democracy and national independence.

The free elections of 1945 brought in a National Assembly and an administration whose policies pleased the nation. With the land reforms and the republican government, centuries-old hopes of the entire country came true.

In the Fall of that year a Hungarian youth delegation represented our country at the International Students' Congress in Prague and worked hard to restore our nation's lost prestige and to break through the barriers which isolated us from the outside world of free and democratic lands.



Wide World

Janos Kadar

We invited foreign students to visit us; there was hardly a country in the world, during the twelve months that followed, whose youth did not attend rallies or congresses organized in Hungary. As the leader of our delegation to Prague in 1946, I signed the document of the International Union of Students, and by that simple act my own country's student movement took a historic step forward. Of course, I had no idea that in two years my signature would be held up by the Communist rulers of Hungary as proof that I was a "paid agent of the imperialists," working to hamper "democratic development" in my own country and striving for the forceful overthrow of the Hungarian regime.

In the meantime the struggle against Communism commenced in all fields of political life. The Party leaders had been badly set back by the election of 1945; their candidates had received only 17 per cent of the total vote. Yet, they demanded a bigger share of positions in the government than their electoral position justified, and—in the shadow of the Soviet armed forces who occupied the country—they could not be denied. Their first target was the department of political police, called at this time, the AVO [AVH], which they seized and dominated. Although the importance of this police force was obvious, the democratic parties had a natural distaste for the work, after years of living under Fascist, or at least undemocratic regimes; also they considered their participation in AVO work undesirable because of the historic unpopularity of the political police with the people.

At first the Communist-dominated AVO concentrated on Fascists and war criminals turned over to Hungary by the Western Powers. But after the summer of 1945 the Fascist problem in the country had ceased to exist. The leaders had gone to the West and their followers had either cast off their old views or become anachronistic objects of ridicule. The Communists saw clearly that their greatest danger was not from the remnants of Fascism but from those who—as in the past—were ready to fight any kind of dictatorship, any kind of terrorism. In order to justify the Party's attitude toward honest democrats, the meaning of the word "Fascist" was changed and broadened to include more and more people, until at last it defined all who opposed Communism.

In 1947 a "great conspiracy" trial was held, in which I and almost all my friends were involved. I was arrested and held in custody for two weeks by the AVO because of my contacts with non-Communists who were then being purged from the chairmanship of MEFESZ, the Federation of Hungarian University Students. Thus, at the age of 25 I felt compelled to withdraw from social activity, for by now no one could participate with a clear conscience in the political life of the country. In the successful Communist campaign for a one-party system which followed the trials, I and my associates were denied the right to vote. The charge in my own case was that I was the "proprietor of a brothel." Naturally I protested this ridiculous accusation and naturally nothing was done to restore my rights before election day. Anyway by then I was in more serious trouble with the regime.

The foreign students, with whom we had been ac-

quainted during the two years after liberation, wanted to keep up the contacts and they insisted on holding their discussions with those of us who had left the student movement, not with the Communist-controlled Federation. This made the regime even more hostile to us, more determined on total domination.

I was arrested again in 1948. "You will come with us for a brief interrogation as a witness," said the AVO man who made the arrest. My "brief interrogation as a witness" lasted over five years and took place in a succession of Communist prisons, ending in the notorious Recsk "Death Camp." There I met again, as fellow prisoners, my old companions from the Gestapo concentration camps.

Rakosi's Rule

By 1948 the Communists, under the leadership of Rakosi, had crushed the roots and eliminated the leadership of Hungarian democracy by a series of "conspiracy" trials highlighted by false charges, shamelessly invented. To ensure his personal rule Rakosi, who liked to have himself characterized in speeches and in the press as "the beloved father of the Hungarian people . . . the best pupil of our great leader and liberator, Stalin," raised the AVO above all State authority. It became the real governing body of the country, controlling all prisons and the hundred or so forced labor camps which at that time contained 130,000 "spies, conspirators and saboteurs."

The most infamous of the concentration camps, and the cruelest in which I served, was at Recsk. Completely isolated from the outside world, we were at the mercy of the band of sadists who made up the bulk of the AVO. Our appointed task was to work in a stone quarry; what it amounted to was the removal of a mountain—with our bare hands! No equipment was issued, not even rudimentary tools, for the first year of our labor. We scraped at the ground with our fingers; we dug holes with bits of wood; we staggered with boulders pouched against our stomachs. Day by day our situation deteriorated. Discouragement set in, and many of us gave up all hope of life. It was, indeed, a "death camp"; for years only the dead issued forth.

This long and dark period of my life was climaxed in July 1953 by a totally unexpected event. One night an AVO man woke me with the usual rude shove on my side and ordered me to get up and go to the Main Building at once. Such a summons was almost invariably the prelude to a great deal of unpleasantness and I was amazed when I entered one of the "interrogation" rooms to find an AVO man in civilian clothes smiling with what might almost be taken for sympathy. He offered me a chair, a cigarette, asked if I would like to submit a list of grievances about life in the camp. I complied loquaciously; he actually took notes. Then he "explained" to me that conditions in the country were altering, the international situation had changed, and "the American imperialists were no longer so belligerent." I was then escorted back to my barracks where my companions, who had been awaiting me with great anxiety, were as powerless to explain the evening's events as I was myself.

The tone of my interview with the AVO man was, I later learned, due to the assumption of the premiership by Imre Nagy. Life immediately became easier in the camp, and by the end of the year Recsk was dissolved. My companions and I were released. After five years spent in the proximity of death, we wanted only peace and a chance to resume our lives quietly. Disappointment awaited us. . . .

The country was ruined economically. The unreasonable investment policy of the Rakosi regime had been catastrophic. At the beginning of the Five Year Plan [January, 1950], the rulers had promised increases in production and a fifty percent rise in workers' living standards. Production was increased by forcibly raised new norms, but the living standard lagged far behind. While industrial output and output per man had gone up and production costs down, the real wages of the workers stood at the 1949 level and in some cases had dropped even lower.

The area of cultivated lands was approximately one million hectares by the Spring of 1953; ten percent of the arable land in the country thus went unplanted, a result of the forced collectivization which was one of the major—and most unpopular—aims of the Party. This collectivization was brought about by brutal and frequent violation of the "principle of voluntary association." The regime herded farmers into the kolkhozes by force, intimidation,

and material means of oppression, such as the levying of unfairly high taxes on private farms and huge compulsory crop deliveries. Economically unsound collectives were set up by the hundreds, to which the peasants did not want to belong, and for which they would not exert themselves.

The New Course

It was in such circumstances that Imre Nagy took office. With the strictly limited powers given to him—Rakosi kept the Party leadership for himself—Nagy set out to bring order to the country with his "New Course," based on the following declared principles:

1. Restoration of "Socialist" justice.
2. Realization of the principle of "collective leadership."
3. Broadening of "democracy."
4. Encouragement of criticism and self-criticism.
5. Opposition to "dogmatism" and "schematism."
6. Creation of the Patriotic People's Front to rally all the "popular" forces on a broad base.
7. Increase in the powers of local councils.

The New Course, or the "June Road," as it was also called, brought results almost immediately. By 1954 production of consumer goods was increasing and the trend toward heavy industry had been reversed. There was a



Interior of the House of Parliament where most of the high-level talks with the Nagy government took place during the Revolt. This photo was taken while Nagy (center in front row) was delivering his key New Course speech, July 4, 1953, on first assuming the Premiership.

Beke es Szabadsag (Budapest), July 8, 1953

marked rise in the standard of living. For the first time the people had the feeling that they were working for their immediate welfare rather than a distant goal.

But of even greater significance was the new spiritual ferment which then arose throughout the country. The writers, poets, and intellectuals, who were in the forefront of the opposition during the Stalinist era, enthusiastically gave their support to the Premier. On one occasion Nagy asked the Writers' Union to investigate the complaints and difficulties of the people as a whole, and the inquiry resulted in an excellent statement by a young writer—now in prison under the Kadar regime—that the Rakosi period could be characterized as a dictatorship of sycophants, not of the proletariat. The Stalinists saw to it that this man was at once expelled from the Party, but his words were a rallying cry, and, after the first moments of shock, others began to voice the same opinions.

Premier Nagy in an article in *Szabad Nep*, October 20, 1954, strongly defended his economic views and attacked the Stalinist principle that workers' living standards should be sacrificed to ever-increasing heavy industrialization. Yet, in spite of his success in office and his popularity with the people, the Premier was steadily opposed by Rakosi. The Party boss did everything possible to paralyze the "New Course," and finally abrogated it entirely in the March 1955 Party decision. Nagy was dismissed and replaced as Premier by Rakosi's henchman, Andras Hegedus.


The defective old policies were resumed and open attacks were directed against Imre Nagy. He was expelled from the Party, deprived of his membership in the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, fired from his professorship at the University. No means of self-defense were accorded him, either through legal channels or in the press. He was vilified on a personal level even more strongly than for ideological reasons. No kind of public or private work was permitted him.

But for the first time in the long Communist rule, there was a considerable body of Party members who were opposed to the hierarchy. During the Nagy leadership, realities had been approached, and the people had been allowed to speak honestly of the problems facing the country. No one, save the rulers themselves, wanted to go backwards into the Stalinist era.

Justification came for the Nagy supporters in less than a year. The Twentieth Soviet Party Congress embarked, in February 1956, on its policy of de-Stalinization, and the response in Hungary was widespread and delighted.

Formation of Petofi Circle

THE TIME WAS ripe for the foundation of the Petofi Circle, the most significant spiritual and political movement of the post-Stalinist period in Hungary. The Petofi Circle, which was named for the Hungarian revolutionary hero and poet executed by the Russians in 1849, gave a voice to the legitimate grievances of the people. It provided a forum where, for the first time, the important problems of the nation could be freely discussed, where faults and failures were attributed to their real causes, and where the members could speak from their hearts, not



Officers' Club in Budapest where most of the Petofi Circle discussions were held.
Hungary (Budapest), No. 8-9, 1956

merely parroting what the Party wanted them to say. The intellectuals who made up the Circle prepared and created the climate for the uprising of people of all classes and backgrounds against the Communist rulers.

The Petofi Circle was organized by students and young intellectuals in 1955. It was not publicized and, at first, known only to a few people. No one foresaw the magnitude of the role it would play in the future, especially not the hierarchy of the Rakosi regime, who also missed the full significance of the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress. Indeed it was the liberalizing forces released by this Congress which provided the Circle with its opportunity to prepare the country for democratization, a task which should have been taken on by the Party itself. Since the authorities failed even to attempt to lead in the liberalization efforts, since Rakosi and his henchmen actually opposed them, the need for such an organization as the Petofi Circle was all the more vital.

The ideals and goals of the Circle were humanism, pure scientific knowledge, freedom of opinion, and full rights to criticize; all these had in the past been merely ideals; no one had even been allowed to whisper them. The meetings started modestly, attended by no more than twenty or thirty young intellectuals. One of the first discussions concerned the situation of the young engineers. Another embodied a debate on Gyula Illyes' drama, "Dozsa."*

* Illyes is a non-Communist dramatist, whose play "Dozsa," while not outwardly anti-Stalinist, provided a certain amount of subtly hidden criticism of life under the regime.

But after the Twentieth Congress the problems of democratization and the economic and political situation were discussed openly in debates that captured the attention of the nation. In May a meeting was held on "The Twentieth Soviet Party Congress and the Problems of the Hungarian Political Economy." In contrast to the earlier gathering—and to the sparsely attended Communist Party conclaves of the same period—this debate was witnessed by hundreds of persons who filled the hall and the corridors and stairways outside. The proceedings continued long after midnight, and the devastating economic policies of the Hungarian regime were openly denounced. Rakosi was accused of squandering 120 billion *forint* on foolish industrial planning. Blistering attacks were launched against the forced industrialization program, the Stalinist principles of the Second Five Year Plan, and even against some of the classic concepts of Marxism. News of this meeting spread like wildfire over the country, and the name of the Petofi Circle was heard in every city and village in the nation.

Soon afterward, in the wake of long preparatory discussions, the Circle opened its debate on the science of historiography. The speakers angrily denounced the history books used by the regime-directed schools and universities. They were full of falsifications, the debaters charged; texts served only to glorify Party functionaries; political clichés had been substituted for scholarly research, and historiography had sunk to the level of political pamphleteering. This castigation of the regime was heard by almost a thousand.

Rakosi Attempts to Dissolve Circle

Naturally the interest aroused by the debates drew the disapproval of the Party and the Secret Police, but it was difficult for them to act with their old forcefulness in the atmosphere created by the Twentieth Congress. Also there was a favorable reaction within the Party itself; a sizable proportion of the membership began to question the omnipotence of the Rakosi clique. The regime simply did not feel confident enough in its own position to institute harsh measures against the Petofi Circle. It could only begin a campaign of intimidation behind the scenes, and this proved ineffective, for the Circle resorted to new methods. The next debate was announced as concerning only the problems of philosophy, but it was prepared even more carefully than the previous one, and it was attended by more than 2,000 persons. Instead of the vague theorizing that might have been expected, the debate centered on actual problems and people. The names of those in charge of the scientific life of the country were disclosed and their appalling lack of knowledge, even in their own specialized fields, was revealed.

However, it is not the purpose of this article to discuss all the meetings which took place, for they were similar in pattern and had one main purpose, that of establishing free and open debate. In this purpose they were so successful that the Stalinist clique felt called upon to counter-attack in full force. They waited only for the propitious moment to crush the Circle. And the moment came.

Six thousand people attended the June 27 debate on the

press. One of the speakers, Tibor Dery,* launched a sharp attack against the careless journalistic practices and hypocritical policies of the regime newspapers. "I do not trust the present leaders, and I don't even trust those who will come after them," Dery said. Another debater, Tibor Tardos,** castigated the press in the name of Hungarian newsmen and proclaimed that the time for ruthless journalistic liars was over.

On June 24, the official Party newspaper, *Szabad Nep*, bowing to the pressure of the Petofi Circle sympathizers on its editorial board and among its readers, had praised the Circle as "the sunlight of justice," and called upon the youth

* A novelist and journalist, Tibor Dery has been arrested by the Kadar regime. On May 27, the *New York Times* stated that the case against Dery is "believed to be under preparation."

** Tardos is a journalist and poet. Arrested by the Kadar regime, he has not yet been tried.



Inside of the Officers' Club, showing the stairway where hundreds of people listened to the discussions of the Petofi Circle broadcast over loudspeakers.

Hungary (Budapest), No. 8-9, 1956

of the country to put aside any Stalinist views they had adopted in the past, to reject the misleading principle of "authority," and to banish from science forever "the barracks spirit," which has only one aim: subordination. The article also appealed to State employees and even to regime leaders to visit the Petofi Circle meetings and take part in the debates.

On June 30, the Party struck back. The Petofi Circle was branded "counterrevolutionary," and the campaign of annihilation was on. All the old shibboleths were brought out. The Circle was denounced as "Fascistic, imperialistic, in the pay of the Americans." All-out efforts were made to persuade the workers to condemn the meetings. Tardos and Dery were expelled from the Party, and the latter's speech at the Circle debate on the press was characterized as an attack on the entire Hungarian system of government and a plea for a return to the "old, pre-war system."

But the campaign failed. The workers would not be convinced that the Petofi group was an evil force, and the Party membership became even more deeply rent by the controversy; only the employees of the Budapest Party Committee condemned the Circle, Party members in the Writers' Union refused to recognize the expulsion of Tardos and Dery. The rehabilitation of Laszlo Rajk* was brought up in several factories as a proof of the impossibility of taking official denunciations at their face value. The weakness of the regime and the personal unpopularity of Rakosi became even more pronounced. One young secondary school professor of my acquaintance told the First Secretary to his face at a Party meeting that "the confidence of all of us in you has been totally undermined."

The growing influence of the Petofi Circle, and the regime's inability to counteract it, together with the unsuccessful efforts of the Rakosi clique to govern the country, convinced the Soviet rulers that a change in leadership was

necessary. The First Secretary was forced to resign in the presence of Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan—not an easy interview for the Russian, it is said, for Rakosi clung desperately to office—and Erno Gero, another, but at least a different, Stalinist, was entrusted with the post. His assignment was to avert the coming crisis by more elastic, though substantially the same, policies.

Gero and the Gathering Storm

BUT THE YOUNG generation was completely out of hand by this time; the deceiving concessions which had served so well in the past were no longer good enough. Youth was ready for the Revolt.

This brings up the most interesting phenomenon of the time—the fact that Hungarian youth, who had never enjoyed freedom of any kind, became the standard-bearers and uncompromising claimants of democratic liberty. While the people of my own age group—in their thirties at the period of the Revolt—had experienced the liberal movements of the pre- and post-war years, the secondary school and university students had known almost no freedom at all. Their urge toward democracy lay entirely in their recognition of the formidable difference between the things that had been said and written by the Stalinist spokesmen and the realities which were everywhere on view. The contradictions were utterly unacceptable to idealistic young people who saw merit only in truth and justice. The new generation yearned for change; they surged with the natural revolutionary tendencies of fresh minds faced with the corruption of age and decay which the Party had created in their country. No outlet was possible for decent young people, except revolt. The Party youth organization, the DISZ, provided no center, no haven; youth could only listen—and nod—to the ideological rhythms of regime functionaries reciting Party platitudes.

On July 19, Gero made a speech in which the tone of the regime toward the Petofi Circle was somewhat moderated. Although he referred to our June 27 meeting as a "small Poznan"** and to our group as a growing danger to the country, his main object was not, apparently, to denounce us, but to draw us into the DISZ, which, he said, could be the only political center for youth. We ignored his advice, of course, and considered his softer words as a sign that we had won our first battle.

The next phase of the political struggle, however, came from Rakosi's followers, who, realizing their powerlessness without their chief, began to agitate for his return. At the forefront of this group were Istvan Kovacs, Bela Szalai and General Jeno Hazai. Kovacs had enjoyed a colorful, opportunistic career, announcing himself a partisan of Imre Nagy in 1953, turning against him when the time seemed propitious. Szalai was a member of the anti-Bolshevik youth movement during the Second World War, who, having no political convictions of his own, afterwards joined the Communist Party to escape imprisonment. In a carefully

* Executed in October, 1949, Rajk was "rehabilitated" March 29, 1956. As Minister of the Interior in the Ferenc Nagy government, Rajk played a major part in the Communist coup of 1947. Later Foreign Minister, he was sentenced to death for "Titoism" and high treason.



Building of the Philosophy Faculty of the University of Budapest, where some Petofi Circle discussions took place.

Magyarorszag Utikony (Boldizsar), Budapest, 1955

** On June 28, 1956, workers demonstrated violently in Poznan, Poland, demanding better living standards and freedom. Army units had to be called upon to reestablish order.



Faculty of Law of Budapest University where the Revolutionary Council of Intellectuals (of which the author was a member) met during the uprising.

Photo from *Beke es Szabadsag* (Budapest), May 11, 1955

prepared Party coup, he seized the chairmanship of the Federation of University Students, but had no prospects for higher rank in the country without Rakosi's support. Hazai, who was a political not a military officer, was a Party Central Committee member; he also took part in the youth movement before joining the army as a Major General. These three openly acted for Rakosi's return. They circulated petitions and made speeches; Kovacs wrote articles hailing Rakosi's re-emergence into active political life.

Rajk's Reburial

This action was unfavorably received by the majority of the Communist hierarchy, who were now fully conscious of the wave of public opinion favoring liberalization. After considerable discussion, the Party decided to halt the reactionary campaign of the Rakosi forces by a public reburial of Laszlo Rajk and other outstanding victims of the Stalinist era. Rajk's widow had long demanded this official act of rehabilitation for her husband, but until now the regime had refused or procrastinated. The present moment, however, was considered suitable. The authorities set the date for the official ceremonies for October 6, 1956, the anniversary of the execution of the generals of the 1848-49 war of independence against the Hapsburgs.

The day was wet and cold. A strong wind blew rain into the faces of those who waited in long silent lines to pass the coffin. Among the crowd was Imre Nagy; his picture appeared in the next weekly issue of *Muvelt Nep*, the first publicly exhibited photograph of the former Premier in eighteen months.

Significantly, the regime did not allow the AVO to appear in uniform on this occasion. It was the first popular demonstration in which the political force showed no outward sign of being in control, although AVO men were present in civilian clothes, in case the crowd got out of

hand. Another new aspect to the proceedings was the presence of students from the military high school, standing in solemn lines at the cemetery.

The coffins of Laszlo Rajk and his "accomplices," Gyorgy Palffy, Tibor Szonyi, and Andras Szalai, lay in state before the Kossuth Mausoleum, and former comrades, who had suffered long years of imprisonment and torture, composed the guard of honor. Victims of the Communist concentration camps came together at the ceremonies. It was the first time many of them had been permitted to gather openly in such great numbers. The common past, the tortures they had all endured under the AVO, forged the crowd into a single identity, and they listened with disillusionment and anger to the meaningless words delivered by Antal Apro, the regime spokesman. Tension filled the air. Only a spark was needed to set off the explosion.

Immediately after the ceremonies, the former prisoners marched to the Batthyany Monument to pay their tribute to the martyrs of 1848. Several thousand persons attended this meeting improvised on the spot. When a young student stepped forward to address the crowd, someone called out, "Don't make a speech—recite the 'Air'."* With a solemn demeanor the student spoke the lines of Attila Jozsef, so meaningful during that time of oppression.

The October Days

ON OCTOBER 4, 1956, the electrifying news spread through the country that Imre Nagy had been admitted once again to the Party. Immediately the students of the University of Political Economy petitioned the Minister of Education, demanding Nagy's complete rehabilitation and return to his professorship. The Ministry gave way and within two weeks the demands of the students were fulfilled.

Meanwhile the Petofi Circle increased its activities and similar groups were set up in large towns like Szeged and Debrecen where the organization was named after the 1848 revolutionary hero, Louis Kossuth. Save for the common hunger for freedom, there were no ties among the different circles. But all faced problems of a similar nature and attacked them in like manner.

There were other important Petofi Circle meetings, and one, on the situation in agriculture, was especially colorful. A certain listener continuously interrupted the speakers, and, since it was our purpose to give free rein to all shades of opinion, we permitted him to take the floor. Only then did we understand his desire to speak, for he launched into a blazing denunciation of the forced collectivization and the criminal economic exploitation of the regime's agricultural policy. His speech was well documented, and opened up new vistas of activity for the Circle members. Similarly the membership debated conditions in the fuel and energy industries, with special attention to the oil fields at Lispe which had recently, as a result of careless management, become submerged in water. Experts who had, in the past, warned of this danger, had been arrested as saboteurs.

* The direct translation of the name of this poem is "Air." In English the meaning might better be expressed by the phrase, "Let us breathe free." Attila Jozsef (1905-1937) was Hungary's most famous poet between the two world wars.

Meanwhile, in the pages of *Irodalmi Ujsag* and other weeklies, the writers and poets continued their struggle for even greater freedom, and the students of Szeged University left the Communist-run DISZ to re-establish MEFESZ on October 16, 1956.* This outwardly minor organizational change set off a chain reaction of students all over the country disaffiliating from DISZ and setting up new organizations, always with the purpose of ridding themselves of Party dictation. The Eighth Plenum of the Polish Communist Party (October 19-21, 1956) and Gomulka's liberalizing leadership brought a warm response from Hungarian youth and new pressure on the Party from the Petofi Circle, which declared, October 22, that the Party leadership should be convened as soon as possible with Imre Nagy and his followers taking prominent positions and that Rakosi be expelled and all efforts to resume his policies halted.**

The reconstituted MEFESZ backed this declaration and called also for a silent demonstration of sympathy to be held October 23 before the Polish Embassy and later around the statues of Petofi and Bem.*** Students distributed thousands of leaflets on the streets of Budapest and in the factories and State-owned enterprises. As a result of the excellent preparation, the entire population sided with the youth groups and took part in the demonstrations.

The Revolt Breaks Out

THE GATHERING before the Polish Embassy had been set for two-thirty in the afternoon. At one o'clock the Ministry of the Interior announced that the demonstration was banned. Leaders of the Petofi Circle and the Writers' Union went at once to the Minister, Laszlo Piros, and pressed him to alter his decision. He gave way, and the ban was lifted at half-past two. But workers, students, and intellectuals were already on the streets, marching toward one of the most memorable moments in Hungarian history.

To evaluate and coordinate the spontaneous events that followed, the leaders of the Petofi Circle, the MEFESZ, the Writers', Journalists', Artists', and Musicians' Unions, university professors, and others set up the Revolutionary Council of Hungarian Intellectuals. Planning and preparation of political action as well as coordination of the various fighting groups were the main tasks of this Council. It set up an armed national guard at the Lorand Eotvos University in Budapest, with headquarters in the Faculty of Law.

* The Federation of Hungarian University Students had another period of activity from 1945, when it was founded to replace MEFHOSZ, the prewar Horthyite student federation, to 1948 when ordered by the regime to merge with DISZ. MEFESZ was reconstituted too late to take an active part in the pre-Revolt ferment in Hungary, but the organization sparked the Revolt itself. It worked closely with the Petofi Circle, and many young Hungarians had membership in both groups.

** See special issue of this magazine, *The Revolt in Hungary*, December, 1956, p. 4, for full text of Petofi Circle declaration. For fuller documentation on the role of Hungarian youth in the Revolt, see *East Europe*, January, 1957, pages 26-38.

*** General Jozsef Bem, Nineteenth Century Polish revolutionary hero who fought for Hungarian freedom.

Interviews with Nagy

After the initial successes of the Revolt, a meeting was held in the University Assembly Hall, October 29, and a delegation appointed to seek immediate contact with Imre Nagy to inform him of the Council's objections to certain of his actions early in the Revolt and to give him a statement of the views of the Council. At the same time a resolution was passed that the meeting would not be adjourned until the delegation had returned with a full report. I was a member of this delegation; the leader was a professor from the University of Political Economy.

We went to the Parliament Building first, where Deputy Premier Ferenc Erdei* tried to prevent us from seeing Imre Nagy. Erdei told us of the Premier's heavy schedule and offered his own services as intermediary. We refused to be put off and bluntly stated our lack of trust in the Deputy Premier, for in the past he had rendered the worst possible service to the country and to democracy by his activities as a "non-Party Bolshevik." We then suggested that Erdei should issue orders to withdraw the Russian tanks from their positions around the Parliament Building, for we considered it intolerable that the Soviets should be in charge of guarding the seat of the highest Hungarian State authority. Erdei's face grew pale, as he listened to our words; finally he left the room to bring Nagy.

* Living quietly in Hungary, Erdei has no official position in the Kadar regime.

Tibor Dery



"Writers Among Themselves: Louis Aragon, the famous French writer, between Istvan Orkeny (left) and Tibor Dery, at the Budapest Peace Congress [in 1953]." Dery was one of the moving spirits of the pre-Revolt ferment. See page 23.

photo and quoted caption from *Beke es Szabadsag* (Budapest), January 1, 1953



Ferenc Erdei, who tried to prevent a delegation including the author from seeing Imre Nagy during the Revolt.

Beke es Szabadsag (Budapest), July 8, 1953

We occupied the time before our audience with the Premier in speaking to other members of the Cabinet. We informed Karoly Janza,* the Minister of Defense, that large numbers of students were still held as prisoners in the cellars of his Ministry and in the political officers' academy. He claimed ignorance of this state of affairs, but promised an immediate investigation; if our facts were true, he said, the students would be released. Our delegation reserved the right to visit those places, if the students were not set free, and the following morning they were all released.

We also asked the then Minister of the Interior, Ferenc Munnich,** why his discredited predecessor in office, Laszlo Piros, still came regularly to the Ministry. Munnich assured us that he had expelled Piros from the buildings that very afternoon. He volunteered to staff the Ministry with his companions-in-arms from the Spanish Civil War, all of whom had been neglected or imprisoned during the Stalinist era.

Finally we met Imre Nagy.

The leader of our delegation spoke first of the general situation. He told Nagy that the confidence of the average man in the street had been badly shaken by the Premier's imposition of martial law and call for Soviet troops. Nagy answered that, when the orders were given, he had not yet

* There has been no further news of Janza's whereabouts since Kadar assumed power.

** Now First Deputy Premier, Munnich is considered second only to Kadar in the present regime.

taken office; his predecessors had deliberately and fraudulently used his name to compromise him and cover their own actions. Nagy asked the delegation to inform everyone of these facts. We told him that it would be highly desirable for him to inform the nation personally. Nagy then said that he intended to uphold martial law against looting, robbery, attempts on the lives of civilians, and common crimes, and we assured him of our complete backing in these respects.

Nagy informed us during the discussion that, according to his sources, the Eighth District Party Headquarters had come under attack and that he would have to take measures to restore order. One of our delegation members, a leader of an armed Freedom Fighters group, told the Premier that AVO men, hiding in the Party building, had several times opened fire on members of our National Guard who were wearing their national insignia at the time, and who had returned the fire in self-defense. The anger of the people at this unreasonable AVO conduct resulted in their laying siege to the building. We asked the Premier to check the truth of the news he was receiving and offered to supply him with objective information on that and other important events of the day. The tone of the interview was quite friendly by the time we had made all our points.

After the Revolt had been won—that is, before the second Soviet attack—our delegation met three more times with Nagy, who proved to be a moderate, fair-minded man. He understood that it was best to accept the demands of the Revolutionaries and to recognize the legality of democratic organizations set up during the Revolt.

Any study of the Hungarian Revolt would be incomplete without mentioning the role of those persons who came from complete obscurity—sometimes from the darkness of the prison cell—to lead the democratic forces. The most outstanding was Jozsef Dudas, who, first as a freedom fighter, then as the defender of Hungarian independence, carved a lasting place for himself in the memories of his countrymen. He was the first of the revolutionary leaders to be executed by the Kadar gang. Many, many more have followed in his steps. They believed, as we all did, that any action, violent or not, is just and right, if there are no legal means at the disposal of the people to overthrow a vicious and corrupt social system.

Hungary After the Revolt: The First Six Months

The chronology below presents all significant developments in Hungary in the six months following the final Soviet destruction of major active armed resistance. The regime press and radio are sources for most of the information. Some items were obtained from trustworthy reports by Western journalists or travellers; these are printed in italics.

I. Chronology of Events

November 12, 1956:

Compulsory deliveries of farm produce are abolished. A decree undermines the authority of revolutionary committees established in the administrative apparatus during the uprising. They are allowed only an advisory capacity and are forbidden to "replace leading officials."

November 14:

Kadar holds talks with workers' delegations in an effort to put a stop to the strike paralyzing industry. Promises not to take reprisals against freedom fighters and pledges to abolish the secret police, hold new elec-

tions and include non-Communist parties in the government. He asserts that Imre Nagy is not under arrest, has not deliberately aided the "counterrevolution" and has the choice of participating in Hungarian political life. Kadar warns, however, that Russian troops will remain in Hungary until the "danger of the reactionary attempt has passed" and rejects workers' demands for Hungarian neutrality.

To appease the people, Party leaders who were members of the hated Rakosi clique—i.e., Erno Gero, Lajos Acs, Bela Szalai, Andras Hegedus—are removed from Party posts.

November 18:

The regime denies "hostile rumors" that young people



J. I. Gromov (right), new Soviet Ambassador to Hungary, presenting his credentials to Istvan Dobи, president of the Presidium.

photo from *Erdekes Ujsag* (Budapest), March 23, 1957

are being deported to the USSR. At the same time, instructs police to render harmless "looters, counter-revolutionaries, terrorists, and armed bandits."

Announcement that henceforth wages will be paid only to workers who show up at the job and produce effectively.

The regime attacks journalists, students, writers, etc., who "continue to champion the cause of the senseless strike."

November 21:

The regime issues a law on workers' councils which strips them of political power. They are promised an economic role as organs of "worker self-management," but are not permitted to take over functions performed by factory directors or Party-controlled trade union committees.

November 22:

The workers call a new 48-hour strike in reaction to the law and to government attempts to obstruct a free election meeting of the workers' councils.

The regime appoints special commissioners to certain enterprises in an attempt to safeguard production.

The Party press announces that the coal supply in Budapest is sufficient for only three days.

November 23:

An official communique states that Imre Nagy has asked and been granted "permission" to go to Romania.

November 24:

The Ministry of Agriculture announces a decree outlining provisions for withdrawal from and dissolution of collective farms.

Police units round up large groups of youngsters heading for the borders.

The regime calls for elections to workers' councils.

To speed reconstruction, the government abolishes the turnover tax for artisans working in construction.

November 25:

Kadar delivers a speech in which he calls Nagy's departure for Romania "correct" because his presence in Hungary would stir up trouble. He insists, however, that Nagy has not been exiled. The Premier also remarks that non-Party members will be brought into the government only when order is restored.

November 26:

Kadar delivers a harsher speech. He pledges to "hunt down" all "counterrevolutionaries," denounces workers' councils for "squandering" public goods, and condemns revolutionary committees in offices and institutions for "behaving anarchically." Kadar then states that Imre Nagy "yielded to the demands of the counterrevolution," "shielded horrors by his name," and committed an unforgivable crime against the Hunga-

rian people. When Nagy announced his desire to leave the country, Kadar concludes, the Party decided to have nothing further to do with him. The Premier also denounces the UN debate on Hungary and claims that the Soviets acted legally at the request of the Hungarian government.

November 27:

The government issues a decree guaranteeing freedom of religion and religious instruction in schools. Plans are made to settle State-Church relations by "negotiations."

An amnesty is announced for emigres who seek repatriation.

November 29:

The regime requests that the Austrian Government help young Hungarian emigres to return home.

December 1:

The regime promises to remedy economic injustices caused by the illegal withdrawal of pensions in the past.

December 3:

Special wages are granted to miners, and the government promises to start investigations of former Security Police officials.

December 4:

Hungarian women in Budapest hold a demonstration for their dead and are fired on by Soviet guns.

Minister of Defense Ferenc Munnich abolishes revolutionary committees on the grounds that they "hamper lawful authorities" and do not carry out any activity in the interests of the public.

"Formations of public order" begin to "discharge their duties in the provinces."

Army officers are made to sign pledges supporting the government.

December 5:

New waves of anti-regime outbursts occur. *Hungarian writers issue a proclamation denouncing Soviet intervention.* Demonstrations in front of foreign legations are broken up by police.

December 6:

The regime condemns the flood of posters and leaflets calling on Budapest citizens to strike, demonstrate, and engage in armed action. Several leaders of the Revolt are arrested, including journalist Gyula Obersovszky, accused of distributing anti-State pamphlets. The government also denounces the presence of "criminal elements" in the workers' councils.

The Budapest Workers' Council sends the government a telegram protesting the arrests of the workers' elected leaders.

The government further affronts popular sentiment by

announcing that UN Secretary-General Hammerskjold will not be welcome on December 16.

A clash occurs between Budapest workers and a group of Kadar supporters marching under a red flag.

The government promises investigation of pre-Revolt AVH (Security Police) practices.

December 7:

New strikes and street fights break out. The Budapest Workers' Council issues a proclamation charging that the continued jailing of workers' leaders will end in a general strike and a new national tragedy. Thousands of workers stay away from their jobs and the electric power situation grows more acute.

December 8:

A Party resolution condemns "counterrevolutionary" activities and attempts to exclude Communists from the workers' councils. On the other hand, the resolution stresses the need to break with the Stalinist past, to democratize the Party, to "construct Socialism" according to Hungarian conditions and to revise economic policy with a view to raising the workers' living standard and increasing agricultural production in both the private and collective sectors. The resolution supports a policy of cultural freedom and pledges to establish a foreign policy of close cooperation with the USSR and the "People's Democracies" on the principles of national independence and sovereignty.

December 9:

The regime outlaws the Budapest Workers' Council and all councils outside factories and declares martial law. Summary jurisdiction is to apply to anyone in illegal possession of arms or guilty of attempts to commit murder, manslaughter, arson, robbery or looting.

Workers' guards are ordered to declare all arms in their possession by December 12 and to request licenses for them.

The government announces that, in certain cases, collective farms will be allowed a one-year extension for fulfillment of their obligations to the State.

December 12:

A general strike goes into effect.

The regime announces that no public meetings or demonstrations can be held without official approval for one month. (This was later extended to June 30, 1957.)

December 13:

The strike continues. Sandor Bali and Sandor Racz, leaders of the outlawed Budapest Workers' Council, are arrested.

A decree abolishes special income taxes for independent artisans and tradesmen who employ help.

The government announces that anyone whose activities or attitudes "endanger public order," or who in-



Defendants in the first public show trial against "counterrevolutionaries" who had fought in the Revolt shown as they are sentenced to death. Left to right: Ilona Toth, Miklos Gyongyosi, Ferenc Gonezi.

photo from *Erdekes Ujsag* (Budapest), April 27, 1957

terferes with smooth production or transportation must be taken into custody.

December 18:

The radio begins to broadcast almost daily announcements of arrests of "counterrevolutionaries."

December 24:

The Party press discloses that 1956 coal production fell ten million tons short of the plan and that the national income had dropped by almost ten billion *forint*. The electric power shortage has forced the government to close a number of industrial plants and, as a result, some 100,000-200,000 workers will be out of jobs.

December 26:

The Ministry of Agriculture condemns illegal sales of collective farm property and issues instructions that all property and equipment of former collectives must be handed over to other collectives, State farms or MTS.

December 29:

The government reveals that between the end of September and December 20 the total number of collective farms declined from 3,930 to about 2,000. A campaign begins to defend kolkhozes against moves "aimed at mutilation of common collective land."

A National Price Office is established.

Minister of Finance Istvan Kossa states that 1957 investments will be cut by 5 billion *forint*. Savings will be made by reducing expenditures for the armed forces and by reorganizing the State apparatus. All large-scale construction will be stopped. Kossa estimates

the total number of unemployed, including civil servants, at 250,000.

Age requirements are decreased for old-age pensions. Men of 58 and women of 53 will be eligible.

December 30:

Ministerial mergers reduce size of State apparatus. The Ministry of State Control is abolished.

Announcement that farmers' compulsory fire and hail insurance will be abolished at the end of March.

January 3, 1957:

Announcement that the reconstituted post-Revolt Party has 100,000 members.

Statement that Soviet troops will leave Budapest if "order" is restored.

January 6:

A long policy declaration discusses need to: draw up new economic plan; broaden fields for independent artisans and craftsmen's cooperatives; supply agriculture with more machinery; raise livestock production; promote "Socialized" agriculture on a voluntary basis; support flourishing kolkhozes and punish offenses committed against collectivized land; effect decentralization; ensure workers' participation in economic life; and guarantee implementation of government resolutions. The declaration also asserts the principle of "freedom" for scientists and artists, "regardless of their political tenets—except for the enemies of Socialism."



Ceremonial State funeral for several men who, the caption states, were killed defending the Budapest radio station from "counter-revolutionaries" on October 23-24, the first days of the Revolt.

photo from *Erdekes Ujsag* (Budapest), April 27, 1957

January 8:

The Central Council of Trade Unions postpones general union elections.

The workers' council on Csepel Island resigns, claiming that the government has deprived it of authority and is arresting the workers' elected leaders.

January 12:

The regime grants loans to workers interested in setting up small businesses.

Eight student leaders are arrested for drafting resolution re-endorsing October 23 demands.

January 13:

Strikes and every effective form of opposition are made subject to the death penalty.

January 15:

The government assumes direct control over all organizations and associations.

January 16:

Kadar criticizes "bourgeois tendencies" in the press, denounces "reformist" views among intellectuals, and insists that "democracy" must have "class content."

January 17:

The Ministry of Interior suspends Writers' Union for "anti-State activities."

January 19:

Jozsef Dudas and Janos Szabo, leaders during the Revolt, are executed.

The Ministry of Interior appoints an overseer for the Journalists' Union.



A woman in Budapest having her identification papers "re-validated," as was required of the whole population by the end of September 1957.

photo from *Erdekes Ujsag* (Budapest), April 20, 1957



One of the new aluminum newspaper stands being set up as Budapest is rebuilt.

photo from *Erdekes Ujsag* (Budapest), March 23, 1957

January 20:

The Ministry of State Security takes over control of all associations.

January 22:

The regime grants miners loans to build houses.

January 25:

Five Communist writers and two journalists are arrested on "suspicion of counterrevolutionary activity."

Minister of the Armed Forces Ferenc Munnich announces army reorganization.

January 26:

A new Ministry of Labor is created.

The regime states that no obstacles must be put in the way of export activities by independent artisans, who must be assured more supplies.

January 27:

Minister of State Gyorgy Marosan warns students not to demonstrate on March 15 (Independence Day). He also opposes demands for university autonomy and rejects student protests against courses in Marxism-Leninism.

January 28:

Kadar guarantees trade unions "autonomy," but says that they cannot be independent of the Party. The Premier also criticizes certain workers' councils for

assuming powers beyond their scope and hints at trade union supremacy over the councils.

January 30:

In a drive to tighten control in agriculture, the government removes Zoltan Vas and four other officials of the cooperative agricultural trading organization.

February 2:

Kadar denounces "national Communism," blames Imre Nagy for fomenting the Revolt, and warns that the "counterrevolution" will pay a high price for any new "provocation." He condemns hostile activities in the countryside and among the Communist intelligentsia, and discusses pressures exerted by believers and non-believers in the field of religious education.

February 3:

A decree states that private land holdings acquired in the future will be restricted to 20-25 cadastral holds (11.5-14.4 hectares).

February 6:

Tightening measures against refugees, the regime increases penalties for illegal border crossings.

February 15:

Announcement of decree allowing peasants who suffered damages during previous collectivization drives to claim compensation.

February 17:

The regime appoints new army leadership and announces that henceforth the Party will play a greater role in shaping the army's "political content."

February 18:

The government disbands the workers' guards and calls for formation of new workers' militia.

February 24:

Farmers are told that taxes will not be increased, that there will be no compulsory sowing area and that the system of voluntary production contracts will be enlarged.

February 28:

The Central Committee is expanded from 23 to 37 members. The Party leadership attacks "revisionist" tendencies, and issues a sweeping denunciation of Nagy. A campaign to increase Party membership begins, and former Party members are given until May 1 to rejoin.

March 1:

The government makes further ministerial changes, with emphasis on decentralization and reduction of administrative personnel.

The government announces that manifestations of student unrest are to be treated as "provocations" and checked by police.

March 2:

The total number of farm collectives is given as 2,349, indicating a re-collectivization drive.

Announcement that Russian will be compulsory in all elementary schools. It will not be compulsory in secondary schools but will be given administrative preference.

March 7:

Theoretician Jozsef Revai publishes most outspokenly "Stalinist" article to appear since the Revolt. Attacks Nagy "revisionism" as main threat to Communism, while only mildly criticizing "Rakosiism."

March 13:

Announcement that as of February 23, 40 persons were sentenced to death by summary courts. Repeated calls for pitiless fight against "counterrevolution."

March 17:

A new Communist Youth League (KISZ) is formed to replace the pre-Revolt youth organization DISZ.

March 19:

A decree is passed sanctioning internal deportations of "troublesome individuals."

March 20:

Kadar visits Moscow. He lauds USSR intervention in Hungary, denounces Nagy, promises to take a categorical stand against "revisionism" and to increase "punitive aspects" of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." He announces that the new Communist Party will be smaller than the pre-Revolt Party and include only "true Communists." He also promises to reinforce the Warsaw Pact, commends presence of Soviet troops in Hungary, asserts "equality" of Soviet-Hungarian relations and obtains a long-term economic loan.



Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, in Budapest, shown toasting Premier Janos Kadar (center) and Istvan Dudas.

photo from *Erdekes Ujsag* January 19, 1957

March 23:

A new decree calls for government approval of Church appointments made since October and in the future. A second decree announces that the "full rigor of the law" will be applied against individuals who use religious instruction for "anti-State purposes" and who exert pressure for or against religious instruction.

March 24:

Announcement that the population must have identity cards checked.

April 1:

The regime discontinues the amnesty for refugees.

April 3:

Minister of State Marosan states that some 1,146 farm collectives have been reconstituted since November.

April 8:

Three death sentences passed in first major show trial of "counterrevolutionaries."

April 11:

Report that Gyorgy Lukacs, Minister of Culture under Nagy and in Romania with Nagy, had asked to return home.

April 21:

Jozsef Revai repeats his view that "revisionism" is the main danger to Communism.

The Writers' Union is dissolved and writer Tibor Dery is arrested.

April 25:

Mihaly Farkas, Defense Minister under Rakosi, is sentenced to 16 years in prison for "violations" during his term of office.

May 1:

Former Socialist Miklos Vas is appointed Vice-Chairman of Trade Union Council.

May 5:

Announcement that the new Party has 300,000 members and that many former members did not apply for re-admission.

May 7:

Death sentences given to three followers of Jozsef Dudas.

May 9:

Kadar announces postponement of promised general elections at opening session of parliament. The Premier rejects demands for a multi-party system, saying that it would only create ideological disunity. He instructs the nation to concentrate on economic recovery and announces that as a result of recent wage increases, the sum paid out in wages and salaries has increased by 1.4 billion forint.

Kadar forms a new government, composed of Kadar stalwarts and one former Social Democrat.

II. Trends and Perspectives

"No organization of our Communist Party, [however] camouflaged by various pseudonyms, ever elected Kadar or his accomplices to take over the government of the nation. They could not have done so even if they had been authorized by the Hungarian people, or the Hungarian Communist Party, because it is not they but Russian terror that rules the country. . . ."

Radio [Free] Rajk, Unidentified location in Hungary,

November 11, 1956

IN THE SIX MONTHS that have passed since Soviet tanks blasted the Hungarian rebels, Janos Kadar has zigzagged from concession to repression, seeking to extirpate the seeds of popular rebellion. Flouting the sentiments of the nation he betrayed, the puppet ruler has described Soviet terror as "friendly aid," himself and a few accomplices as the Communist Party, and the freedoms his countrymen fought for at so great a price as slogans of the "fascist counterrevolution." Armed with these hypocritical perversions, and backed by Soviet power, he has persecuted the brave and unrepentant, suppressed popular liberties, and pledged his country's unwavering submission to the USSR. At the same time, however, Kadar has had to cope with the fact of his own isolation by embracing some of the popular causes upheld during the bloody October days. Having neither a Party nor a people behind him, he has been compelled to give ground economically and, to a lesser degree politically, in order to solve a chaotic situation, assume actual command, and permit an end to overt Soviet control.

The battle did not end with the fighting: in mid-November, plagued by a paralyzing industrial strike, opposed by a still inflammable population, and having virtually no allies except the Soviet Army, Kadar was forced to court leaders of non-Communist parties and to adopt a conciliatory attitude towards the people's demands. His overtures, however, were met with hostility and mistrust; and his promises had an increasingly hollow ring as police and army units ruthlessly rounded up masses of Hungarian insurgents. The strikes and demonstrations continued, as Kadar began slowly to renege on some of his promises, moved to wipe out all organs of revolutionary power, and withheld major political concessions. In the end, economic resistance was broken only by threats of death for all "provocations." From that time on, it became unmistakably clear that Kadar would tolerate no form of liberalization endangering absolute Communist supremacy.

As soon as he had overcome his initial weakness, Kadar rejected all possibilities of a multi-party system, and broke his immediate post-Revolt promise to hold free elections. Indeed, he postponed elections of any sort in the realization that the regime could not afford the risk at the present time. On the other hand, he has persistently tried to make peace with the people by verbal repudiation of the "Stalinist past," and by removing from power some of the most


notorious leaders of the hated Rakosi government. He has also attempted to broaden the base of his support by continuing to seek the support of individuals formerly affiliated with other parties or factions of the Communist Party—providing they are willing (as some former Social Democratic Trade Union leaders have been) to cooperate fully with him.

Even though he has opposed "revisionist tendencies," i.e., real liberalization, and has supported the view that "Rakosiism" is a relatively lesser crime, Kadar has nevertheless proclaimed himself to be following some middle course between the two. In political fact, however, his efforts to liquidate the "counterrevolution" have resulted in a rule comparable in harshness to that of the worst Rakosi days. Kadar has restored the system of internment camps, abolished by Nagy in 1953, has called for the arrests of all "troublesome individuals" and has clamped down on all associations and organizations. With trials and arrests still occurring daily, it is probable that the popula-



Above: An Army captain showing members of the "workers' militia" the parts of a machine gun. Below: "Csepel workers' militia taking the oath."

photo from *Erdekes Ujsag* (Budapest), March 16, 1957



Four new Ministers who entered the government on March 1. Left to right: Defense Minister Geza Revesz, Interior Minister Bela Biszku, Education Minister Gyula Kallai, Health Minister Frigyes Doleschall.

photo from *Erdekes Ujsag* (Budapest), March 9, 1957

tion has been little impressed by the dissolution of the pre-Revolt security police organization; everyone in Hungary has had the opportunity to know that the police still retain crushing power.

Kadar has clamped down in areas vital to his political control, but he has understood the advisability of permitting relaxation in areas where he is not threatened politically. His harshest measures have been reserved for individuals and groups, such as the liberal Communist writers, who have openly persisted in opposing his orders despite repeated warnings; unable to win or subdue them, Kadar has put them in prison. Yet, needing the support of Communist intellectuals, he has given the press more leeway than it had in the past and, barring articles on political subjects, periodicals have lately assumed a more lively tone.

Kadar's crying need for any and every form of support also has promoted some relaxation in Church-State relations. Towards the end of November, with the nation aroused by the treacherous capture of Imre Nagy, Kadar imitated the Gomulka regime in Poland by guaranteeing religious freedom and acquiescing to a revival of religious education. Since that time, he has defended this revival against opposition from hostile forces. On the other hand, having gained new confidence in his reorganized army and police force, Kadar recently has made clear his view of the Church's subordination to the State; he has reasserted his control over Church affairs, and so far his promised "negotiations" with the Church have resulted only in a forced statement of political support by the Hungarian Catholic Bishops.

Relations with Youth

KADAR'S ZIGZAG POLICY is perhaps best illustrated in his dealings with youth, from whose ranks the majority of rebels came. In the days following the final Soviet intervention, a great number of young people fled the country

and many others were arrested, deported and executed; those who remained were openly hostile and either "lost interest" in politics, or joined new, non-Party organizations in which they continued to demand national autonomy and independence. The situation remained chaotic until mid-March, when Kadar, having prevented a student demonstration on Hungarian Independence Day, called for the formation of a new Party youth organization to teach "Socialism" to young people. The regime has admitted that winning youth's confidence will be an arduous task, and so far the government has refrained from alienating young people further by liquidating non-Party organizations still in existence. For the moment, the program for youth seems to be based on "persuasion" and correction of "past errors."

The Party has been particularly wary of the student youth organization, MEFESZ, which played a major role in the Revolt, and it has tried to infiltrate the MEFESZ leadership with trusted Communists. It has also warned students about the dangers of demanding freedom for universities and has insisted that the study of Marxism-Leninism will remain a basic requirement; to offset this, the Party has compromised on the question of national feelings by making Russian language courses compulsory only in primary schools and by paying lip service to the "Hungarian road to Socialism."



Opening of the National Assembly on May 9. Istvan Dobi, president of the Presidium, in inset.

Erdekes Ujsag (Budapest), May 11, 1957

Economic Concessions

FAR MORE BASIC CONCESSIONS have been granted in the economic field. Soviet tanks could suppress the Revolt, but had little power to get the workers back on the job and producing effectively. For months after the Revolt, the nation lived on reserves and foreign aid, and by the time the strike was broken, losses had mounted enormously. Kadar thus took the only course open to him: to speed economic recovery, he was forced to give more material incentive—to raise wages. To increase supplies of consumer goods he was forced to allow limited private trade. He also conceded to the permanent existence of workers' councils as economic organs and promised the workers a greater role in economic management. Miners, in particular, benefited by concessions, since their refusal to go down into the pits was responsible for a serious slowdown and cutback in production.

Partly because of these concessions, the workers have saved the country from absolute economic disaster. The farmers, however, have been the chief beneficiaries of regime concessions. Immediately upon assuming office, Kadar realized that the urban workers were his most formidable foes; he therefore turned to the peasantry for support and cancelled the much-hated compulsory delivery system. Since then, he has granted the farmers other concessions—i.e., he has promised not to increase farm taxes—and although the government has not abandoned its program to "Socialize agriculture" and has attempted to reconstitute dissolved collectives, it is unlikely that it will push collectivization as it did in the past. The Party has continually promised the farmers that "mistakes of the past" will not be repeated, and has discussed the importance of material incentives in boosting agricultural output.

Kadar's present economic program represents, in part,



Janos Kadar addressing the National Assembly on May 9.

Erdekes Ujsag (Budapest), May 11

a continuation of the program launched by Gero under pressure in the immediate pre-Revolt period. Politically, his course is harsher: he clearly intends to prevent all opposition to his rule and will insist on maintaining Party control in all political and ideological spheres.

One Rote to "Socialism"

Kozneveles (Budapest), a periodical published by the Hungarian Ministry of Culture, reported in its May 1 issue the following remarks addressed by a Budapest high school teacher to his class:

"You must be prepared for the possibility that the chairman at your [oral] final exams will ask your opinion of the October events. I cannot help you on this subject. But tell your political science teacher to dictate the required text to you, and then learn it well."



Left: "Over there—I wonder how much you people make in this business?" Right: "Over here—I wonder how much the People's State has to contribute to this business?"



Szpilki (Warsaw), May 19, 1957

Current Developments

Area

Traffic in Delegations

Satellite countries, which in former times sent their delegations chiefly to the Soviet Union, continued their recent trend toward more frequent visits with each other. A Czechoslovak group, headed by Premier Viliam Siroky, spent five days in East Germany, May 20-24, participating in denunciations of West Germany and NATO. Romania sent a parliamentary delegation to Czechoslovakia, May 25 (and received one the next day from Yugoslavia). Bulgarian Party and government leaders, including Secretary Todor Zhivkov and Premier Anton Yugov, went to Hun-

gary, June 4-6. And on June 17 the Polish Party leader, Wladyslaw Gomulka, left for a visit to East Germany in what was expected to be a show of reconciliation between the two Parties which have been at odds since the Polish liberalization. All the Satellite countries, along with Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and North Korea, attended the Third Congress of the Union of Scientific and Technical Organizations, May 16-17, in Sofia.

There was also considerable contact with lands outside the East European world, Communist and non-Communist. A Bulgarian Army delegation met with Chinese regime leaders Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai in Peiping, May 4. The French Communist Party sent a group to Hungary, May 31. (Other French Party members had been in Bulgaria and Romania in April.) The Poles received the British Nobel Prize-winning physicist Professor Cockcroft for a lecture, May 19, and on June 4, *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw) reported that an American trade delegation had arrived in Poland to discuss Polish economic needs as well as American participation at the Poznan Fair. (This year's fair is the first in which the U. S. has participated.) A Polish

Party group journeyed to Helsinki, Finland, May 30, and on the same day a Czechoslovak delegation in Colombo extended a trade agreement with the government of Ceylon. One Romanian group returned from China, May 17, and another from Australia, June 1, after signing a trade agreement with that country.

Poland

Gomulka Addresses Ninth Plenum

On May 15, the opening day of the Ninth Plenum of the Party Central Committee, Wladyslaw Gomulka delivered a long policy report in which he pleaded the cause of Party unity. The Polish chief promised to stand by decisions made at the Eighth Plenum last October, but he closely defined the limits of democratization, condemned attempts within the Party to go beyond these limits, and insisted that the Party must assume leadership in developing the "Polish road to Socialism."

"Proletarian Internationalism" and "The Polish Road"

In his opening remarks Gomulka sought to clear up "misunderstandings" which had arisen in connection with the theory of national roads to "Socialism." He said that the Polish road to "Socialism" contained three main elements—development of workers' councils, of various forms of peasant economic self-management, and expansion of the powers of the people's councils. He asserted that it was neither necessary nor "entirely suitable" for nations having different historical conditions to take the road adopted by the USSR, but he warned that "Socialism" was opposed to all forms of nationalism and was based on general principles common to all countries. Gomulka said that these principles included the establishment of a Marxist-Leninist Party, the socialization of means of production, "proletarian internationalism," and the unity and equality of all "Socialist" countries. Placing particular emphasis on the role of the Party in building "Socialism," Gomulka said:

"The direction of . . . processes [transforming society from capitalism to Socialism] by the Marxist-Leninist Party of the working class is essential. . . . All our enemies know this. . . . That is why they attack Socialism and aim above all at the Party. . . . The most important task is for the Party of the working class to conduct a policy which favors strengthening the Party and which augments its leading role. . . ."

Party to Lead Workers' Councils

Gomulka underlined the necessity of Party leadership in referring to the desired future status of the workers' councils. He mentioned "harmful tendencies" manifested in discussions on the role of the councils, and insisted that the councils were not organs of political power. He also stated that the Polish councils would differ from those in Yugoslavia, and opposed various "false concepts" concerning the workers' collective ownership of factories. The Party Secre-



Minister, to workers playing with ball marked "workers' council": "Go ahead and play, children, don't disturb yourselves."

Glos Szczecinski (Szczecin), April 11, 1957

tary stated that both central planning and central administration were necessary in Poland and that plans to establish councils on a level above enterprises would merely confuse matters, since the councils would then take over functions now performed by administrative organs without having the necessary administrative experience.

He defined the tasks of the workers' councils as: studying production and production costs, compiling reports on the qualifications of employees occupying important posts, and taking steps against the "plague of thefts, bribery and other offenses in work establishments." Gomulka also spoke about the councils' role in organizing work, technical progress, labor discipline and the distribution of the factory's works fund. He added that it was necessary to establish arbitration commissions composed of ministerial and trade union representatives to settle differences of opinion that might arise between the councils and management.

The Party leader emphatically declared that the councils could "not be left to their own fate." He called upon the trade unions to help the councils and declared that the Party must supply "political leadership" by instructing Party members of the councils, "who should be united in a Party group." Although Gomulka insisted that the councils must retain their "autonomous character" and

that council membership should not be dictated from above, he also insisted on the removal from the councils of "ideologically alien elements which emerged on the crest of the October wave." He further stated that "The task of a workers' Party is . . . to point out to workers the candidates for membership in the councils whose . . . election would be the best guarantee of successful work." In conclusion, he warned the councils not to become divorced from their staffs and not to make "ill-timed experiments" that might be too costly.

More Power to People's Councils

Gomulka then turned to the problem of the people's councils which, along with the workers' councils, are to play a major role in the decentralization program. Gomulka announced that so far results in transferring more power to the people's councils [which are local organs of administration] were unsatisfactory. To speed decentralization, he urged, among other things, that: controversial questions concerning the activity of central and local authorities be solved (presumably by shifting to the latter work they ought to be doing), and that districts and towns, henceforth under effective council management, be transformed into key centers of economic, cultural and social activity. He also called upon ministries to desist from petty interference in the councils' work, directing that local councils completely take over the management of small State industry in 1957, and that they be assured of financial independence by increased revenues. "The peoples'

councils," Gomulka emphasized, "are the State authority on a local level. The Party must work and watch daily to see that these organs function as well as possible."

Agricultural Policy Substantially Unchanged

With regard to the third element in Poland's "road to Socialism," Gomulka stated: "Agricultural circles, producers' associations and peasant [presumably, trade] cooperatives express the idea of the peasantry's economic autonomy." The Party leader went on to explain that the agricultural circles [entailing cooperation other than land pooling], like the workers' councils, have an economic character and must help raise production. He stressed, particularly, their ability to form associations for the purchase of agricultural tools for common use in villages, and remarked that the heads of such associations would "play a decisive role" in the "struggle" between the poor and wealthy peasants by ensuring that the former are no longer dependent on the latter for the use of agricultural machines. Gomulka reiterated his previous stand that the Party believed in the extensive development of various forms of co-operation, but that no peasant would be forced into an agricultural collective. He stated, however, that the "rural cooperative [must] become the main sector in which Party organizations concentrate their work." No concession was made to Natolin demands that the Eighth Plenum decision to countenance de-collectivization be reversed or denounced.

Gomulka also spoke about the Party's cooperation with the ZSL (United Peasant Party) which, he said, had drawn up the new agricultural policy jointly with the Communist Party. Gomulka assured the ZSL of independence from the Party, but at the same time he expressed anxiety about "hostile elements" in the ZSL's ranks and denounced "various types of demagogues, troublemakers and people who still dream about [pre-war peasant leader] Mikolajczyk" and who are beginning to "raise their heads even more boldly."

Major Stress on Party Unity

After briefly discussing the Party's policy of coexistence with the Church, Gomulka dealt with the crucial problems of Party unity and Party leadership. On the subject of the Party's role in democratization, Gomulka said:

"The Party represents the most important instrument for the solution of all problems of our life. . . . This is exactly what many people not only outside but also inside our Party forget. . . . Socialist democracy can develop only . . . under conditions of a . . . liquidation of the ideological-political influence of the bourgeoisie and a systematic expansion and strengthening of the ideological-political influence of Socialism among wide strata of the working people. . . . Those who see in the Party an obstacle hampering the broadening of democratic freedoms in our country take a naive view of the problem of Socialist democracy. The Party is the main obstacle preventing the bourgeoisie and the reaction from abusing democratic freedoms to the detriment of Socialism and the interests of the working class. . . ."

Gomulka then stated that the Party's strength depended

A Story on Promotion

By J. B. from Zabrze

From *Przekrój* (Cracow), May 19, 1957

AT LAST MY DAD is 65 years old!

All his life he has been an intellectual, a modestly placed bureaucrat earning only 1,200 *zloty* a month. His status as a member of the intelligentsia has constantly hindered his career and my own as well. I was given neither scholarships nor any of the other benefits participated in by Polish youth. Nevertheless, neither dad nor I were downhearted. In fact, every year on St. Andrew's Day we celebrated together by drinking "pure Polish vodka."

This year dad was released from work at the bureau and began to draw his monthly 480 *zloty* old-age pension. With the help of friends he obtained new employment—a fine working-class job at an automobile servicing garage, where his wages are 1,500 *zloty* per month, plus tips which run nearly as high as his salary. Thus, it can at last be said that I am of worker-peasant origin! Unfortunately, however, it has all come too late. I have already finished my studies, and the list of directors' cadres is closed to me.

At any rate—this year dad and I celebrated St. Andrew's Day with genuine Tokay wine.

above all on the unity of its ranks. Although he declared that unity could not be "blind and mechanical" and must be based on principles of "democratic centralism," he also said that:

"... a Party member cannot have the right to express outside the Party convictions not conforming to the convictions of the majority of members. . . . If a member does not agree with the Party, if he does not want to subordinate his opinion on basic problems to the will of the majority of the Party, if his general outlook prevents him from accepting the ideological principles of the Party, he must leave its ranks. . . . or the Party must exclude him from its ranks."

Gomulka stated that Party unity had been seriously weakened by violations of democratic centralism and by parallel mistakes in Party policy prior to the Eighth Plenum. This crisis, he said, had been manifested by mistrust of Party organizations, ideological chaos within the Party, and the emergence of various mutually opposed Party groups. Gomulka added that the crisis had been influenced to a large extent by the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress which, through its exposure of the "cult of the individual" had caused a serious upheaval within the international "workers' movement." Gomulka declared that the Eighth Plenum had shown the Party the path out of this crisis. He pointed out that the reorganized Politburo was already "acting as a monolith" but he warned that the Party was still weak, "like a convalescent after a grave illness," and

that this weakness had permitted a broad offensive against it.

"In October and later, various reactionary, petty bourgeois and rebellious elements misused criticism and self-criticism carried out by the Party . . . and launched a campaign against hundreds and thousands of the most active Party members . . . under the false slogan of a struggle against Stalinists. . . . Since the Eighth Plenum, the Party has failed to achieve a fully monolithic character in its ranks. The consequences of the previous period are finding expression in ideological confusion . . . in false theories, in revisionist tendencies and in a tendency to deny democratic centralism as the Party's organizational basis."

"Revisionists" Harshly Attacked

Gomulka was particularly harsh on the subject of revisionism. He sternly reprimanded Party writer Kolakowski for an article in *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), February 3, which stated that "Socialist democracy" should not be opposed to "bourgeois democracy," and which recommended that the Party do no more than inspire the development of "Socialism." Gomulka also attacked as revisionists Communist editors Zimand and Woroszylski, who work, respectively, on *Poprostu* and *Nowa Kultura*. "All revisionist theories," the Party leader announced, "are similar to one another, for they come from the same source: from the same bourgeois ideology under whose influence Social Democratic ideology was formed."

Gomulka accused the revisionists of failing to recognize



Polish Boy Scouts marching in the Warsaw May Day celebration.

Swiat (Warsaw), May 5, 1957

The Diligent Profiteers

A FIFTY MILLION *zloty* enterprise founded in the Polish courts during the month of May, while the Office of the Public Prosecutor ordered the arrests of 21 persons and made tortuous progress through a maze of crooked dealing, perjury, bribery, and conscienceless adulteration of wine and vodka.

Details, as recounted over Radio Warsaw, May 18, were incomplete but fascinating. The heroes of this financial odyssey toward a disproportionate share of the profits of the liquor industry were Henryk Sosna and Ryszard Kowarski; their resourcefulness in overcoming problem after problem was a monument to ingenuity if not to honesty. The opening gambit was the purchase of an eleven-hectare fruit farm in the Grojec district, purportedly for Kowarski's ex-wife. Why the entrepreneurs employed this lady's name as a front for the operation was not disclosed by the broadcast; how she happened to be the *ex-Mrs. Kowarski*—a fact which may or may not have importance in the case—was also unexplained. All that shows clearly in the early stages of the enterprise is that, immediately after taking possession of the farm, Sosna and Kowarski built a modest, though illegal, juice-processing factory for their own fruit and for that of some of their more readily corruptible neighbors.

The next step in their unethical pursuit of the almighty *zloty* was to circumvent the State purchasing agents and sell directly—and therefore more profitably—to the wine-ries and vodka distilling factories. Since national law prohibits the factories from accepting produce without the State purchasing agent's label, a certain amount of judi-

the Party's leading role, of denying democratic centralism, and of disputing the essence of the class struggle. The ideology of revisionism, he continued, was the ideology of capitulation to the class enemy. "In our conditions, the views and thoughts of the revisionists are . . . aimed at a return to the past while pretending to pave the way for the future."

Gomulka also referred, though more mildly, to the dangers of dogmatism and conservatism. The dogmatists, he declared, are "politically isolated from the masses because they carry out a narrow sectarian policy unacceptable to the masses of the population. . . . The dogmatists always utter correct Marxist principles. . . . But for them, these correct principles are nothing but phrases or empty sounds because under the dogmatic methods of thinking these principles cannot be put into practice." In a later passage Gomulka condemned "conservatism" within the Party apparatus. "This," he explained, "is not ideological and dogmatic conservatism. Of the latter only a little now is left, though it still exists. It is practical conservatism, deriving from the habit of using administrative work methods."

Strikes Explained as "Contradictions"

Gomulka also touched upon the problem of strikes. Stating that nothing further could be squeezed from the economy for wage increases, the Party chief referred to "a number of recent short strikes in various enterprises caused by

cious bribery became necessary. Twenty-nine managers of fruit and vegetable purchasing agencies succumbed to temptation and provided the labels. But this only uncovered a new problem for the two friends; to ship their produce they needed railroad priority. They got it—in the same manner in which they acquired purchasing agency labels.

Having thus gained direct entree to the factories, Sosna and Kowarski, naturally enough, applied themselves to methods of increasing production. Since carrots and beetroots grow on the farms in their area, and since those vegetables are considerably cheaper on the Polish market than fruit, the entrepreneurs hit upon the idea of diluting their processed fruit juices with vegetable juice. The quantity of their product increased magnificently, but, as in their previous machinations, success brought still more problems. Two sets of factory functionaries had to be pacified: one, not to notice the odd composition of the Sosna-Kowarski vintage; the other, not to voice suspicion at the sudden increase in shipments from the Grojec area. Therefore the friends recruited purchasing agents from other parts of the country. More bribes were paid. More people came into the enterprise, which, presumably, grew to such a size that the details could no longer be contained. Unsusceptible authorities got wind of the various manipulations and closed in.

As yet no date has been set for the public trial of Sosna and Kowarski, who have thus far refused to make a full confession. The Public Prosecutor is still bravely navigating the maze.

economic demands." Gomulka declared that the Party strongly opposed strikes but, at the same time, did not want to take administrative measures against striking workers:

"Workers know very well the limits within which a strike must be contained so as not to require intervention by the authorities. They know very well that there are kinds of work which . . . do not admit strikes. . . . A strike is a signal of political weakness in the Party organization. Without depriving workers of the right to strike we must tell them: a strike is not a means of improving life; it does not increase but reduces the national ration of bread. Consequently, it is better not to strike. A strike as such is the expression of certain contradictions between the working class or some individual groups of it and the people's power. But these contradictions are not antagonistic, or can be non-antagonistic. One can always settle them through mutual agreement. . . ."

In other parts of his speech Gomulka discussed the need for further industrialization, for liquidating profiteering in private trade, and for removing corrupt or purely 'formal' members from Party ranks. Towards the end of his lengthy, six-hour report, he returned once again to the subject of "proletarian internationalism." Although he upheld the view that differences of opinion between Communist Parties are normal, he cautioned that, "in relations between Parties, we place in the forefront everything which unites

us . . . and put aside whatever divides us, letting time furnish a solution." He also insisted that Polish independence and sovereignty depended on the unity of all "Socialist" States and the "international workers' movement, headed by Communist and Workers' Parties." Not only did he fail to designate the USSR as the leader of the Communist movement, but he also plainly stated that "we can differ from other Parties in our appreciation of the events in Hungary." Gomulka added, however, that "this does not change the fact . . . that, for the sake of maintaining peace and security for all Socialist countries, the Soviet Army's help in suppressing the counterrevolution was a regrettable but unavoidable necessity."

While speaking temperately of the Soviet Union, Gomulka reserved his highest praise for the Chinese Communist Party. He commended the Chinese for developing the "creative teaching" of Marxism-Leninism: "The new methods of solving non-antagonistic differences are an expression of the great force of the Chinese Communist Party and of its profound link with the people. The thesis of the hundred flowers blossoming also constitutes a bold step hitherto unknown in the practice of Socialist building in other countries." In conclusion, Gomulka mentioned the necessity of finding new methods of Party political work. He cautioned, however, that the search for new methods could be fruitful only if it did not conceal the fundamental contradictions between capitalism and "Socialism": "Certain of our revisionists lose sight of these differences and they thereby set foot on the road which leads to apostasy." (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], May 16-17.)

Resolution on Party Tasks

Before the Plenum ended on May 18, the Party passed a resolution based on the main lines of Gomulka's speech. The resolution condemned the revival of "reactionary forces," denounced attempts to "reestablish bourgeois parties and organizations," and decried efforts of "hostile forces" to infiltrate the Communist Party. It also attacked views opposing Polish sovereignty to the "Polish-Soviet alliance" and the "international solidarity of Socialist States." Other parts of the resolution called for a struggle against all "manifestations of the witchhunt against Party leaders and activists," against factionalism, revisionism, pressure against religious non-believers, and speculation in private trade. Aside from affirming Gomulka's statements regarding the workers' and people's councils, the resolution discussed the problem of "reviving the political movement of youth under Party leadership." The resolution claimed that Party assistance to youth should be more than "organizational" in view of the fact that "retrograde, reactionary forces are trying to confuse the minds of youth with alien ideology, nationalism, clericalism and disbelief in the superiority of Socialism and its future."

Berman and Radkiewicz Ousted from Party

The Ninth Plenum also passed a resolution recalling Jakub Berman, former Politburo member, and Stanislaw Radkiewicz, former head of the Ministry of Security, from

the Central Committee and excluding them from the Party. This action was taken after a commission appointed by the Eighth Plenum reported on the results of its investigations concerning Party responsibility for past "distortions" in the administration of justice. Berman and Radkiewicz will have the right to reapply for Party membership after three years. The resolution similarly expelled former Deputy Minister of Public Security Mieczyslaw Mietkowski from Party membership; Mietkowski had previously been removed from the Central Committee.

Although both Berman and Radkiewicz were made responsible for laxity in guiding the work of security organs, the commission declared that both men were ignorant of the criminal methods of investigation practiced by the Tenth Department of the Ministry of Security. It declared that security officials Romkowski, Fejgin, Rozanski and Swiatlo (the latter now in the West) had "deliberately concealed these impermissible methods" from Radkiewicz and the Politburo in general. The cases of the three former police officials are now under investigation; Swiatlo, the resolution said, "is now making use of both calumnies and real crimes," of which "he was one of the main perpetrators and accomplices."


Party Congress in December

The Plenum decided to convene the Third Party Congress in December and appointed a commission to draft amendments to Party rules and the theses of the Congress. Although the commission is composed largely of known Gomulka supporters, it also includes Party members to the left and right of Gomulka, i.e., the "Stalinist" Wiktor

Gomulka's Humor at Poznan

ANSWERING THE QUESTIONS of workers at the Cegielski factory, Polish Party leader Gomulka observed that some questions were "of the rumor-mongering type" and did not deserve attention. "I will cite two such questions as an example. Is it true that Minc, the former chairman of the State Economic Planning Commission, left for Switzerland and opened a bank there with our money?" This information is slightly distorted. Minc did not go to Switzerland but left for the planet Jupiter. There he founded an interplanetary tourist agency, not a bank, and he got the money for that purpose from the Devil. He did not take even a farthing from us.

"The second question: Is it true that Comrade Gomulka is going to Switzerland for treatment and will not return, and that his place will be taken by Comrade Zenon Nowak [one of the leading "Stalinists"]?" Switzerland again! It appears that the authors of these questions are advocates of the policy of neutrality; otherwise they should have chosen California, in the United States, for me. Comrades, I hardly have time for a stroll in the city park, let alone a trip to Switzerland." (*Trybuna Ludu*, June 6, 1957.)



"One can travel so . . . and so . . ." This is the illustration and the headline for an advertisement in *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), the Polish Party daily. Placed by a group of East German firms announcing their presence at the Poznan Fair, it marked the first time that a Polish Communist publication has carried an advertisement for foreign concerns.

Klosiewicz, and the outspoken "liberal" Julian Hochfeld who took a prominent part in previous Sejm debates.

During the course of the session, the Plenum released Minister of Agriculture Edward Ochab from his duties in the CC Secretariat and appointed Jerzy Morawski and Zenon Kliszko as new members of the Secretariat.

Unofficial Reports

Although officially Gomulka directed his harshest criticism at the "revisionists," unofficial reports indicate that the Party leader bitterly attacked the "Stalinists" during the Plenum debates. The attack was said to have been provoked by Kazimierz Mijal, a member of the pro-Soviet faction, who called Gomulka's policy one of "capitulation to capitalism." Mijal was apparently supported by other Natolinists, who proposed two amendments to the Party resolutions—one on the leading role of the Soviet Union and another condemning the Hungarian uprising as a counterrevolution. In an impassioned answer, Edward Ochab reportedly declared: "We have had enough speeches written in imported ink." Gomulka likewise lashed out at the Stalinists, stressing the difference between internationalism and servility. The real leaders of the Stalinist faction, Zenon Nowak and Franciszek Mazur, decided not to join Mijal, and openly supported Gomulka's line.

Shortly after the Plenum ended, Gomulka, Premier Cyrankiewicz, and economic planners Jedrychowski and Szyr, were reported to have made a secret weekend trip to Moscow to hold discussions with Soviet leaders. No information on the journey appeared in the Polish press, but it

was rumored that the talks concerned policy decisions made at the Plenum and Poland's economic situation.

Gomulka Visits Poznan

On June 5, nearly a year after the "bread and freedom" riots by workers in the city of Poznan (June 28, 1956), Party leader Gomulka paid a visit to Poznan's Cegielski factory workers, who had sparked the riots. They bombarded him with over a thousand questions concerning Poland's economy, relations with the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and the American loan. His speech responding to some of those questions was reported by Radio Warsaw on June 6. In concluding, he dealt with questions about the "Black Thursday" rioting:

"You have asked me how the memory of those who perished should be honored. . . . Place mourning wreaths at the graves—at all the graves, both those in which our working comrades lie and those where the soldiers and workers of the security organs rest. . . . From the Poznan tragedy the Party and government have drawn broad conclusions aiming at a close union of the working masses and the people's power."

Family Allowances Increased

Taking into account the high Polish birth rate, the Council of Ministers has raised family allowances retroactively to April 1, 1957 (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], May 12). Couples with only one child still receive no allotment, but those with two children now get 165 *zloty* per month, instead of 145. For three offspring the allowance has been increased to 295 *zloty*, where formerly it was 240. Four children return 445 and five now yield 595 *zloty*; the previous rates were 340 and 440 respectively. For every additional child, beginning with the half-dozen, there is another 50 *zloty*, and no ceiling has been set on the number of children eligible for allowances.

Approximately 1,600,000 families will benefit from these increases. Total cost to the regime for family allowances is now 7.3 billion *zloty*, one billion more than previously.

Hungary

1957 Plan

The national economic plan for 1957 was presented to the National Assembly on June 3 by Arpad Kiss, president of the National Planning Office. He stressed that the plan was limited to achieving economic stability and that industrial production this year is expected to be about seven percent below the level of two years ago. National income will be about 91 billion *forint*, or 9 percent below what was planned for last year.

The main emphasis of the plan is on raising the output of consumer goods in order to balance the increased amount of money in circulation. He said that the purchasing power of workers will be 14 percent higher this year than last, and to meet it the output of light industry and the food industries will have to increase considerably. For example, the production of cotton goods is to rise by 14

million square meters, of woolen goods by almost 4 million square meters, knitted goods by 1,170 tons, footwear by 3 million pairs, soap by 5,600 tons, beer by 100,000 hectoliters, enamelware by 10 percent, aluminumware by 48 percent, metal tube furniture by 24 percent, radios by 20 percent and washing machines by 200 percent. He indicated, however, that total requirements this year will be met only through heavy imports from the Soviet Union and other East European countries, which in turn are made possible by the loans and credits those countries have granted.

Investment Slashed

Consistent with the emphasis on consumption, industrial investment has been severely cut. Kiss said that nearly 200 construction projects had been eliminated. Of the 8.2 billion *forint* allotted to investment, 3.2 billion will go to manufacturing, 1.7 billion to trade, transportation and agriculture, and 3.3 billion to "non-productive" investment. The latter item includes a sum of 2.2 billion *forint* for housing construction.

Only five production targets for heavy industry have been published, all of them lower than actual output in 1955:*


	1957 (Planned)	1955 (Actual)
Coal (million tons)	20.5	22.3
Electric power (billion kwh)	5.3	5.4
Cement (thousand tons)	860	1,175
Rolled steel (thousand tons)	770	883
Oil (thousand tons)	632	1,601

Kiss said that the extremely low target for oil production is the result of the flooding of the oil fields at Nagylengyel. This occurred in 1956 before the Revolt, and has been ascribed by experts to the forced production carried on during the Rakosi regime.

Housing Emphasized

Under the plan the State is to complete 21,100 apartments, "more than the combined total of dwellings built

*Targets for 1957 from *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), May 17. Production in 1955 from *Magyar Statisztikai Zsebkonyv* (Budapest), 1956.



"Technical progress"—only the price changes.

Szpilki (Warsaw), May 19, 1957

in 1953 and 1954." Another 20,000 dwellings are to be built by private individuals with the aid of long-term loans from the State. The State will also start work on 13,000 apartments to be completed in 1958.

In agriculture total production is expected to increase by three percent. The area sown with bread grain will be reduced by 273,600 hectares in order to raise the production of fodder by about 20 percent. This is necessary for the production of more livestock, although, as Kiss pointed out, the country will have to continue importing large quantities of bread grain.

Kiss said that the plan presumes that labor productivity will reach the pre-Revolt level by the end of the year. At present it is substantially below that level.

1957 Budget

Minister of Finance Istvan Antos presented this year's budget to the National Assembly on June 3 (*Nepszabadsag*, June 4). He estimated total revenue at 52.6 billion *forint* and expenditure at 51.8 billion *forint*. Though he deprecated the danger of inflation, the extent to which it has already progressed is indicated by the magnitude of budgeted expenditure—23 percent higher than last year. At the same time, total investment has been radically cut, amounting to only 8.2 billion *forint* as compared with last year's budget figure of 12.8 billion *forint*.* He said that certain planned investments have been "temporarily suspended," including those in the Sztalinvaros steel works, the Debrecen ball bearing works, the Vac cement factory and the Szekesfehervar light metal plants. Moreover, a total of 7.8 billion *forint* will go to subsidize enterprises working at a loss. An essential item in balancing the budget will be the 4.3 billion *forint* in long-term credits and grants provided by the USSR and the other Satellites. He said that this aid would finance more than half of this year's imports. He also stated that the reduction in expenditure for administration was made possible by the recent government reorganization and the abolition of 21,000 administrative positions.

The published budget figures for this year and last are as follows (in billions of *forint*):

	1956**	1957
Revenue	43.4	52.6
State enterprises	27.6	36.2
Cooperatives	—	1.1
Taxes on population	5.2	5.0
Borrowing	—	4.3
Unspecified	10.6	6.0
Expenditure	42.2	51.8
People's economy	22.5	33.7
Industry	9.0	—
Investment	5.3	3.2
Subsidies	—	7.8

*Total State investment this year is 5 billion *forint*. The other 3.2 billion will come from enterprise funds, long-term bank credits and funds provided by the cooperatives.

**From *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), February 9 and 10, 1956.

Agriculture	5.0	—
Investment	1.9	0.7
Kolkhoz credits	0.6	0.3
MTS	1.2	0.1
Educational, cultural, welfare and health	11.5	12.5
Defense	4.1	1.9
Administration	2.1	1.7
Police and justice	—	2.0
Surplus	1.2	0.8

Soviet Troop Agreement

Nepszabadsag (Budapest), May 29, reported the text of an agreement completed two days before pertaining to the status of Soviet troops on Hungarian soil. Andrei Gromyko and Marshal Georgi Zhukov, Foreign and Defense Ministers of the USSR, and Imre Horvath and Lt. General Geza Revesz, their counterparts in the Hungarian regime, signed the pact. The agreement attempts to give a gloss of legality to the Soviet occupation of Hungary by requiring the

BOLESŁAW PIASECKI, "STALINIST" leader of the Polish puppet "Catholic" organization "Pax," has been a frequent target for attack by the more liberal adherents of the Gomulka regime. In a speech to a plenary meeting of Pax on May 7, Piasecki counter-attacked and attempted a reasoned defense of his hard-line, Soviet-oriented position. Significant excerpts from the speech follow (*Slowo Powszechnie* [Warsaw], May 10):

"The Soviet people must accept the principle that the stronger People's Poland becomes, the better for the Soviet Union, and conversely we accept the fact that the stronger the Soviet Union, the better for Poland. . . ."

"While taking a most positive view of our recently increased cordiality with People's China and Yugoslavia, we must determinedly disavow the sort of commentary on the development of these relations which presents them as a counterbalance to our alliance with the Soviet Union. . . ."

"Aside from the speeches of Wladyslaw Gomulka, classical in their lack of ambiguity, there is not enough solicitude for the Socialist commitment of the masses. . . . It is an objective statement to say that opinion in Poland shows signs of an anti-Socialist neurosis. . . . The listlessness into which Socialist dynamics has fallen also manifests itself in the intellectual permission to use Socialist camouflage for schemes which have nothing in common with the attainment of a state in which man will no longer be exploited. . . ."

"The application of Chinese Socialist reasoning introduces a stimulating current of thought. The conception of the hundred flowers is of great importance as it allows the materialist singleness of Leninist thought to coexist with a dualistic outlook. . . . However Socialist social thought cannot become eclectic; it cannot shed its ambition and responsibility. . . ."

"Along with the obvious achievements, the October events had two unnecessary costs: first, the impairment of the prestige of the State authorities and the authorities of the social organizations; second, the fact that many citizens have not felt obliged by the indubitable rise in wages to intensify the effect of their work. . . ."

"The country yearns for purposeful national investments, despite the Three Year Plan, the Six Year Plan, and the privations of the citizens which went with them. . . . That is why priority of investment over consumption, naturally in a sensible proportion, must remain a feature of Socialism. . . . What is wrong, however, and reflects a defeatist spirit, is the fact that the appeal to the social-economic in-

itiative of society aims at an increase in production in the manner of capitalist countries. There have even been attempts to model such Socialist institutions as the workers' councils on patterns alien to our constitution. . . ."

"It must be stated unequivocally that the liquidation of factions in the Party and the achievement by the Party of unity is indispensable. . . . We are told that unity of the Party must be based on convictions and not be the outcome of mechanical pressure, but such reasoning curtails the prestige of the Party, which is so necessary for the smooth functioning of a people's State. . . ."

Adverse reaction to the speech was quickly manifest in the Polish press. *Express Wieczorny*, a Warsaw daily, carried a denunciation of Piasecki on May 16: "He speaks as an autocratic governor would speak. . . . His maneuvers are geared to capture the political power in Poland for himself, to make it appear that it is only Piasecki who can save the Party from complete ideological decomposition."

On May 19, *Po Prostu*, which speaks for the young Communist intellectuals, called the speech, "long and boring, the ideas obsolete." The publication denied Piasecki's allegation that non-Socialist ideas are permeating the country and accused him of a wish to return to the status quo of the country before the Eighth Plenum.

Nowa Kultura, the organ of the Writers' Union, continued the attack in its May 19 issue: "It is possible for a politician who has no popularity at all to say unpopular things, either because he has nothing to lose or has lost everything already." The journal accused the Pax organization of holding its gathering only a few days before the plenum of the Communist Party in order to influence the latter group. It denied Piasecki's claim to a following of 300,000 people, saying that the Pax leader took that figure from purported circulation estimates of his organization's newspaper, *Slowo Powszechnie* "the only journal which it has been possible to get at any time of the day on the newsstands since the October events," and one which sells for 50 groszy less than most other papers. Piasecki was further taken to task for "totalitarian leanings" and for his misgivings over renewed relations with Yugoslavia. "Piasecki even corrects Mao Tse-tung, having something critical to say on the subject of the hundred flowers."

On May 23, the Warsaw daily, *Zycie Warszawy*, (not a Pax journal) printed a statement of resignation from several members of the Pax organization publications, "due to the discrepancy between our views and the political-ideological line of the association Pax."



"To health, to eternal Czechoslovak-Polish friendship." Making the toast are Premier Viliam Siroky [of Czechoslovakia] and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic Josef Cyrankiewicz, during the visit of the Polish . . . government delegation to Czechoslovakia."

Kvety (Prague), May 16, 1957

"consent" of the puppet Kadar government for the presence or movement of Soviet troops. The agreement stated:

"The temporary stationing of Soviet troops on the territory of the Hungarian People's Republic does not in any way affect the sovereignty of the Hungarian State; the Soviet troops will not interfere in the interior affairs of the Hungarian People's Republic. . . . The strength and location of Soviet troops temporarily stationed in Hungary will be determined in special agreements between the two governments. . . . Movements of Soviet troops outside their garrisons on Hungarian territory may be made in each case only with the consent of the government of the Hungarian People's Republic. . . ."

The "special agreements" pertaining to Soviet troop strength and location in Hungary have not been published. The means by which Hungarian authorities will be informed on matters concerning the troops are not known.

Courts Urged to Greater Severity

Despite the unabated stream of arrests, jail sentences, and executions of "counterrevolutionaries" (see page 51), Party spokesmen have been calling for stronger measures against the participants in the October Revolt. *Nepszabadsag*, the official Communist newspaper, ran an article on May 19 which took exception to "the liberalism apparent in some of the court sentences and in the attitude of some of the judges toward the enemies of our people." Such judges, the paper averred, should be discharged. On May 30 the journal widened its denunciations to include not only those who took part in the rebellion, but also "those who protect and take these men under their wings." On June 1, Radio Budapest broadcast excerpts from a press conference with Minister of Justice Ferenc Nezval, who spoke of the need to amend the laws governing appeals

for mercy in the courts. Too many appeals were being filed, he said; the appeal for mercy should be used only in exceptional circumstances.

Agricultural Policy Reviewed

The Kadar regime's policy for agriculture was set forth on May 20 in a lecture by Lajos Feher, member of the Party Central Committee. According to a summary broadcast by Radio Budapest on that date, Feher attacked both the "sectarian mistakes" of the Rakosi period and the "right-wing deviations" of Imre Nagy. He explained that the collectivization movement in Hungary had gone through two great crises: in the fall of 1953, when more than 100,000 people had left the collectives, and at the end of 1956, when more than 50 percent of the collectives were dissolved. The Party had failed to win over the majority of the small and medium peasantry, he said, because of its excessive reliance on force. Moreover, the burden of compulsory deliveries had been so high that it had destroyed incentives for increasing production. On the other hand, Imre Nagy had been seriously at fault in arguing that the postwar land reform had eliminated the danger of capitalism in the countryside. He said that Nagy's supporters, who had sharply criticized the mistakes of past years during the public discussions in the summer and fall of 1956, had really been aiming to liquidate the collective farms.



The new Hungarian shield, without the hammer and sickle that was part of the previous shield. The new Hungarian flag has neither hammer and sickle nor red star.

Nepszabadsag (Budapest), May 12, 1957

Neutrality is for Capitalists

ONLY CAPITALIST COUNTRIES ought to be neutral, according to Foreign Minister Imre Horvath of Hungary (Radio Budapest, June 3). In a lecture given on June 3 under the auspices of the Party Central Committee he said: "We approve of the neutrality of certain capitalist countries since it signifies that they do not join the imperialist military blocs created with a view to starting a war." But for "Socialist" countries the problem is different. "The neutrality of a Socialist country must be assessed not only from the point of view of peace but also from that of the cause of Socialism. While a true neutrality on the part of a capitalist country means standing apart from the conquerors and those ready to go to war, the neutrality of a Socialist country represents an underhanded attack on the cause of peace and Socialism and its betrayal."

In the future, said Feher, the Party must avoid both of these ideological extremes. Collectivization will continue, but it must be based on persuasion. The medium peasants own a third of the country's arable land and nearly half of its private farms, and hence it is impossible to carry through the "Socialist transformation" of agriculture without their support. "We must convince them with patience and by example of the superiority of kolkhoz crop yields."

He admitted that present crop yields are at an extremely low level compared with those in other countries. At the same time he claimed that the Party had recognized this problem in resolutions adopted in 1953 and 1956. The trouble was that the resolutions had not been carried out. "Thus, from 1954 to 1956, inclusive, only 820,155 tons of artificial fertilizers were supplied instead of the originally scheduled 1,438,000 tons. During the same period, of the 13,000 tractors that had been promised to agriculture, no more than 8,300 were delivered." He stated that from now on the production of fertilizers and tractors will be among the principal tasks of the industrial sector.

Latest Figures on Collectivization

Some additional information on the agricultural situation was supplied by a Foreign Ministry spokesman on May 25 (Radio Budapest). He told a press conference that after October, 3,037 collective farms had dissolved, of a total of 5,011. By April 1, however, the number had risen again to 3,410 farms with 161,095 members and 801,209 hectares of land. As compared with the status before October, the collective sector has lost about 32 percent of its farms, 46 percent of its land, 55 percent of its members and 75 percent of its livestock. Because of damages resulting from the Revolt, the indebtedness of collectives has increased 20 percent.

Further Attacks on Nagy

Still endeavoring to destroy the reputation of Imre Nagy,

the Kadar regime has manufactured a new "analysis" of the struggle that has revolved around the anti-Stalinist leader since he was deprived of his first Premiership in April, 1955. At that time, *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), May 17, stated, the reasons for Nagy's ouster were not made public, and the air of secrecy which resulted "confused" Party members and the country-at-large. "Nagy," *Nepszabadsag* declared, "became a martyr," and his adherents, in demanding his unconditional readmission to the Party, were able to conceal their real motives, which were to gain prestige and a national following for their "right-wing political line."

In his maneuvering to become Premier, *Nepszabadsag* continued, Nagy had to gain the backing of the majority of the Party Central Committee. For this reason, in spite of many statements to the contrary, he approved calling for the assistance of Soviet troops both at the October 23 meeting and again, after he had accepted the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers, on the following day. But, as he never tried to implement either the appeal for troops or the martial law decree, it is obvious "that he did not want to see the counterrevolution crushed," but instead "he chose the road most suitable to the objectives of the counterrevolution."

Concluding, the article speculates on the "probability" that Nagy and his closest advisers "would have been swept away" in the wake of the Revolt. "Yet this does not alter in any way the fact that Imre Nagy aided the counterrevolution by attacking the power of the people and that he played the role of an infamous traitor."

Price Increases

Because the rise in production since the October Revolt "has not been as rapid as the increase in purchasing power," price increases on certain articles were announced by Minister of Internal Trade, Janos Tausz (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], May 12). Products affected by the order were agricultural machinery, building materials, bicycles, sewing machines, washing machines, electric stoves, cameras; other price boosts included coffee, liquor, and room charges at first-class hotels.

Tausz stressed the fact that the regime had not increased the cost of basic consumer items such as food and clothing. He also stated that the measures were intended to put an end to profiteering.

Bishops Support World Peace Council

Following their understanding with the regime (see *East Europe*, June 1957, page 54), the Bench of Hungarian Catholic Bishops published a communique regretting "the delays in disarmament, the continuation of atomic tests, and the absence of conventions banning the use of nuclear weapons" (Radio Budapest, May 23). The Bishops gave their support to the Communist-dominated World Peace Council, and established a new "national Catholic committee" in conjunction with the Hungarian National Peace Council, a regime organ.

Move to the Cities

Nearly a million and a half people, one-seventh of the entire Hungarian population, changed their places of residence between January, 1956 and March, 1957 (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], May 23). The majority of the movers went to the cities. During the first quarter of 1957, 52,000 people took up residence in Budapest; since a smaller number left the capital, the population of the city increased by 37,000, aggravating the already severe housing shortage. According to 1954 figures, the latest available, 276,000 people in Budapest then lived in apartments or houses which they shared with others not of their immediate family, and 30,000 people were classed merely as "night-lodgers." Undoubtedly these figures have since increased.

Czechoslovakia

Journalists' Union Congress

The Second Congress of the Czechoslovak Journalists' Union met in Prague, June 1 and 2. Speeches by First Party Secretary Antonin Novotny and Union chairman Vojtech Dolejsi, and a letter to the Congress from the Party's Central Committee, all stressed the absolute subservience of the press to the regime. There was no discernible trace of the spirit of ideological ferment or real criticism which marked meetings of journalists in Poland and Hungary in the past year.

Radio Prague reports Dolejsi's instructions on the first day of the Congress to follow "the tradition set by Klement Gottwald . . . to learn from the experiences of the Soviet press." Novotny stated: "Our press should be more critical, should contribute to the uncovering and removal of all shortcomings. Its task is to struggle for the realization of the policy of the Communist Party . . ."

Another broadcast the same day summed up the letter from the Central Committee which alluded to "the incorrect opinions apparent among some journalists." The letter outlined the necessities of journalism as: "militant partisanship and ideological purity, the systematic struggle against opinions hostile and injurious to the cause of Socialism . . . implacability in the face of any manifestation of hostile ideology and revisionism. . . ." The letter, which was read to the group by Novotny, cautioned that "efforts aimed at more vivid and attractive writing have nothing in common with the superficiality and harmful escapism we see in certain cases."

In a reply to the Central Committee the journalists promised "the Party and government to do their utmost

to live up to their mission of building Socialism, consolidating the unity of Socialist countries, and promoting the peace front throughout the world."

"Spy" Scare

State security organs continued to hammer at alleged espionage activities carried on by NATO. On May 25, Radio Prague told of a group conducting an industrial "spy apparatus" in Pilsen, both at the Lenin Works (formerly the Skoda plant) and at the Elektra National Enterprise. Several members of the alleged espionage ring were arrested and one signed a statement to the effect that he had "obeyed the orders of the [NATO] espionage center in Frankfurt-am-Main for financial remuneration."

Another group, "the majority of whom were recruited from former wine shop operators . . . and had committed criminal offenses in the past, including pilfering of corps," was directed to obtain economic, military, and political information in Czechoslovakia by "the center of the American espionage services in Munich." The capture of these men was announced in *Rude Pravo* (Prague), June 1.

On the following day the paper carried a piece headed "The Story of Agent Lopata," which described the "training" of the agent in West Germany, how he crossed to East Germany, and attempted from there to enter Czechoslovakia. "However, he was followed at all times by the East German police, and the Czechoslovak Border Guard was prepared for the intruder."

Zapotocky Addresses Students

Political dissatisfaction among university students, which reached a height in the public demonstrations of May 1956, is still giving concern to the regime. In recent months President Zapotocky has made a number of speeches at universities and colleges. In a speech given in May at the Czech Technical College in Prague, he revealed that during the last May Day parade some students passing in review had chanted: "How about a talk with us? There are things we might discuss." Zapotocky commented, "I think the slogan justified and agree with it. This is not to say, however, that I consider correct all the opinions many would like to discuss."

In his speech, printed in the May issue of *Vysoka Skola* (Prague), a monthly publication for universities and colleges, he dwelt at some length on the subject of economic relations with the Soviet Union. "Our enemies frequently . . . try to prove that we are being exploited. . . . Apart from

(Continued on page 50)

Chinese Revisionism

FOR THE SECOND TIME in a year, theoretical pronouncements by Chinese Communist Party leaders have become the crux of discussion and debate in Poland, discussion with enormous practical and political significance. The first time was in the late summer of 1956, after the Poznan riots and before the October Revolution, when the slogan of the Chinese Party leader Mao Tse-tung, "Let all flowers blossom; let all schools of thought exist in peaceful rivalry,"

was brandished by the Polish liberal Communists as theoretical justification for the "Polish road to Socialism."

In recent weeks, as the liberals have been increasingly oppressed both by hard-line Party members who clearly wish a return to the old system and by Gomulka's apparent determination to keep a tight rein on public expressions from the liberal wing, they have flooded the press with discussion of the Chinese example and precept. Now, in

addition to the cry "Let all flowers blossom," they have as weapon the new Chinese ideological formula concerning "non-antagonistic contradictions." This, if applied to the Polish situation, would deny the Polish Stalinists, and the Soviets whom they echo, theoretical justification for attacking the liberals as "enemies of Socialism," and permit the continuation of Polish dissidence from the Moscow line.

The theory of "non-antagonistic contradictions" was pronounced by Mao Tse-tung at a secret meeting of the Chinese National Council in February 1957; an official version was not published until June 18. There have been a great many explanations and exegeses of the idea in the Polish press, however, applying the theory to Polish conditions in more or less explicit fashion. An example is the following article from which significant extracts are taken:

"Chinese Flowers"

"The principle 'Let all flowers bloom' is only one of the elements of the great change which has for some time been taking place in the general line of the Communist Party of China. If we wanted to define the character of this turn in one sentence, we would say that it is the Chinese version of the Polish October. In regard to ideology, this turning point means the abandonment of the old interpretation of Marxism as a sealed and sacred book; a departure from the period when truths were decreed instead of being forged from reality. It means the abandonment of the administrative monopoly of Marxism 'protected' against bad influences through the simple non-publication of any non-Marxist literature. One of the responsible [Chinese] comrades, an ideological activist, explained to me as follows: 'An unused intellect atrophies; a non-fighting thought gets moldy. In order to revive Marxism, it is necessary to supply it with nutrient and to confront it with current bourgeois thought, as well as with past achievements. Herein lies the sense of the principle of letting all flowers blossom.' Let's add: here also lies the consciously accepted risk that what will blossom will not be flowers only, but sometimes also weeds."

"As regards Party life, the new policy has three elements: the maximum broadening of internal Party democracy; a decisive struggle against bureaucracy and against the tendency to create stuffed shirts (for example, a very interesting innovation in this regard is the proposition that all Party members, even those who occupy high positions, should devote a part of their time to manual work on equal footing with workers and peasants); a sharp attack against dogmatism and sectarianism in Party work."

"On the State level, this policy means the strengthening of proletarian dictatorship through reducing to a minimum its repressive role and by widening its basis. . . .

"In order better to understand the problem, it is worthwhile to outline Mao Tse-tung's reasoning. . . . In theory, there are two kinds of contradictions within society: between the people's masses and the enemy and within the people itself. At present, the Chinese counterrevolution being deprived of all importance, and the conditions of

Socialist production having triumphed on the entire front, the contradictions between the enemy and the masses have become less important. They are represented today only by spies and subversive activists sent over by the American intelligence service; this, however, has no major importance. For this reason, the contradictions within the people itself are now coming to the foreground. This very wide definition covers a variety of topics: differences of opinion which sometimes touch upon such fundamental matters as, for instance, conflicts between the authority which is, in theory, the workers' authority, and a part of the working class; conflicts between the rulers and the masses, etc. The solution of these conflicts is the main task of the proletarian dictatorship during the long historical period of the transition to Socialism.

"This leads to two very important conclusions: first, in spite of the fact that Chinese society is still divided into classes, and there are still capitalists in that country, the contradictions between the working class and the national bourgeois do not have an antagonistic character at the present time, and the transformation of the bourgeoisie into working intelligentsia is progressing in a peaceful way, without violent upheavals. Secondly, it is obvious that the contradictions within the people itself must be solved by means of persuasion and discussion and not by means of violence.

"It would appear that both these conclusions are important not only for China, but for all countries which are building Socialism." (*Sztandar Młodych* [Warsaw] May 7, 1957.)

In this manner, using the Chinese ideological innovations (which Khrushchev, in his June 2 television broadcast admitted might apply to China but denied application to the Soviet Union), the Polish liberals have brought the great weight of Chinese prestige to back their pleas for more free speech and free journalism, for the right to criticize Party bosses, for art unfettered by Stalinist shackles, and for the whole spectrum of liberalization.

Elsewhere in the area, the Chinese innovations have been largely ignored, except in Hungary, where it has been carefully stated that they do not apply. Radio Budapest, May 25, discussed the Chinese revisions as "a process of enormous importance," but went on to say that the Chinese methods are "not correct in all Socialist countries and especially not in every phase. We may add that [they are] especially incorrect after a recently defeated counterrevolutionary attempt." The broadcast adduced a number of differences between the Chinese and the Hungarian conditions which would make serious criticism of the regime leaders or industrial strikes impermissible in Hungary. Among these differences, the broadcast said, was the lack of unity in Hungary, the presence of a "counterrevolutionary" bourgeoisie. "It must be kept in mind, also, that the Chinese comrades after 1949 liquidated the class enemy in a much harder and more consistent way than we did. Thanks to this, and other things, the People's Democracy is today solid in China, it cannot be shaken, and this is why they can broaden courageously and generously the democracy of the masses [and we cannot]."

uranium and sugar, we export to the Soviet Union only plant installations and consumer goods. You, the technicians, do not have to be told that it is far more profitable for the economy of any country to export finished products instead of raw material. . . . It would be foolish to think that the recent events around us failed to influence our economy and its planning. Recent international events have had repercussions in our mutual economic relations. Some of the People's Democracies will be unable to offer us the same goods as before, and also our exports to these countries will be curtailed in view of their limited investment programs. For this very reason, the expansion of economic contacts with the Soviet Union is of great significance at the present time. . . ."

Uranium Deliveries Defended

Zapotocky went on to discuss "a particularly important subject in our mutual economic contacts with the Soviet Union"—the delivery of uranium:

"We do not conceal the fact that we have been, are, and—according to a mutual agreement—will keep on delivering our uranium to the Soviet Union. . . . The Soviet Union never appropriated our uranium mines, and never claimed a right to them. The contract on uranium deliveries to the Soviet Union, on the conditions and price, was already concluded prior to February 1948; it was concluded in 1946, the negotiator being the then Minister of Foreign Trade, Prof. Dr. Ripka,* the contract being unanimously approved by the then National Front government as a body, including Mr. Zenkl* and all the other members of the government. This contract has been in force up till now.

"So if Free Europe attacks this contract, it should direct its criticism above all at its own emigre circles. As I have already said, we are fulfilling the contract and are proud to be able to do so. Everybody can surely appreciate that if we were unable to deliver our uranium to the Soviet Union under very favorable conditions for us, we would be unable to deliver it to anyone at all. And this great national wealth of ours would become worthless. Somebody might, perhaps, object that it would be possible to utilize the uranium in our own country. However, reality long ago removed any justification for this objection; during our visit to the Soviet Union we could see for ourselves how childish and ridiculous this objection is."

He also entered an apology for the fact that the college facilities were overcrowded. The chief reason for this, he said, was the mistaken building program of earlier years. "It must be said quite frankly that after the revolution our eyes were bigger than our stomach. We were all becoming megalomaniacs. This was most evident in the way we started to build our homes. Our architects thought that to design and build apartments of less than four rooms would be reactionary. As to the building of public buildings and schools, we were thinking only of palaces and rejected temporary buildings. And temporary buildings were just what we needed most if we were to meet all the responsibilities which were descending upon us like an avalanche."

* Now in exile in the West. In fact, the contract was negotiated by the then Premier Fierlinger, leader of the fellow-travelling Socialists, and Deputy Premier Gottwald, Communist Party chief. Zenkl was not in the government at the time.



St. Vitus Cathedral, the largest in Prague, during a performance of J. B. Foerster's cantata, "St. Wenceslaus." This was one of the highlights of this year's "Prague Spring," an annual music festival.

Svet v Obrazech (Prague), June 1, 1957

Apathy in Youth League

In another talk at Karlovy University on May 24 the President quoted a conversation he had had with a student who had expressed the opinion that the Youth League at his school should be abolished. "What were his reasons? According to him the Youth League does not do anything at the school. 'And you,' I asked, 'are you a member of the Youth League?' 'Yes,' he replied, 'but I am not an official.' 'And why are you not an official?' 'Because I was not elected.' 'You don't want to work, then?' 'I do, and I

Terror In Hungary

The Official Announcements, May 9-June 8

Following is a list of arrests, trials and convictions of persons accused of participation in the Revolt or of subsequent opposition to the Kadar puppet regime. It includes only those whose fate was announced in the regime press. Many others, an unknowable number of others, have been killed or now lie in prison or the torture cellars of the AVH.

May 9:

Endre Cserbakoi sentenced to life imprisonment for "active participation in activities directed against the People's Democracy." (*Nepszabadsag*)

May 14:

Sandor Racz sentenced to 15 years in prison, forfeiture of political rights for 10 years and confiscation of all property. Karoly Imre sentenced to 13 years in prison, Arpad Kiss sentenced to 10 years in prison, Sandor Kasa sentenced to 7 years in prison, "for participation in the counterrevolution." (*Nepszabadsag*)

May 15:

"Gabor Folly having been found guilty of helping organize and lead a movement directed at the overthrow of the democratic State, the Court of Appeals has reversed [the life sentence of the lower court] and sentenced him to death. The sentence has been carried out." (*Nepszabadsag*)

May 17:

"Karoly Bobek has been executed for participation in the counterrevolution and for murdering a policeman." (*Nepszabadsag*)

"The Municipal Court has given the leaders of the 21-member Miskolc counterrevolutionary group the death penalty." The other defendants, "among whom there are several minors," were given sentences of 10 to 15 years. (*Nepszabadsag*)

May 22:

Geza Kruger, MTS locksmith, sentenced to 12 years in prison and Istvan Tamasi, tractor driver, sentenced to 6 years in prison, "on charges of hiding firearms." (*Nepszabadsag*)

May 23:

"Pal Kabelacs has been sentenced to death for participation in the siege of the Radio Budapest Building" during the Revolt. His brother, Karoly Kabelacs, "has been sentenced to life imprisonment for the same crime." (*Nepszabadsag*)

"Sandor Kiss and Sandor Szrog have been sentenced to death for killing a Russian soldier. The sentence has been carried out." (*Nepszabadsag*)

Agoston Preszmayer sentenced to death. Radio Budapest, May 21, said that he "participated in armed combat during the counterrevolution and acted as a liaison agent for Pal

Maleter" [who led the fight against the Soviet intervention; Minister of Defense during the Revolt, he was taken prisoner on the eve of the final Soviet onslaught while discussing with the Soviets the withdrawal of their troops]. "His associates have been sentenced to prison terms ranging from 1 to 6 years." (*Nepszabadsag*)

May 29:

The Supreme Court "reduced the sentences passed by the Miskolc County Court on Dr. Istvan Szombathy and his six fellow-accused for conspiring against the State. Szombathy's death sentence was reduced to 13 years in prison; the others received sentences ranging from 7 to 11 years in prison." (Radio Budapest)

"The police have concluded their investigations in the case of Ekram Kemal, 33, a Yugoslav citizen of Turkish origin, domiciled in Budapest and with several previous convictions, accused of organizing a plot to overthrow the people's democratic regime." (Radio Budapest)

May 31:

Mrs. Dezso Nagy sentenced to 8 years in prison. "During the attack on Party headquarters [in Pest] she spat several times at a soldier hanging by his feet, in view of the crowd. Mrs. Dezso Nagy had several previous convictions for absenteeism." (Radio Budapest)

"In a trial that has now lasted for seven days, fourteen counterrevolutionary murderers from Magyarvar have had to account before the Gyor County Court for murdering three frontier guard officers, opening up the Western frontier, and other felonies." (Radio Budapest)

June 6:

"The Gyor County Court started summary proceedings today against certain members of the Writers' Union . . . charged with the crime of organizing activities directed against the democratic State. The first day in court was spent in the interrogation of the defendants." (Radio Budapest)

June 8:

Andras Tompa, former captain of the police of County Heves, "and four accomplices," arrested "for counterrevolutionary crimes." "After November 4 Tompa planned to carry large quantities of arms and ammunition away in trucks, with a view to organizing resistance against Soviet troops in the Buk Mountains." (Radio Budapest)

would accept an office on condition that the whole organization was completely changed and became something quite different from what it is today." But who is to see to it that it is changed? Obviously it can be only he and all the members of the organization." (*Mlada Fronta* [Prague], May 25.)

Zapotocky also appeared at the Collegium Maximum of the Faculty of Law at Prague University on May 25. He commented again on the problems of the youth organization, saying that the remedy must be sought from within by the young people themselves. "Youth today," he added, "has its difficulties against which it must struggle, but it also has many wrong ideas." (*Svobodne Slovo* [Prague], May 25.)

National Committee Elections

Rude Pravo (Prague), reported on May 22 that 99.21 percent of the Czechoslovak electorate took part in the May 19 balloting for posts on the national committees (organs of local, district, and regional administration). Candidates of the National Front received 99.2 percent of the vote (8,744,914); the number of what the report termed "valid" votes against the Front was 77,641. There were no opposition or alternative candidates, and the 74 defeated members of the 216,302-man Front ticket were all local contestants; elections will be repeated in those communities. All district and regional candidates were "victorious."

In the previous elections of 1954, 98.2 percent of the electorate voted, and the National Front received 93.5 percent of this vote.


Welfare Pact with Yugoslavia

Czechoslovak relations with Yugoslavia took an apparent turn for the better at the end of May. *Rude Pravo*, May 23, announced the signing in Belgrade of an agreement in the field of social welfare, calling for cooperation between the appropriate social organizations and scientific institutions of the two countries and for an exchange of lecturers and publications. Citizens of one country, permanently residing in the other, will have the same social welfare rights and benefits as citizens of the second country. A mixed commission will be established to suggest further measures of cooperation.

On May 24, Radio Prague broadcast a sixty-fifth birthday greeting sent to Marshal Tito from Czechoslovak President Antonin Zapotocky. On May 27 it was announced that a delegation led by Premier Vilim Siroky would visit Yugoslavia during the second half of the month of June; on June 14, however, *Rude Pravo* announced without explanation that the visit had been postponed.


Musicians Muted

Czechoslovak authorities have refused visas to members of the Cleveland Symphony Orchestra who were to take part in the Prague Spring Music Festival. *Rude Pravo* (Prague), May 12, stated that the visas were withheld to protest United States insistence on fingerprinting the Czech Philharmonic Orchestra which had scheduled an American tour early in 1958. It is now doubtful that the tour will take place.



"The Leader, among children."

Szpilki (Warsaw), June 2, 1957



"Twelfth anniversary of the liberation of Czechoslovakia was celebrated [on May 9] by a festive review of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces. The units of our border guards, greeted with special enthusiasm, also marched in Prague before representatives of the Party and government."

Kvety (Prague), May 16, 1957

Albania

Plaku Flees to Yugoslavia

Divisive stresses in the Albanian regime were dramatized by Major General Panajot Plaku's flight from the country. He was former Deputy Defense Minister and, until his departure, Minister-Without-Portfolio. Plaku's flight to Yugoslavia was confirmed over Radio Tirana, May 28, which announced that the Presidium of the Albanian People's Assembly had discharged him from his official posts and accused him of high treason. On the same day *Zeri i Popullit* (Tirana), the organ of the Party Central Committee, published a letter purportedly from Plaku's mother, brother, and sister-in-law, which was most thoroughly in the tradition of Stalinist invective:

"Panajot Plaku is the loathed enemy and infamous traitor to the Party, the fatherland, and the blood of his comrades and brothers. . . . This traitor is neither our son, our brother, nor our brother-in-law.

"May he be unworthy of the milk he took from my breast; may he be unworthy of the caresses I gave him when he was a child; may he be cursed; may he never have a happy day; may he perish like a dog, like a filthy traitor."

An unconfirmed report over Radio Rome, May 30, announced the arrest of Plaku's wife and three children. The

broadcast stated that Plaku had previously been demoted from Deputy Minister of Defense to Minister-Without-Portfolio because of his anti-Soviet sentiments.

Bulgaria

Clothing Industry Lagging on Deliveries to USSR

An editorial in *Rabotnicheskoe Delo* (Sofia), May 10, sharply criticized the clothing cooperatives for failure to fulfill a Soviet trade agreement. The agreement provides that Bulgaria will deliver clothing, shoes and knitted goods worth more than 806 million *leva* during 1957. But the first quarter's planned deliveries were fulfilled by only 34 percent in woolen goods, 4.7 percent in work clothes, 2.7 percent in cotton dresses and 0.3 percent in shirts. The editorial warned: "There is no time to lose. It is necessary to exert every effort to insure the fulfillment of plans and the completion of Soviet orders. . . . The fulfillment of the Soviet orders will insure employment for many tens of thousands of jobless workers and will allow the full use of the production capacity of our plants." The reasons for the failure were given as inadequate supplies of sewing machines, patterns and materials, and lack of training among the workers. The editorial observed that, at the same time, "many workers' cooperatives fulfill and over-fulfill the plan for ready-made clothes for the domestic market"—where standards of quality are lower.

Texts and Documents

KADAR ADDRESSES THE ASSEMBLY

Below are major excerpts from Hungarian Premier Janos Kadar's speeches to the National Assembly on May 9 and May 11. Kadar here expresses the latest hardening in the line against Imre Nagy, against all who took part in the Revolt, and against any individuals or organizations who attempt to defy the absolute control imposed by his regime by means of the Soviet Army. He also discusses the recent moderate economic concessions the regime has been forced to grant.

THE COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY UPRISING which broke out in our country with the active support of international imperialism on October 23, 1956, turned with blind fury against every attainment of our people's democracy and against everything our people have achieved by their toil over the past decade. The counterrevolution tried to overthrow the lawful State . . . to replace it with that most reactionary of bourgeois institutions—the Fascist dictatorship. By annihilating our national independence, it intended to transform our country into a colony of the imperialists. . . . Those with an axe to grind and those unaware of the facts or unable to grasp their meanings still attempt to deny the counterrevolutionary character of the armed uprisings, but the prominence of the facts frustrates every effort at camouflage. In the hours immediately preceding the Revolt, red flags were burnt, and red stars, the sacred symbols of Socialism, of the progress of mankind, and of the fraternity of peoples, were smashed to pieces. . . .

During the last week of October, 1956, the coalition [government of Imre Nagy and non-Communist political parties] was motivated by anti-Communism, the desire for bourgeois restoration, and anti-Soviet feelings. From the very moment of the coalition, the Hungarian Workers' [Communist] Party was not in a leading, but in a subordinate, position. . . . Right-wing elements had seized the leadership, excluding Smallholders' and Peasant Party politicians who had taken part, during the past years, in the building of Socialism under Communist regimes. . . . From [Cardinal] Mindszenty's vague words in favor of private ownership and the full return of Church property, few

people realized that what he was really asking was restoration of private ownership of the banks, factories, mines and confiscated land. . . .

The armed attack against the people's republic, the revival of the bourgeois parties, the demands for returning the factories to the former owners, are in full accord with the theory and practices of social reaction, in other words, of counterrevolution. Mindszenty, [former Defense Minister] Maletter, [General] Bela Kiraly, and [executed Revolt figure] Dudas, as well as Imre Nagy and his group, were not revolutionaries but betrayers of the Party, the Hungarian people, the Republic, and the fatherland.

"Nagy and His Traitors"

There are people who reproach us for talking too much about the counterrevolution and the treason of Imre Nagy. They reproach us for not concentrating instead upon the mistakes of the past, the damage caused by the sectarian and dogmatic leadership of Rakosi, the violations of law. . . . We must not forget the mistakes of the past, and we do not forget them. The former leadership caused untold harm to the Party and to the State. It is our task to prevent the recurrence of those mistakes. They retarded the development and weakened the will of the Hungarian dictatorship of the proletariat, evoking a legitimate bitterness among the masses and thus enabling the counterrevolution to force a wedge between the Party and a section of the workers. . . .

It must, however, also be clearly stated that the former leadership, despite its faults—and they were grave—led the Party and the country along the road to Socialist construction, sought not to

weaken, but to strengthen the worker-peasant State and the alliance between Hungary and the Socialist camp. By contrast, Imre Nagy and his traitors abandoned the position of Socialism and invited the forces of counterrevolution to hatred of the Soviet Union. . . .

After the creation of our government, we repeatedly warned the insurgents to cease their struggle and lay down their weapons. Some of the counterrevolutionaries rebuffed our overtures and continued to bear arms against us. Therefore, we had no alternative but to annihilate them. Others functioned as before in the various counterrevolutionary committees and workers' councils. When these groups remained adamant in their refusal to cooperate with us, we had no choice but to dissolve them. . . .

We have also been patient with the writers. . . . However, the December 28 Resolution of the Writers' Union amounted not only to defiance of the government, but to an open alignment of this organization with the forces of counterrevolution. It is known, moreover, that writers participated in the formation of the resistance to the government. It is understandable, therefore, that we could no longer tolerate the activity of the Writers' Union against the people's democracy.

I read in the press of the Western countries that there were constant massacres in our country after the Revolt was put down. This, of course, is untrue. But we would not have performed our duty to the Party and to the fatherland had we allowed our patience to endure endlessly. . . . The government has not called, and will not call, anyone to account for having participated in any march or demonstration, provided that that person did not commit any other, graver, counterrevolutionary act. But we cannot guarantee immunity for all. The government will seek out its enemies. . . . We can allow no immunity to those who, after November 4, stubbornly persisted in their fight against the people's democracy. . . . The government has set about the reorganization of the armed services. . . . the police, the forces of public order. . . . We have passed security resolutions, banned certain people from certain cities or areas, placed other people under police surveillance. . . . At the same time the government guards to the utmost the strictest observance of legality. . . .

The political results of the past six months can be summed up as follows: we possess a strong Party . . . a stable government, organized armed forces; ministries are functioning, councils are working, and the confidence of the masses is growing day by day; the counterrevolution

has been isolated politically. . . . Industrial and agricultural production is rising steadily. . . . The development of coal production is far in excess of expectations. . . .

There was also some improvement as far as the selection of consumer goods is concerned, and the stocks of trade were increased. As a consequence of the counterrevolution, the stocks of wholesale trade dropped from a value of 14.5 billion *forint* to 8.5 billion *forint*. As of March 31, 1957, the value of these stocks is again more than 11 billion. These results are, of course, partly due to the brotherly assistance of the countries of the Socialist camp, especially that of our best friend, the Soviet Union. . . .

"Wage Increases"

It is the resolute aim of the government to correct the faults of recent years. In the past few months we have adjusted the wages of several classes. . . . As a result, those affected by the changes earn 1.2 billion more per year. . . . The earning possibilities of technical workers have increased by 240 *forint*, those of teachers and others employed in educational institutions by 140 million. Certain wage increases were also possible in agriculture. . . . All these measures increased the earnings of those affected by 4.3 billion *forint*.

Other measures have been taken in the field of agriculture. A decree of the Presidential Council abolished compulsory deliveries of produce, which increased the income of the peasantry by 2 billion *forint*. Another law fixed the income tax of the farm population at the same level as last year. . . . Another made provisions for the acquisition of agricultural land and woodland by private individuals. . . .

Among the measures favorably affecting a wide strata of the population was the abolition of the tax on childlessness. . . . The government also took measures to adjudicate cases of illegally cancelled pensions. . . . Monetary rewards were introduced for mothers of six children. . . . The special income tax payable by artisans and private traders for employing others was abolished. . . . A decree licensed private retail trade. . . .

Several measures were aimed at reducing the very costly and inflated administrative apparatus both in government and the economy. Certain ministries were merged, and the number of persons working in the State apparatus was reduced by 22,000. . . . To provide for those dismissed from government service . . . we have, for a transition period, reduced the retirement age limit and temporarily in-

creased pensions to those in the lowest categories. A measure provided for the payment of unemployment benefits. . . .

The downfall of the well-meaning people who, prior to or during the October events, lost their political bearings was due, to no small extent, to the revisionist distortions, according to which . . . the Marxist-Leninist principles of Party and working class leadership are obsolete. . . . According to certain bourgeois views . . . the leading class of society in the atomic age is the intelligentsia or, as maintained by some in our country, the youth. According to the clear teachings of Marxist-Leninism, the intelligentsia represents a very important part of society, but does not constitute a class and therefore cannot be a leading class. Less still does youth constitute a class. . . . Recent events have provided a practical lesson to us in the meaning of the loss of a healthy class outlook. . . . This loss led to tragedy for the intelligentsia and youth who sought to take over the leadership of the nation. . . .

The strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat now confronts the Party and the entire working class. . . . Conditions for deepening and consolidating the worker-peasant alliance are particularly favorable these days. Our peasantry knows that by defeating the counterrevolution, the working class and the Party have helped in protecting the land. More, however, is required for the building of a Socialist society. . . . To promote the Socialist development of the Hungarian villages, the government must support the State farms, the machine tractor stations, and the producer cooperatives [*kolkhozes*]. . . .

In Hungary after 1948 a coalition of democratic parties might have been utilized for progressive results by the government. However, this possibility was never exploited, and now, after nearly ten years, we cannot turn back the wheel of history. . . . After the negative experiences of last October, when these parties obviously aimed at a bourgeois restoration . . . it is apparent that we can in no way make use of them. In the present condition, the multi-party system cannot be applied as a method of government. . . .

The National Assembly's mandate will expire this week. In normal circumstances the Assembly should have been dissolved and new elections held. The counterrevolution, however, has disturbed and gravely violated the order of our country, causing serious damage to our people's economy. The workers are preoccupied with healing the wounds of our land. For this reason the government takes the

view that in our present position it would be incorrect to expend our time and strength on parliamentary elections. We propose that, by taking advantage of the possibilities afforded by the Constitution, the National Assembly's mandate should be extended and the elections postponed. . . .

This year's economic plan will shortly be debated before the Assembly, and following this, the new Three Year Plan will be submitted. . . . Our economy is weighed down by certain stresses and contradictions. . . . One of these is our necessity to import raw materials and power. . . . A second is the very considerable material damage caused by last year's counterrevolution which cost the nation three billion *forint* in destruction and depleted reserves, nine billion in lost production due to strikes, and six to eight billion in loss of national revenue due to the decline in production and productivity. . . . The third costly contradiction in our economy derives from the increase in wages which has not been equalled by a corresponding increase in production. . . . Industrial output is 20 percent below last year's; wages are 23 percent above. . . .

The people of Yugoslavia too are engaged in building Socialism . . . [but] there are certain Yugoslav views with which we can not agree. One of these views treats the Socialist camp as a military bloc. . . . Neither can we accept the Yugoslav comrades' appraisal of the question of workers' councils formed during the counterrevolution. We are not pleasantly affected by the arbitrary practices indulged in against us by the Yugoslav press . . . telling us what is right and wrong, what we should do and how we should do it. . . . No article criticizing any resolution of the Yugoslav Party or any measure of the Yugoslav government has appeared in our press since 1953. . . .

"Differences of Opinion"

*Kadar's Second Speech to the Assembly
(May 11, 1957)*

THREE MUST INEVITABLY be differences of opinion . . . but there are no ideological differences separating the overwhelming majority of deputies. . . . There are differences of opinion between Communists and non-Communists and also among Communists. . . . However, once a decision has been adopted, it should be carried out in unity. . . . I am of the opinion that those people further the cause of our nation who, having expressed their opposition while a measure is in formulation, deem it their duty, when the

decision has gone against their desires, honestly to espouse the measure in their everyday work and life. . . .

If I discuss the leadership of the country [during the past year] . . . I must say the following. It consisted, fundamentally, of two factions. One determined in July to eliminate the mistakes of the past, and I am convinced that, had we followed the line adopted then . . . in one year we could have remedied those mistakes without major damage or sacrifice. . . . This was the smaller but better part of the leadership. The other faction . . . was the Imre Nagy group. . . . I am not in a position to deny that I, too, voted for Nagy to become Premier . . . because, despite his many faults, I was convinced that he was an honest man supporting the working class. It became clear only later that he was not as he appeared. . . . My section of the Party leadership was in the dark about what was happening in the country; not so the Nagy faction. They knew what was happening because they were responsible for it . . . and consequently were in a position to exert pressure on the other half of the leadership to cooperate with them in the uncertain situation for awhile. . . . I came to the realization on November 1 that the Nagy road could no longer be followed. . . .

I would like to deal here with one other idea concerning the relationship of the leaders and the masses. I think, first of all, that the leadership can fulfill its task only if it never disregards the standpoint

and will of the masses. . . . To that I must add that in my opinion the task of the leaders is not to put into effect the wishes and will of the masses, and this statement will sound rather strange. In my opinion the leaders' task is to realize and accomplish the interest of the masses. Why do I differentiate between the will and the interests of the masses? In the recent past we have encountered the phenomenon of certain categories of workers acting *against* their interests. What is the task of the leader in such a situation? Is it mechanically to implement incorrect ideas? No, it is not. . . . If the will of the masses does not coincide with progress, then one must lead the masses in another direction. . . .

This brings up the problem of our youth. . . . Young people are always inclined to idealize . . . and sometimes those ideals are embodied in personalities. . . . It is very important that we do not idealize anyone in the eyes of youth and that we do not idealize life's realities. We must not forget that it was more on emotional than intellectual grounds that these young people were followers of the people's democracy and of the idea of Socialism, and they saw contradictions. Socialism . . . is just being born, amid pain, struggle, difficulty. . . . If we told the youth that the present is Socialism, we did not tell the truth. If we spoke in terms of personalities, we were wrong. . . . We must always be very careful before we say, 'the best,' or 'the greatest,' because

we will be called to account when the thing [so described] proves even less than mediocre. . . .

It is the way of human progress that the progressive working class gains for its ideas that part of the youth of the ruling classes which supports the good. The abnormal thing is what we have recently experienced: that children of the working class . . . joined the forces of counter-revolution and accepted the ideas of Fascism. . . . Unfortunately, tolerance and humaneness must be supplanted by severity for the guilty. . . . I may also say that for those who committed no capital crime, the way back to society must be found, but the penalty must be severe. If someone committed a capital offense, he must get what he deserves. . . .

We have been forced to introduce a new measure which is not popular. The authorities have had to increase the prices of certain articles. . . . We must also state that an increase in prices is not a trend in our economic policy. But this time it was necessary to put things in order. . . . And there will be order. . . .

In conclusion I see that there is confidence here in the government . . . and, as far as we are concerned, there could be no greater reward for our work. Our wish is to be able to justify this confidence. . . . When I meet people now, they greet me and they look at me in such a way that I am quite humble, because all this love, gratitude and confidence impose such a responsibility. . . .

"My Beliefs" (Continued from page 16)

The careerists are sycophant bootlickers; they have no principles or opinions of their own and, without any compunction, will say that black is white. In every case they seek the favor of those who are in a position to assure them a better place in Party or State affairs, greater prestige, more income, broader authority and, last but not least, a limousine. They go to any length to gain the leaders' favor; they grovel and bow and scrape before them; they flatter them . . . the leaders tolerate and quite frequently pamper them . . . because they will do anything and carry out any orders for them without the slightest reservation.

* * *

The violent contrast between words and deeds, between principles and their realization, is rocking the foundations of our People's Democracy, our society, and our Party. This contrast, of which the people are becoming ever more conscious, is leading to dissension and loss of faith among the masses, who hope for a better, happier and more peaceful life, for the realization of the truly high ideals of Socialism. The working people are unable to reconcile the rapid progress of Socialism with the deterioration, or at least the stagnation, of their standard of living.

* * *

As in the years before 1953, so too now in consequence of the June 1955 agricultural resolution, the working peasants' normal farming is being made so difficult that there is scarcely any chance for even the simplest of replanting, let alone intensified crop rotation. In days gone by this resulted in the mass exodus of working peasants from the land, and the present policy can likewise lead to no other result.

* * *

A peculiar people's democratic provincialism, an intensified estrangement . . . a Chinese Wall not only between our homeland and the Western capitalist countries but between the Hungarian People's Democracy and other countries in the democratic and Socialist camp as well, is now developing. We have come to the point where Party members, even members of the Central Committee, cannot obtain the press of sister Parties, the statements of Party and State leaders of people's democratic countries, the speeches by Comrades Bierut [former Polish Party leader] or Siroky [Czechoslovak Premier], or the resolutions of sister Parties. The same applies to many aspects in culture, art, and literature, to the debates in Peoples' Democratic countries, to the exchange of ideas, etc. Indeed, we have come to such a point that members of the Central Committee cannot even obtain certain publications of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Thus, for example, the agricultural resolution of the Central Committee of the Polish Party is banned in Hungary, as is the evaluation of this resolution in the official [Polish] Party paper, *Trybuna Ludu*, as is the study written concerning relations between Polish and Western literatures, art, etc.

Forebodings of Disaster

We can emerge from the grave crisis into which the Rakosi regime has swept the country in one of two ways: either we ourselves can eliminate the Stalinist policy before it is too late and lead the country back to the June road, and thereby avert economic and political bankruptcy, or we can fail to change the course of events, in which case the mounting tension may bring the country to a grave crisis.

* * *

We are again coming dangerously close to the situation [with respect to Socialist legality] as it existed in the Spring of 1953. . . . Because of the mistakes of the Party and government leaders we have again reached a point where our State apparatus, local councils, organs of justice, police, and national defense commit many illegalities with regard to the people, especially peasants. . . . The number of people against whom legal proceedings have been started or carried out runs into the tens and tens of thousands, not to mention abuses and other illegalities perpetrated in fields of produce and tax collection, the regrouping of farm plots, and the reorganization of collectives. . . . Ever more frequently signs point to the degeneration of the dictatorship of the proletariat. During the past six months, the hazards of rightist deviation have taken on dangerous proportions—not in the way of right-wing deviation from Marxism but in the form of a shift to the right by the broadest masses of the people, the ever more pronounced turn against the Party and government, and the spread and increase of a reactionary, counterrevolutionary atmosphere. . . . Communists have an immeasurable responsibility to recognize and prevent the impending danger and to indicate the way out of the danger, which can be done only by fully enforcing the principles laid down in the June [1953] resolutions and those of the Third Congress of the Party.

* * *

. . . It is a basic prerequisite that the nation be given a clear picture of its economic problems. This is part of the responsibility which the Party and the State leadership owe to the members of the Party and to the entire working people, who have the right to know the state of actual conditions. This, however, is not so nowadays; an evaluation of the situation currently prevailing, its atmosphere and methods, discloses a specter similar to that which existed in the years 1951-52. As in those days, the leaders of the Party and State are again expounding in speeches, writings and in propaganda and agitation that we are following the proper road and that the Party's policy is reaping one success after another. . . . It is to be feared that, falling under the influence of our own propaganda, we may be on the brink of national disaster before we become aware of possibly catastrophic mistakes.

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